[excerpts from 'early greek science: thales to
aristotle' by g.e. lloyd, ancient culture and
society series, the norton library, c.1970.]
[note: educational fair-use of copyright, bc]
I: the background and the beginnings
it is often claimed that science began with the
greeks. what does it mean to say this? indeed
what does it mean to talk of science as having
an origin at all? on one view of what science is,
where it is defined, as by Crowther, as 'the
system of behaviour by which [human] acquires
mastery of [their] environment', no human society
is or ever has been without the rudiments of
sciences. more commonly, however, science is
defined more narrowly, not as a system of
behavior, but as a system of knowledge.
Clagett, for example, has described it as
comprising first 'the orderly and systematic
comprehension, description and/or explanation
of natural phenomena', and secondly, 'the tools
necessary for that undertaking', including
especially, logic and mathematics. 1
but did science, so conceived, begin at a
particular point in space and time, at least
so far as the western world goes? most of those
who have written on ancient science have
thought so. aristotle was the first to suggest
that the inquiry into the causes of things
began with Thales of Miletus. Thales and the
other Milesian philosophers, Axaximander and
Anaximemenes, undoubtedly owed a great deal
to earlier ideas and beliefs, both Greek
and non-Greek, but their speculation- so
it is generally argued- makes a definite
break with the past, and this justifies
the claim that both philosophy and science,
as we know them, originated with them. to
assess this line of interpretation we must
examine just how original and distinctive
the Milesian's contribution was. first,
however, we must consider what there is
to be said on the other side. Thale's
world was far from being a primitive one,
and some of the achievements of the Near
Eastern civilizations with which Miletus
was in contact are directly relevant to
our problem.
...
(technology, urban civilization, writing)
the point is often made that however important
technological developments were for the
evolution of civilization, they imply no
science, but only guesswork and luck. but
while they involve no conscious thinking
theorising, they demonstrate a highly
developed ability to observe and to learn
from experience... (p.3)
technology made extraordinary advances in
the fourth and third millennia. but two
other features of ancient Near Eastern
civilizations are more closely related
to early Greek science. the first of these
is medicine, the second mathematics and
astronomy... (p.4)
yet despite the achievements of the Near
Eastern peoples in the fields of medicine,
mathematics and astronomy, it is still
reasonable to argue that Thales was the
first philosopher-scientist. we must now
consider what this claim involves and how
far it is justified...
...there are two important characteristics
that do distinguish the speculations of the
Milesian philosophers from those of earlier
thinkers whether Greek or non-Greek.
first there is what may be described as the
discovery of nature, and second the practice
of rational criticism and debate.
by the 'discovery of nature' i mean the appreciation
of the distinction between the 'natural' and the
'supernatural', that is the recognition that natural
phenomena are not the products of random or arbitrary
influences, but regular and governed by determinable
sequences of cause and effect. many of the ideas
attributed to the Milesians are strongly reminiscent
of earlier myths, but they differ from mythical
accounts in that they omit any reference to super-
natural forces. the first philosophers were far
from being atheists. indeed Thales is reported
to have held that 'all things are full of gods'.
but while the idea of the divine often figures
in their cosmologies, the supernatural plays no
part in their explanations.
a single example will illustrate this: the theory
of earthquakes which is attributed to Thales.
Thales apparently imagined that the earth is
held up by water and that earthquakes are
caused when the earth is rocked by wave-tremors
in the water on which it floats. the idea that
the earth floats on water is one that occurs in
several Babylonian and Egyptian myths, and we
have no need to go beyond Greece itself for a
mythical precursor to Thales' theory, for the
idea that Poseidon, the god of the sea, is
responsible for earthquakes was a common Greek
belief. simple as Thales' theory of earthquakes
is, it is a naturalistic explanation, making no
reference to Poseidon or any other deity. first,
then, to adapt an expression from Farrington,
the Milesians 'leave the gods out': whereas
when an earthquake or a flash of lightning is
described in Homer or Hesiod, it is often,
though not invariably, attributed to the
anger of Zeus or Poseidon, the philosophers
exclude any reference to the wills of divine
personages, their loves, hates, passions
and other quasi-human motives. and secondly,
whereas what Homer describes is usually a
particular earthquake or a particular flash
of lightning, the Milesians focused their
attention not on a particular example of
the phenomenon, but on earthquakes or
lightning-flashes in general. their inquiries
were directed towards classes of natural
phenomena, and they exhibit this feature of
science, that it investigates the universal
and the essential, not the particular and
the accidental. (pp.9-10)
the second distinguishing mark I referred to
is the practice of debate. admittedly we must
proceed carefully here...
nevertheless we have reliable evidence that
many of the early Greek philosophers knew and
criticized one another's ideas...
what bearing has this tradition of criticism
on the development of science? once again
we may compare the Milesians with earlier
thinkers. the themes dealt with in ancient
Near Eastern, or early Greek, mythology
include such questions as how the world
originated, how the sun travels round the
earth, or how the sky is held up, but each
of the myths dealing with any one of these
themes is independent of the others. the
Egyptians, for instance, had various beliefs
about the way the sky is held up. one idea
was that it is supported on posts, another
that it is held up by a god, a third that
it rests on walls, a fourth that it is a
cow or a goddess whose arms and feet touch
the earth. but a story-teller recounting
any one such myth need pay no attention
to other beliefs about the sky, and he
would hardly have been troubled by any
inconsistency between them.nor, one may
assume, did he feel that his own account
was in competition with any other in the
sense that it might be more or less correct,
or have better or worse grounds for its
support, than some other belief. {* note:
wow, sounds just like 'theorists' of today.}
when we turn to the early Greek philosophers,
there is a fundamental difference. many of
them tackle the same problem and investigate
the same natural phenomena, but it is tacitly
assumed that the various that the various
theories and explanations they propose ~are
directly competing with one another. the
urge is towards finding the best explanation,
the most adequate theory, and they are, then,
forced to consider the grounds for their ideas,
the evidence and arguments in their favour,
as well as the weak points in their opponents'
theories. the Presocratic philosophers were,
to be sure, still highly dogmatic: they
offered their theories not as tentative or
provisional accounts but as definitive
solutions to the problems in question.
