Christopher Doss asks:
>Is death, the ultimate nothingness which as it were 'bounds' Dasein,
>'within which' all presencing, considered temporally, occurs, simply
>Being-in-the-world considered in its full temporal articulation?
Heidegger describes the authentic 'experience' of death as an ec-stasis of
Dasein, a passionate confrontation with one's own thrown falling existence
and its they-self. The authentic projection, on my reading, seems to rely
on angst to bring the 'immediate present' itself into consideration, not as
a concept as such but rather as a phenomenological experience of
being-in-the-world. The notion of the present moment, of presence and
self-presence, is central to the question of being as Heidegger asks it,
and I think that *Being and Time* can be read in part as a *Destruktion* of
the 'traditional' ontology of the present-at-hand, a deconstruction which
has in mind a temporal projection of presence as presencing. With notions
such as the authentic projection of being and the temporalizing moment of
presence within which "Ecstatic temporality clears the 'there'
primordially" (BT, p. 402) the question of being might become an
experiential rather than merely a conceptual concern (already outined as
Heidegger's transcendental method in the intro).
I would like to read the authentic projection in terms of Heidegger's later
writings on the will to power and with regards to the 'willful experience'
of resolute anticipation (cf. 'Origin of the work of art'). The possibly
problematic distinction between the temporality of Dasein (Zeitlichkeit)
and the wider question of the temporality of being (Temporalitaet) will be
central to this reading, for the temporal meaning of being was to be based
on the temporal analytic of dasein as disclosed in the authentic projection
of death. Yet what is the difference between Zeitlichkeit and
Temporalitaet?
************************************************
Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it
face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by
concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned
*freedom towards death* - a freedom which has been released from the
illusions of the 'they', and which is factical, certain of itself, and
anxious.
Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 311.
************************************************
Malcolm Riddoch
Murdoch University
Western Australia
Ph: + 61 9 228 0232
Email: riddoch@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>Is death, the ultimate nothingness which as it were 'bounds' Dasein,
>'within which' all presencing, considered temporally, occurs, simply
>Being-in-the-world considered in its full temporal articulation?
Heidegger describes the authentic 'experience' of death as an ec-stasis of
Dasein, a passionate confrontation with one's own thrown falling existence
and its they-self. The authentic projection, on my reading, seems to rely
on angst to bring the 'immediate present' itself into consideration, not as
a concept as such but rather as a phenomenological experience of
being-in-the-world. The notion of the present moment, of presence and
self-presence, is central to the question of being as Heidegger asks it,
and I think that *Being and Time* can be read in part as a *Destruktion* of
the 'traditional' ontology of the present-at-hand, a deconstruction which
has in mind a temporal projection of presence as presencing. With notions
such as the authentic projection of being and the temporalizing moment of
presence within which "Ecstatic temporality clears the 'there'
primordially" (BT, p. 402) the question of being might become an
experiential rather than merely a conceptual concern (already outined as
Heidegger's transcendental method in the intro).
I would like to read the authentic projection in terms of Heidegger's later
writings on the will to power and with regards to the 'willful experience'
of resolute anticipation (cf. 'Origin of the work of art'). The possibly
problematic distinction between the temporality of Dasein (Zeitlichkeit)
and the wider question of the temporality of being (Temporalitaet) will be
central to this reading, for the temporal meaning of being was to be based
on the temporal analytic of dasein as disclosed in the authentic projection
of death. Yet what is the difference between Zeitlichkeit and
Temporalitaet?
************************************************
Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it
face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by
concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned
*freedom towards death* - a freedom which has been released from the
illusions of the 'they', and which is factical, certain of itself, and
anxious.
Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 311.
************************************************
Malcolm Riddoch
Murdoch University
Western Australia
Ph: + 61 9 228 0232
Email: riddoch@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---