>
>
>Proximally and for the most part Dasein is inauthentic, and
>it follows from that that any modification, including authenticity
>is grounded in inauthentic being.
>
>in one's deepest and most constant being, one is inauthentic, fallen,
>authenticity is only possible on this selfsame basis. Nor does it
>change fallenness but takes it over.
Well, now, you've buttressed my question further for this is precisely
where I was lead with the text. Adorno's "Jargon of Authenticity"
critiques existentialism in general and Heidegger in particular for his
inability to provide us with a meaningful account of historicality without
a true subject. And your response to the question-at-hand demonstrates
Adorno's point magnificently. If we can overcome or take over what is
essentially Dasein, namely fallenness, than there is nothing preventing us
>from being able to take over our thrownness. The authentic Dasein, by
escaping his pre-determined possibilities then loses the sense of
historicality, or thrownness, which Heidegger tries so desparately to say
is part of Being-in-the-World. In fact, this "facticity," if you will,
ought to be inescapble because it is an existential of Dasein. And once
one existential can be taken over by authenticity, so can our thrownness be
taken over. And if this happens we may as well go back to Descartes and
Hegel and adopt the subject/object dichotomy....Ethan
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------
Ethan Leib (Yale '97).....ethan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Man is timid and apologetic; he is no longer upright; he dares not say "I
think," "I am," but quotes some saint or sage.
-Emerson, "Self-Reliance"
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
>Proximally and for the most part Dasein is inauthentic, and
>it follows from that that any modification, including authenticity
>is grounded in inauthentic being.
>
>in one's deepest and most constant being, one is inauthentic, fallen,
>authenticity is only possible on this selfsame basis. Nor does it
>change fallenness but takes it over.
Well, now, you've buttressed my question further for this is precisely
where I was lead with the text. Adorno's "Jargon of Authenticity"
critiques existentialism in general and Heidegger in particular for his
inability to provide us with a meaningful account of historicality without
a true subject. And your response to the question-at-hand demonstrates
Adorno's point magnificently. If we can overcome or take over what is
essentially Dasein, namely fallenness, than there is nothing preventing us
>from being able to take over our thrownness. The authentic Dasein, by
escaping his pre-determined possibilities then loses the sense of
historicality, or thrownness, which Heidegger tries so desparately to say
is part of Being-in-the-World. In fact, this "facticity," if you will,
ought to be inescapble because it is an existential of Dasein. And once
one existential can be taken over by authenticity, so can our thrownness be
taken over. And if this happens we may as well go back to Descartes and
Hegel and adopt the subject/object dichotomy....Ethan
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------
Ethan Leib (Yale '97).....ethan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Man is timid and apologetic; he is no longer upright; he dares not say "I
think," "I am," but quotes some saint or sage.
-Emerson, "Self-Reliance"
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---