I'd like to thank Erik Davis for his recent post in response to my
suggestions about the differences between _Anti-Oedipus_ and _A Thousand
Plateaus_, particularily with regard to "institutionalization" or the
"radical." I guess I would like to ask more what is meant by
institutionalization (which seems more than mere citation, though that too
is a useful index of how a work or a writer has been taken up).
I realize also that I was vague about what I meant by "radical"ness. I
guess I was vague because I am none too happy about the word myself
(although I am interested in questions of political effectivity), yet it
does seem to enable a certain form of analysis--individuals might affiliate
themselves with Marxism, for example, because they perceive it to be
"radical" yet we might still say that Marxism is not in itself "radical" or
necessarily "oppositional." Yet the fact that it is "arguably" radical has
definite and concrete institutional effects (tending to determine who would
subscribe to such a label and who might wish to stigmatize those labelled).
Thus what I am saying is not intended to be oriented towards a position
which might hope to identify the "radical" (or the
non-institutional, perhaps identified with the radical) and then
proclaim "hurray" for (say) _Anti-Oedipus_ and "boo" to _A Thousand
Plateaus_ (or even "hurray" for D&G and "boo" to Derrida, Rorty,
Kant...). Neither "Theory" nor academic or political work in
general are about constructing some kind of hit parade; nor,
indeed, should we be searching for "resistance," "subversion," the
"radical" or whatever in the way that much cultural studies seems
to be doing in some desperate attempt to alleviate academics' own
sense of powerlessness and *ennui*. This may be "almost amusing"
but it is both too easy to perform this (auto)valorization of
theoretical practice and too glib merely to denounce it.
On the other hand, we all work within or in the shadows of
institutions of various kinds, not merely the academy but the
publishing industry and the various media which diffuse theoretical
knowledge (even in a "bastardized" form, such as the Manchester
_Guardian_, the _New York Times_ or _Vogue_, merely to mention
three arenas where "deconstruction," for example, has become a
buzzword with some cultural capital). What happens to thought when
it goes through the inevitable processes of institutionalization?
Are some thoughts institutionalized differently and to different
effects (to constitute a "sect" of Deleuzians, say, among a
particular group of (relatively) disenfranchised academics)?
Further, it seems to easy to suggest that, in the academy, some
concerns or thinkers are "interdisciplinary." I would ask *which*
disciplines do these thinkers or currents of thought straddle? How
does (say) D&G's reception differ in philosophy, cultural studies,
English, geography... by whom are they taken up in each case? What
alliances (holy or unholy) are opened up or enabled (and perhaps
erased) as these thinkers become "accepted" if only provisionally.
And how does all this affect thought's (or some thought's) possible
political effectivity--however that may be defined, and it clearly
cannot be defined in any essentialist way?
Such are the questions with which I continue to be concerned. In
this regard, it seemed pertinent to suggest that we could now see
what might be termed a "boom" in Deleuzoguattarianism--a boom whose
signs would include, among many others, the relative intensity of
activity on this mailing list. In that case, following Meaghan
Morris, it would be pertinent to observe that:
A boom... overtly defines and directs what can be done at a
given moment. Once it is conceded that booms positively shape
the possible, by stabilizing a temporary horizon in relation
to which one cannot claim a position of definite exteriority,
then it also becomes possible to think more carefully the
politics of one's own participation and complicity. ("Banality
in Cultural Studies" _Discourse_ 10.2 [Summer 88]) 5)
Given all this, I wanted (originally) to suggest that D&G had been
taken up differently according to academic generation. Secondly,
I wished to propose that this might be regarded as in some senses
strange, for the following reasons:
The generational difference proposed was as much a difference in
terms of the academy's hierarchy as it was one of age. Thus, my
favored examples were Jameson and Hassan (though Gene Holland,
whose institutional position is not that of Jameson, might also
represent such a group). As I continue to think about the matter,
I am prepared to accept that Jameson (whom I am reading in parallel
to Deleuze at the moment) remains a privileged example, but so be
it.
I then suggested a two-fold move, each part of which was dependent
on a stereotype of some kind--though I would suggest that these
stereotypes have both resonance and truth-value. First, I
suggested that _Anti-Oedipus_ was arguably more "radical" than _A
Thousand Plateaus_; second, I suggested that a generation more
established in the academy might tend generally to "accept" the
"less radical" while the "young Turks" would go for what could be
perceived as "radical" precisely as a strategy against those who
could (for example) be seen as blocking their paths to promotion,
tenure, a job etc. However, I continued, this did not seem to be
the case, as the "younger" generation seemed more interested in _A
Thousand Plateaus_, and the older in _Anti-Oedipus_.
At the same time, I tried to offer a few counter-rationalizations
as to why the situation might be the way it in fact is.
