>From "What is Philosophy?"
[a discussion of "The major differences between the philosophical
enunciation of fragmentary concepts and the scientific enunciation of
partial propositions"]:
"From an intitial point of view, all enunciation is positional. But
enunciation remains external to the [scientific] proposition because the
latter's object is a state of affairs as referent, and the references
that constitute truth values as its conditions...On the other hand,
positional enunciation is strictly immanent to the [philosophical]
concept because the latter's sole object is the inseperability of the
components that constitute its consistency and through which it passes
back and forth. As for the other aspect, creative or signed enunciation,
it is clear that scientific propositions and their correlates are just as
signed or created as philosophical concepts: we speak of Pythagoras's
theorem, Cartesian coordinates, Hamiltonian number and Lagrangian
funciton just as we speak of the Platonic Ideal or Descarte's cogito and
the like. But however much the use of proper names clarifies and confirms
the historical nature of their link to these enunciations, these proper
names are masks for other becomings and serve only as pseudonyms for more
secret singular entities. In the case of propositions, proper names
designate extrinsic partial observers that are scientifically definable
in relation to a particular axis of reference; whereas for concepts,
proper names are intrinsic conceptual personae who haunt a particular
plane of consistency." [23-24]
Here we have a number of notions of proper names and attribution: first,
the relation between signing and creation, as if the name is the mark of
the necessary positionality of the creation. If creation is an extension
of differences and the internal differentiation of becoming, than is not
the proper name part of the consistency of the plane? Does not it compose
this consistency? Another point: proper names are only masks of course,
pseudonyms even if we don't want them to be, but they mask *singularities.*
Signature = singularity. If the I is not owned, nor congealed, than it
moves into creation, always singular and external to ourselves. It does
not disappear, but like the philosopher's names, is immanent to the concept.
But clearly proper names and signatures have different roles in different
fields, and what is the field of the list? Is the "deleuze" (or rather
deleuze@xxxxxxxxxxxxx) the signature here?
But another point--obvious, but in a necessary way. The ethics that
Deleuze points us towards is a kind of experiment. The lingo, the other
proper names that haunt us (is not a ghost the singularity of the unseen
rather than its supercelestial unity?), they are all relations and tools
incorporated into our singularity machines. Does not the proper name
designate then a set of operations which may or may not work? Perhaps the
trick is not to erase the signatures, but to reimagine the signatures not
as a fixed sign of a person (like myself, probably hopelessly oedipalized
and stratified for all their wit and good intentions) but rather as the
consistency of a certain unique and singular field whose power
intensifies the more its peculiar terrain is marked? So "erikd" is a
certain experiment, neither excellent nor wholly failed, whose specific
features can be marked: Buddhism, impatience, magical semiotics, etc...
Think of how many proper names haunt D&G! Soak in that index!
But the list itself selects from these enunciations, this manifold
experiments, constructing its own plane, its own interplateau. It is not
only a matter of writing pseudonomously, but of writing towards a
collective enunciation, like a magazine's name, only faster and with less
imposed coherence.
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[] Erik Davis (oo) Cernunnos sez (cribbing the Fall): The only []
[] erikd@xxxxxxxxx __ thing real is waking and rubbing your eyes. []
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