>Hmm. sorry I can't follow, could you give an example (have't read
>your book print yet.)
I'm not sure I can give you examples, but let me try to re-explain.
1. You are correct that Aristotle makes substance one of the 10 categories of
being, and in this sense, he doesn't say what being is, only the 10 or so ways
it presents itself. But more than this, Aristotle also says that being is not
a highest category or highest genus, which means that the 10 categories are
not subcategories or subsets of being. The reason Aristotle gives, which
Deleuze also notes, is that we say that differentia "are", we predicate being
of differences. This makes being different from a genus like, say, animal,
which is predicated of species like man and bird, but not predicated of the
differences that make men and birds different animals -- in other words, we
say "man is an animal" but not "winged is an animal" or "rational is an
animal". But we do say "winged is" and "rational is". What all this means,
in a nutshell, is that being is predicated of both identity and difference,
and so unlike a genus it does not signify a commonality or identity among
differences, or it does only signify that. So being is not a highest identity
that is divided into 10 sub-groupings. Conversely, the 10 categories need not
share anything in common in order for being to be said of all of them. If
there is a unity among the categories, it must be conceived differently.
2. Aristotle does, however, say that being qua being is substance. The other
categories, then, do not express being as being, but rather being as quantity
or being as quality. The reason substance has this special status is that it
is defined as something existing in-itself. Substance exists only by virtue
of it being substance, whereas other types of beings -- i.e., qualities --
exist only by being qualifications of some substance (there is no 'green' that
exists in itself, green is a quality that exists only because there are
substances that are green). The analogical conceptions of being that Deleuze
criticizes begin with this idea, that being is expressed primarily as
substance, and that the other categories have being only analogously to the
being of substance. As Deleuze says, this is the way to get around the
problem that being is not a common identity over the different categories,
making it possible for the 10 categories to still have a relation to one
another and hence a kind of quasi-unity.
3. Another aspect of Deleuze's criticism of Aristotle's categories, and, by
extension, the analogical conception of being designed to connect them, is
that it never really reaches a concept of difference. The reason is that it
still sees difference as something that divides up or specifies an identity,
the way "rational", for example, works to specify the genus "animal" in order
to define "man" -- man is a rational animal. Difference is therefore only
understood insofar as it is compatible with identity, but this means it is
subordinated to identity. Deleuze instead demands a concept of difference
that is difference in itself, not difference defined in relation to identity
or the concept. One of the ways this is approached, however, is by looking at
how the subordination of difference to identity does not work entirely -- it
doesn't work, for example, when asking how the 10 categories are
differentiated from one another, since they are not subdivisions of a shared
identity.
Hope this makes a bit more sense.
Nathan
>^/JAn, thankful for all topics on D & R
>
Dr. Nathan Widder
Lecturer in Political Theory
University of Exeter
Exeter EX4 4RJ
United Kingdom
Web page: http://www.ex.ac.uk/shipss/politics/staff/widder/
Genealogies of Difference: http://www.press.uillinois.edu/s02/widder.html
MA in Critical Global Studies: http://www.ex.ac.uk/shipss/school/ma/global.php
>your book print yet.)
I'm not sure I can give you examples, but let me try to re-explain.
1. You are correct that Aristotle makes substance one of the 10 categories of
being, and in this sense, he doesn't say what being is, only the 10 or so ways
it presents itself. But more than this, Aristotle also says that being is not
a highest category or highest genus, which means that the 10 categories are
not subcategories or subsets of being. The reason Aristotle gives, which
Deleuze also notes, is that we say that differentia "are", we predicate being
of differences. This makes being different from a genus like, say, animal,
which is predicated of species like man and bird, but not predicated of the
differences that make men and birds different animals -- in other words, we
say "man is an animal" but not "winged is an animal" or "rational is an
animal". But we do say "winged is" and "rational is". What all this means,
in a nutshell, is that being is predicated of both identity and difference,
and so unlike a genus it does not signify a commonality or identity among
differences, or it does only signify that. So being is not a highest identity
that is divided into 10 sub-groupings. Conversely, the 10 categories need not
share anything in common in order for being to be said of all of them. If
there is a unity among the categories, it must be conceived differently.
2. Aristotle does, however, say that being qua being is substance. The other
categories, then, do not express being as being, but rather being as quantity
or being as quality. The reason substance has this special status is that it
is defined as something existing in-itself. Substance exists only by virtue
of it being substance, whereas other types of beings -- i.e., qualities --
exist only by being qualifications of some substance (there is no 'green' that
exists in itself, green is a quality that exists only because there are
substances that are green). The analogical conceptions of being that Deleuze
criticizes begin with this idea, that being is expressed primarily as
substance, and that the other categories have being only analogously to the
being of substance. As Deleuze says, this is the way to get around the
problem that being is not a common identity over the different categories,
making it possible for the 10 categories to still have a relation to one
another and hence a kind of quasi-unity.
3. Another aspect of Deleuze's criticism of Aristotle's categories, and, by
extension, the analogical conception of being designed to connect them, is
that it never really reaches a concept of difference. The reason is that it
still sees difference as something that divides up or specifies an identity,
the way "rational", for example, works to specify the genus "animal" in order
to define "man" -- man is a rational animal. Difference is therefore only
understood insofar as it is compatible with identity, but this means it is
subordinated to identity. Deleuze instead demands a concept of difference
that is difference in itself, not difference defined in relation to identity
or the concept. One of the ways this is approached, however, is by looking at
how the subordination of difference to identity does not work entirely -- it
doesn't work, for example, when asking how the 10 categories are
differentiated from one another, since they are not subdivisions of a shared
identity.
Hope this makes a bit more sense.
Nathan
>^/JAn, thankful for all topics on D & R
>
Dr. Nathan Widder
Lecturer in Political Theory
University of Exeter
Exeter EX4 4RJ
United Kingdom
Web page: http://www.ex.ac.uk/shipss/politics/staff/widder/
Genealogies of Difference: http://www.press.uillinois.edu/s02/widder.html
MA in Critical Global Studies: http://www.ex.ac.uk/shipss/school/ma/global.php