I am uneasy with this generational model. Its advantages seem to be that it
begins to insribe the historical within the academy in a fairly intuitive
way: those who are currently graduate students and looking for one of the
very few jobs presently "out there" may feel their relationship to those
already tenured as one of pronounced "difference." Or, for example, I am
sure that it was a very different experience to be a graduate student in the
mid-70s (with the flurry of translations of Derrida, Althusser, Gramsci etc.
that announced the arrival of "Theory") than it is now (when "Theory" has
become its own institution with secondary literature and critical
apparatuses etc. courtesy of everyone from Terry Eagleton to Jonathan Culler
to Toril Moi).
Anyhow, I don't want to go on for too much longer. As to how and
why _Anti-Oedipus_ might be interpreted as "more radical" than _A
Thousand Plateaus_, I would first direct attention to Nick Land's
"Making It With Death: Remarks on Thanatos and Desiring-Production"
(_Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology_ 24.1 [January
1993]: 66-76)--though I know that Land would run a mile from the
word "radical." Further, I would ask if you could find anything
like the following in _A Thousand Plateaus_:
Destroy, destroy. The task of schizoanalysis goes by way of
destruction--a whole scouring of the unconscious, a complete
curettage.... It should therefore be said that one can never
go far enough in the direction of deterritorialization: you
haven't seen anything yet--an irreversible process.
(_Anti-Oedipus_ 311; 321)
Compare this to the "warnings" concerning the dangers of "third
line" of absolute deterritorialization in both _Dialogues_ and _A
Thousand Plateaus_. While we're at it, we could merely compare the
first lines of each book--the first almost the archetype of
(modernist?) shock, the second referring (scholastically?) back to
a previous publication.
Finally, on my suggestion of the parochialism and gender-
limitations of Deleuze's "revisionist" philosophical histories.
First, given that Deleuze is indeed now received in some form of
"interdisciplinary" space, for whom it might be strange to suggest
that what he "detested more than anything else was Hegelianism and
the dialectic" ("I Have Nothing To Admit"). Second, I would
further suggest (without crying "identity politics" but without
necessarily repudiating them either) that feminist and post-
colonial critiques of Western philosophy are not so easily
dismissed, and that I would be surprised to learn that I was the
only one worried by Deleuze's oft-quoted metaphor for his
philosophical enterprise--"as a screwing process or... an
immaculate conception. I would imagine myself approaching an
author from behind, and making him a child" ("I Have Nothing To
Admit")--which seems so clearly to be an almost archetypical male
fantasy of reproduction (and the reproduction of a world) without
women.
But all this, I hope, is up for grabs.
Jon
--
Jon Beasley-Murray
Department of English and Comp. Lit.
U. of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
jbmurray@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
------------------
suggestions about the differences between _Anti-Oedipus_ and _A Thousand
Plateaus_, particularily with regard to "institutionalization" or the
"radical." I guess I would like to ask more what is meant by
institutionalization (which seems more than mere citation, though that too
is a useful index of how a work or a writer has been taken up).
I realize also that I was vague about what I meant by "radical"ness. I
guess I was vague because I am none too happy about the word myself
(although I am interested in questions of political effectivity), yet it
does seem to enable a certain form of analysis--individuals might affiliate
themselves with Marxism, for example, because they perceive it to be
"radical" yet we might still say that Marxism is not in itself "radical" or
necessarily "oppositional." Yet the fact that it is "arguably" radical has
definite and concrete institutional effects (tending to determine who would
subscribe to such a label and who might wish to stigmatize those labelled).
Thus what I am saying is not intended to be oriented towards a position
which might hope to identify the "radical" (or the
non-institutional, perhaps identified with the radical) and then
proclaim "hurray" for (say) _Anti-Oedipus_ and "boo" to _A Thousand
Plateaus_ (or even "hurray" for D&G and "boo" to Derrida, Rorty,
Kant...). Neither "Theory" nor academic or political work in
general are about constructing some kind of hit parade; nor,
indeed, should we be searching for "resistance," "subversion," the
"radical" or whatever in the way that much cultural studies seems
to be doing in some desperate attempt to alleviate academics' own
sense of powerlessness and *ennui*. This may be "almost amusing"
but it is both too easy to perform this (auto)valorization of
theoretical practice and too glib merely to denounce it.
On the other hand, we all work within or in the shadows of
institutions of various kinds, not merely the academy but the
publishing industry and the various media which diffuse theoretical
knowledge (even in a "bastardized" form, such as the Manchester
_Guardian_, the _New York Times_ or _Vogue_, merely to mention
three arenas where "deconstruction," for example, has become a
buzzword with some cultural capital). What happens to thought when
it goes through the inevitable processes of institutionalization?
Are some thoughts institutionalized differently and to different
effects (to constitute a "sect" of Deleuzians, say, among a
particular group of (relatively) disenfranchised academics)?
Further, it seems to easy to suggest that, in the academy, some
concerns or thinkers are "interdisciplinary." I would ask *which*
disciplines do these thinkers or currents of thought straddle? How
does (say) D&G's reception differ in philosophy, cultural studies,
English, geography... by whom are they taken up in each case? What
alliances (holy or unholy) are opened up or enabled (and perhaps
erased) as these thinkers become "accepted" if only provisionally.
