Nik,
You said in your recent post that you "interpreted ... that _authentic_
being towards death was 'Being-towards-the-end'. That is, if you
understood the former in an authentic way you would understand it as the
latter."
It seems to me that Heidegger uses these two phrases --"being-toward-
death" and "being-toward-the-end" -- more or less synonymously. Both
refer to a certain way of being directed toward one's own death. This
directedness can be either authentic or inauthentic, depending on
whether we rest content with the public interpretation of death, or
anticipate death by "running ahead" to it. I think it would be possible to
understand death as the "end," but still do so in an inauthentic manner.
Evidently you found my use of the term "intending" rather confusing.
What I was trying to bring out here was the insight that lies behind
Heidegger's use of the phrase "being-toward-death." Non-human animals
experience death also, and presumably they sometimes have a sense of
impending death. But they don't "die," in the rather unusual sense
Heidegger gives the term. That is, they have no "being-toward-death."
The reason becomes clear if we look back to Division One of BT, where
Heidegger introduces the term "being-towards." He presents it as a
characteristic structure of discourse; more specifically, of the
particular type of discourse he calls assertion. He says that:
"Asserting is a way of Being towards [Sein zum] the thing itself that
is" (217f./260). And again: "That which is 'shared' [when an assertion
is communicated] is our _Being towards_ [Sein zum] what has been pointed
out--a Being in which we see it in common" (155/197). For Heidegger, I
think, this "being-toward" is something which arises, necessarily and
exclusively, through the sharing of assertive disourse.
The implication would seem to be that the reason we can be-towards-death
(while non-human animals can't) is that we can take part in discourse
about death. We hear others say things about death, and we repeat those
things ourselves. In doing so, we come to be directed toward death or
to intend death not simply on the basis of our experience of it, but
also on the basis of the discourse we have absorbed about it.
Since we can't escape discourse about death, it is inevitable that we
are somehow engaged in being-towards-death, that we somehow intend
death. But Heidegger's point is that this intending of death need not
be authentic (though it can be). There is more than one way for me to
intend my own death.
-- Phil Miller
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
You said in your recent post that you "interpreted ... that _authentic_
being towards death was 'Being-towards-the-end'. That is, if you
understood the former in an authentic way you would understand it as the
latter."
It seems to me that Heidegger uses these two phrases --"being-toward-
death" and "being-toward-the-end" -- more or less synonymously. Both
refer to a certain way of being directed toward one's own death. This
directedness can be either authentic or inauthentic, depending on
whether we rest content with the public interpretation of death, or
anticipate death by "running ahead" to it. I think it would be possible to
understand death as the "end," but still do so in an inauthentic manner.
Evidently you found my use of the term "intending" rather confusing.
What I was trying to bring out here was the insight that lies behind
Heidegger's use of the phrase "being-toward-death." Non-human animals
experience death also, and presumably they sometimes have a sense of
impending death. But they don't "die," in the rather unusual sense
Heidegger gives the term. That is, they have no "being-toward-death."
The reason becomes clear if we look back to Division One of BT, where
Heidegger introduces the term "being-towards." He presents it as a
characteristic structure of discourse; more specifically, of the
particular type of discourse he calls assertion. He says that:
"Asserting is a way of Being towards [Sein zum] the thing itself that
is" (217f./260). And again: "That which is 'shared' [when an assertion
is communicated] is our _Being towards_ [Sein zum] what has been pointed
out--a Being in which we see it in common" (155/197). For Heidegger, I
think, this "being-toward" is something which arises, necessarily and
exclusively, through the sharing of assertive disourse.
The implication would seem to be that the reason we can be-towards-death
(while non-human animals can't) is that we can take part in discourse
about death. We hear others say things about death, and we repeat those
things ourselves. In doing so, we come to be directed toward death or
to intend death not simply on the basis of our experience of it, but
also on the basis of the discourse we have absorbed about it.
Since we can't escape discourse about death, it is inevitable that we
are somehow engaged in being-towards-death, that we somehow intend
death. But Heidegger's point is that this intending of death need not
be authentic (though it can be). There is more than one way for me to
intend my own death.
-- Phil Miller
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---