RE: 2 questions

>
>2. The Categories of Aristotle is criticized in D & R in a fashion
>that I don't understand. Is the problem that Substance is a category
>in itself, as different from Being, but that every other of the 9
>also must partake in that's the problem ? And if the mistake is so
>great, why has not philosophy in general been enlightened ? And how
>is Difference In itself supposed to become a Catgegory or something
>similar to it...?
>

Aristotle says that substance is one of the 10 categories of being, but he
also says that being is not a genus, so that the 10 categories do not share a
common identity. He also, however, says that being qua being is substance, as
only substance exists by virtue of itself, while the other categories -- i.e.,
quality, quantity -- exist by virtue of existing in substances. It's this
last idea that leads to the analogical conception of being -- substance is the
primary meaning of being, and other categories have a being that is only
analogous to the being of substance.

That is one aspect of the criticism in D&R, there are also problems Deleuze
notes that the conception of being as substance, insofar as substance refers
to form, confuses the concept of difference with those differences compatible
with the concept (that is, compatible with identity). Here, Aristotle's
differentia are contraries, and contraries are treated as the maximum form of
difference, but as Deleuze notes contrariety is maximum only with respect to
essence.


Nathan

Dr. Nathan Widder
Lecturer in Political Theory
University of Exeter
Exeter EX4 4RJ
United Kingdom
Web page: http://www.ex.ac.uk/shipss/politics/staff/widder/
Genealogies of Difference: http://www.press.uillinois.edu/s02/widder.html
MA in Critical Global Studies: http://www.ex.ac.uk/shipss/school/ma/global.php


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