RE: null conscience and uncanny anxiousnesses


>>What is the connection between nullity, conscience, anxiety and
>>uncanniness?

>Anxiety (in the face of Being-towards-possblts) would be that state of

Anxiety/*Angst* is the mood in which one comes to (authentic) knowledge
of the one certainty - Death - or nullity.

Bearing in mind that when H. uses 'mood', he is speaking of Verstimmung,
that is, ontological attunement to the possibilities inherent
in Being. He is not speaking of the ontico-everyday sense of mood as
some kind of emotion or feeling. He is counterposing Verstimmung against
knowing (the bare factical acknowledgement). Mood and Knowing are the
equiprimordial functions which together yield Understanding. Through
Understanding, one comes to the possibility of conscience.


>mind or mood which discloses Dasein as uncanny in the world of Das Man,
>of the 'they.' Being-towards-death would be Dasein's way of
>being-towards the possibility of the impending impossibility of death;

Perhaps an accidental mistake here - death is not an impossibility. It
is the one certainty of human existence which we must all come to terms
with. This coming to terms with leads us to anxiety (but only as one
possibility) and other emotional states.

>and the call of conscience attests to this as Dasein's most
>primordial... facticity.


>Da-sein's throwness is revealed as primoridally grounded in nullity.

I'm not sure I can agree with you here, either that thrown-ness is
revealed in being-toward-nothingness, or that it is primordially
grounded in nullity. That Dasein IS is primordially grounded in
being-toward-nothingness.

>The nullity, or not, belonging to Dasein is always already a
>possibility in its constant becoming: "...Dasein is dying factically
>and indeed constantly, as long as it has not come to its demise."
(H section 52.)

We are always equally close to dying.


>
>Now, in English, there are at least two ways to read this. In
>contemplating death, Dasein (he) becomes anxious and realizes that what
>he has lived by and for, the edicts of the 'world' of the
>'they,' are not suited to his project, and that he has been his
>inauthentic they-Self. (Guilty!) The positive aspect of this is that he

Um - there is in your remarks a common mis-translation of H's
'gueltig', which does not necessarily mean guilty. It seems more
fitting to use the word 'responsible' to convey the full sense of
his usage. The Call to Conscience reveals us/bring us away from the
Fallenness (engendered by listening to Das Man) into inauthenticity.
The Call reveals Dasein as fundamentally self-responsible. By that
I mean responsible for self, nothingness, and the entire framework
of Being itself.
(Personally - I think Sartre did a much better job of making this clear
than did H., but that's probably the only thing he did better IMHO.)

>is called TO conscience to evaluate projections (as Authentic or In-
>authentic), and may come to grasp, or fail to grasp, authentic
>Being-towards-Self -- through attestation.
>Contemplation (acknowledging the possibility) of the negation of his
>Being, nullity (Being-toward-Nothingness), leads
>Dasein to hear the call of his conscience. This might be termed the
>midlife-crisis theory

(or even better, the crisis of choosing life, not death; the choice we
may every moment, 'though for the most part without thinking)
Good ol' W.Shakespeare puts this call into the mouth
of Hamlet, methinks.

>
>But this is not quite right, doesn't jive and gel, because Dasein
>experiences nullity, the not, not as an actual or biological event,
>which can never reach him in any case, but in his everyday becoming.
>It is not that he 'anticipates' his death, but that he feels nullity
>constantly.

One must be careful in speaking of Dasein 'experiencing', since H is
speaking of the ontological structure of Being, which comes/stands
prior to the possibility of experiencing (as commonly understood).
The ontological precedes and makes the grounds for any possibilities
which Dasein might encounter. In coming to terms with these possibles,
we may grasp them either as (1) those parts of myself (authentic -
that is responsible ((gultig)) being; or as (2) myself as given over
by the burdensome weight of others (inauthentic being, which refuses
to be responsible for self-ness; attempting to escape the need to
choose oneself for oneself).

>
>So, let us add to the above account of nullity that: Dasein has choosen
>to go to grad school and study philosophy, and this possibility both

Dasein does not choose, since it is the ontological and stands prior
to conscious choosing. The result of Dasein is that one becomes the
possibility of facing choice, either Eigentlich or Uneigentlich. The
problem is figuring out whether the choice for grad school is authentic
(and thus responsible for oneself) or inauthentic (forced onto you
by "they").

>opens up and closes off some other possibilities. He can never return
>to re-make this choice, cannot go back in time, but must proceed from
>where he finds himself in his thrown possibilities. His becoming is
>also a not or dying in this sense. It is this of which he is made
>conscious. He can only chose authentically those possibilities which
>are available to him from where he is.

One may also choose the inauthentic. This is, however, a passive (mere)
acceptance of that which is given rather than an active facing up
to the situation, owning oneself, and choosing oneself for oneself.

And my comments have gone on too long at this point. We'll take this
up at some other point, praps when not so overfull from holiday
fowl murder and emolation thereof.

>Either way, the death/guilt drive is bothering me here. Does anyone
>else think there is something fishy here? Why should
>Being-towards-death and anxiety be that by which meaning is disclosed?
>I find this highly unsatisfying as an account. I much prefer
>ex-tasis and thauma *and creativity* -- present more so in later
>Heidegger -- as disclosing of Being. I am much too tired to continue,
>but I will post back on if there is an interest in hearing these
>objections.
>
>Will respond to all replies not flames.
>
>Cheers,
>
>rita
>

Micheal.

-------------------------------------
Micheal vanPelt,PhD
Chair, Humanities Division
Philander Smith College
Little Rock AR 72202 USA
Off: 501-370-5339; Res: 501-666-7199
E-mail: us005330@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Author of PIRK -The Philosopher's Internet Resource Kit.
Note just a list of lists, but a complete (pretty much) guide to
philosophy resources on the Internet, including instructions on the
WorldWideWeb, WWW sites, FTP, Gopher, the software to use, and how-to's
on all of it.
Now available ftp from raz.mc.duke.edu/pub/PIRK.
11/23/95
Time: 10:09:29

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