nevertheless they frequently show their
awareness of the need to examine and assess
theories in the light of the grounds adduced
for them, and this principle is, one may say,
the necessary precondition for progress in
both philosophy and science. (pp 11-12)
but the more one argues for the originality and
importance of the Milesians' contribution, the
more pressing becomes the need to consider why
this development took place at the time and the
place that it did. this is an extremely difficult
and controversial question. at one stage it
would have been fashionable to refer simply to
the genius of the individual philosophers, to
speak of a 'Greek miracle' and to leave it at
that: yet that is no explanation, but rather
what we have to try to explain. on the other
hand too narrow an economic explanation must
also prove unsatisfactory. certainly Miletus
was, until its destruction by the Persians in
494, a rich city:
its wealth was derived partly from its industries
(particularly woolen textile manufacture) and
partly from trade, and it was famous as a founder
of colonies. yet while this may have been a
necessity, it can hardly have been a sufficient,
condition of its producing the first philosophers.
the material prosperity of Miletus was, after all,
no greater than that of many other cities, both
Greek and non-Greek, of this period. it would be
rash to claim to be able to deal with this problem
adequately within the scope of this study, but some
aspects of it may be noted briefly.
first we must restate precisely what has to be
explained. what the Milesian philsophers achieved
was, we may repeat, no fully articulated system
of knowledge. had they done so, that would indeed
have rightly been considered a 'miracle'. their
achievement was rather to have rejected super-
natural explanations of natural phenomena and
to have instituted the practice of rational
criticism and debate in that context. to
understand the background to this development
we must refer not only to economic factors,
but also and more especially to the political
conditions in Greece at the time. it is here
that the contrast between the Greek world and
the great Near Eastern civilizations is most
marked. it is not, however, that Greece was
more peaceful and stable than Lydia, Babylonia
and Egypt. on the contrary, the period was one
of great political upheaval throughout the
Greek world, and like many other Greek cities
Miletus itself suffered from bitter party
strife and was ruled intermittently by tyrants.
yet whereas in the Near Eastern super-powers
a change of rule usually meant no more than a
change of dynasty, major developments took
place in the political and social structure
of the Greek cities. the seventh and sixth
centuries saw the foundation and consolidation
of the institutions of the city-state, the
development of a new political awareness and
indeed a proliferation of constitutional forms,
ranging from tyranny through oligarchy to
democracy.** the citizens of such states as
Athens or Corinth or Miletus not only often
participated in the government of their country;
they engaged in an active debate on the whole
question of the best type of government.**
(** note: this is exactly what The Republic by
Plato documents, during this same time, bc.)
this still does not help us to explain why of
all the emerging Greek city-states it should have
been Miletus that produced the first philosophers,
and indeed in the present state of our knowledge
we must admit that no definite answer to that
question is forthcoming. the main features of
the economic and political situation in Miletus
were repeated, to a greater or lesser degree,
in many other Greek cities. but while we may
be no nearer explaining this phenomenon than
before, we may at least see it now as part of
a larger development. the freedom by which
the Milesian philosophers called in question
earlier ideas and criticized one another's may
be compared with the spirit in which the citizens
of the growing city-states debated the best form
of political constitution.
a particular example may help to bring this out.
though it might seem far-fetched to compare
Thales with his contemporary, the poet and
law-giver Solon, the exercise reveals certain
interesting points of similarity between them.
first it should be noted that Thales' own
activities were not confined to speculative
thought. several of the stories that are told
about him relate to his engaging in business
and political affairs: thus Herodotus (I, 170)
reports that he advised his fellow Ionians to
set up a common council and to federate. both
Thales and Solon were regularly included in the
lists the Greeks drew up of their Seven Wise Men,
and the Seven included a high proportion of
law-givers and statesmen. Solon himself, of
course, was chiefly famous for the far-reaching
constitutional reforms he carried out at Athens
in 594, and we are particularly lucky in having
some of his own poems in which he speaks of the
aims and principles that guided him. these poems
indicate that he accepted personal responsibility
for his proposals, and an essential item in his
reform was to publish the laws and make them
accessible to all Athenians. in their very
different spheres of activity, the philosopher
Thales and the law-giver Solon may be said to
have had at least two things in common. first,
both disclaimed any supernatural authority for
their own ideas, and secondly, both accepted
the principles of free debate and of public
access to information on which a person or
an idea should be judged. the essence of the
Milesians' contribution was to introduce a
new critical spirit into [human's] attitude
to the world of nature, but this should be
seen as a counterpart to, and offshoot of,
the contemporary development of the practice
of free debate and open discussion in the
context of politics and law throughout the
Greek world. (pp 13-15)
(the Theories of the Milesians,
{first things first, em-related})
(The Problem of Change, etc...)
---
[carpal tunneled. will follow-up with
a proposal for why this may relates to
situations today, and what it may mean,
and what might be possible as a result]