And how does all this affect thought's (or some thought's) possible
political effectivity--however that may be defined, and it clearly
cannot be defined in any essentialist way?
Such are the questions with which I continue to be concerned. In
this regard, it seemed pertinent to suggest that we could now see
what might be termed a "boom" in Deleuzoguattarianism--a boom whose
signs would include, among many others, the relative intensity of
activity on this mailing list. In that case, following Meaghan
Morris, it would be pertinent to observe that:
A boom... overtly defines and directs what can be done at a
given moment. Once it is conceded that booms positively shape
the possible, by stabilizing a temporary horizon in relation
to which one cannot claim a position of definite exteriority,
then it also becomes possible to think more carefully the
politics of one's own participation and complicity. ("Banality
in Cultural Studies" _Discourse_ 10.2 [Summer 88]) 5)
Given all this, I wanted (originally) to suggest that D&G had been
taken up differently according to academic generation. Secondly,
I wished to propose that this might be regarded as in some senses
strange, for the following reasons:
The generational difference proposed was as much a difference in
terms of the academy's hierarchy as it was one of age. Thus, my
favored examples were Jameson and Hassan (though Gene Holland,
whose institutional position is not that of Jameson, might also
represent such a group). As I continue to think about the matter,
I am prepared to accept that Jameson (whom I am reading in parallel
to Deleuze at the moment) remains a privileged example, but so be
it.
I then suggested a two-fold move, each part of which was dependent
on a stereotype of some kind--though I would suggest that these
stereotypes have both resonance and truth-value. First, I
suggested that _Anti-Oedipus_ was arguably more "radical" than _A
Thousand Plateaus_; second, I suggested that a generation more
established in the academy might tend generally to "accept" the
"less radical" while the "young Turks" would go for what could be
perceived as "radical" precisely as a strategy against those who
could (for example) be seen as blocking their paths to promotion,
tenure, a job etc. However, I continued, this did not seem to be
the case, as the "younger" generation seemed more interested in _A
Thousand Plateaus_, and the older in _Anti-Oedipus_.
At the same time, I tried to offer a few counter-rationalizations
as to why the situation might be the way it in fact is.
I am uneasy with this generational model. Its advantages seem to be that it
begins to insribe the historical within the academy in a fairly intuitive
way: those who are currently graduate students and looking for one of the
very few jobs presently "out there" may feel their relationship to those
already tenured as one of pronounced "difference." Or, for example, I am
sure that it was a very different experience to be a graduate student in the
mid-70s (with the flurry of translations of Derrida, Althusser, Gramsci etc.
that announced the arrival of "Theory") than it is now (when "Theory" has
become its own institution with secondary literature and critical
apparatuses etc. courtesy of everyone from Terry Eagleton to Jonathan Culler
to Toril Moi).
Anyhow, I don't want to go on for too much longer. As to how and
why _Anti-Oedipus_ might be interpreted as "more radical" than _A
Thousand Plateaus_, I would first direct attention to Nick Land's
"Making It With Death: Remarks on Thanatos and Desiring-Production"
(_Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology_ 24.1 [January
1993]: 66-76)--though I know that Land would run a mile from the
word "radical." Further, I would ask if you could find anything
like the following in _A Thousand Plateaus_:
Destroy, destroy. The task of schizoanalysis goes by way of
destruction--a whole scouring of the unconscious, a complete
curettage.... It should therefore be said that one can never
go far enough in the direction of deterritorialization: you
haven't seen anything yet--an irreversible process.
(_Anti-Oedipus_ 311; 321)
Compare this to the "warnings" concerning the dangers of "third
line" of absolute deterritorialization in both _Dialogues_ and _A
Thousand Plateaus_. While we're at it, we could merely compare the
first lines of each book--the first almost the archetype of
(modernist?) shock, the second referring (scholastically?) back to
a previous publication.
Finally, on my suggestion of the parochialism and gender-
limitations of Deleuze's "revisionist" philosophical histories.
First, given that Deleuze is indeed now received in some form of
"interdisciplinary" space, for whom it might be strange to suggest
that what he "detested more than anything else was Hegelianism and
the dialectic" ("I Have Nothing To Admit"). Second, I would
further suggest (without crying "identity politics" but without
necessarily repudiating them either) that feminist and post-
colonial critiques of Western philosophy are not so easily
dismissed, and that I would be surprised to learn that I was the
only one worried by Deleuze's oft-quoted metaphor for his
philosophical enterprise--"as a screwing process or... an
immaculate conception. I would imagine myself approaching an
author from behind, and making him a child" ("I Have Nothing To
Admit")--which seems so clearly to be an almost archetypical male
fantasy of reproduction (and the reproduction of a world) without
women.
But all this, I hope, is up for grabs.
Jon
--
Jon Beasley-Murray
Department of English and Comp. Lit.
U. of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
jbmurray@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
------------------