On Wed, 1 Nov 1995 14:51:30 -0500 (EST) you wrote:
Hello Anthony,
>In section 18, (involvement, &c.), Heidegger makes a leap in the meaning
>of [for-] when involvement (from hammer through to Dasein) moves from
>[for-which] to [for-the-sake-of-which]. The latter shows up only for
>Dasein, and the nature of the [for-] is different. Could anyone explain
>how this gap is filled and what exactly is the nature of the gap?
Heidegger would have said: "The latter shows up only for the Being of
Dasein"
First: I think, in my view, you misunderstand "Dasein". Dasein is a
title (and structure) to explain, how existence *is*. Dasein is
related to existentiell and existential mode of existence. But there
is no difference between existentiell and existential, because we can
only execute us in existentiell mode and reflect theoretical the
existential mode.
But, to your question. I give you an example: Someone is buying in a
store. I ask him/her why he is buying. They (!) have to answer, that
they are buying because they don't want to be hungry. That is a
"for-which" (Um-zu). They concern their "in-the-world-being". When I
ask further on: why you don't want to be hungry?? They have to answer
(perhaps): "Because of X". The last answer they could give is:
"because of my will" and at least "because for the sake of myself
wanting". The last for-which is no for-which (no concern), it is at
all the presupposition (!) to concern something. We couldn't get
around with "ready-to-hand" when we have no "for-the-sake-of-which" as
a presupposition to understand "our" Being. Heideggers says: "Das
primaere Wozu ist ein Worum-Willen". And the "Worumwillen" has no
relation to "presence-at-hand" or "ready-to-hand", it is only in
relation to our existence. The ground for existence we can not find in
the things, we concern "for-which", the ground *is* existence. And the
"Worumwillen" can only have beings with character of Dasein.
I hope that clear it up a little bit for you.
>All
>equipment points towards Dasein, but does M.H. make it so from an egoism,
>or does he justify this? Where?
Could you explain what you mean with "egoism". I don't understand your
note in this context. What has "egoism" (a moral (!!) category) to do
with "All equipment points towards Dasein"???
- Christian
Christian Lotz
chrlotz@xxxxxxx
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
Hello Anthony,
>In section 18, (involvement, &c.), Heidegger makes a leap in the meaning
>of [for-] when involvement (from hammer through to Dasein) moves from
>[for-which] to [for-the-sake-of-which]. The latter shows up only for
>Dasein, and the nature of the [for-] is different. Could anyone explain
>how this gap is filled and what exactly is the nature of the gap?
Heidegger would have said: "The latter shows up only for the Being of
Dasein"
First: I think, in my view, you misunderstand "Dasein". Dasein is a
title (and structure) to explain, how existence *is*. Dasein is
related to existentiell and existential mode of existence. But there
is no difference between existentiell and existential, because we can
only execute us in existentiell mode and reflect theoretical the
existential mode.
But, to your question. I give you an example: Someone is buying in a
store. I ask him/her why he is buying. They (!) have to answer, that
they are buying because they don't want to be hungry. That is a
"for-which" (Um-zu). They concern their "in-the-world-being". When I
ask further on: why you don't want to be hungry?? They have to answer
(perhaps): "Because of X". The last answer they could give is:
"because of my will" and at least "because for the sake of myself
wanting". The last for-which is no for-which (no concern), it is at
all the presupposition (!) to concern something. We couldn't get
around with "ready-to-hand" when we have no "for-the-sake-of-which" as
a presupposition to understand "our" Being. Heideggers says: "Das
primaere Wozu ist ein Worum-Willen". And the "Worumwillen" has no
relation to "presence-at-hand" or "ready-to-hand", it is only in
relation to our existence. The ground for existence we can not find in
the things, we concern "for-which", the ground *is* existence. And the
"Worumwillen" can only have beings with character of Dasein.
I hope that clear it up a little bit for you.
>All
>equipment points towards Dasein, but does M.H. make it so from an egoism,
>or does he justify this? Where?
Could you explain what you mean with "egoism". I don't understand your
note in this context. What has "egoism" (a moral (!!) category) to do
with "All equipment points towards Dasein"???
- Christian
Christian Lotz
chrlotz@xxxxxxx
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---