Rita,
>As briefly as I can, I believe that Heidegger leaves open the
>possibility of this reading where he makes it clear that the call of
>conscience calls Dasein back in calling it forth. Back to what, is my
>question? To natality and creativity. Death is grounded in natality,
>which is as inexplicable, and the force of which is, for me, the driving
>force -- as opposed to death and/or dying. Death already is in virtue of
>natality, and any account of death and dying is incomplete without an
>account of natality. More so, death in unintelligible without natality,
>in virtue of which it is. His emphasis on death covers over this fact.
>
>I have changed my terms, from creativity to natality. Natality is the
>locus of creativity, and creativity is needed for an account of change
>through time. What Heidegger does is bring the subject, Dasein, together
>into one moment, through protention and retention, where Dasein is pure
>and momentary present. That is, present-to-itself, consciousness. But
>then, He cannot escape himself, he is caught up in himself, tripping over
>himself, unable to see beyond the momentary present measured by the march
>of his feet. Temporality depends on natality, and creativity or change
>through time is the very essence of temporality -- beyond the pure and
>momentary presence where the ego is 'coiled in on himself.' (Levinas.)
Where do these concepts of natality, protention, retention and
present-to-itself come from? Are they in regards to temporality? I don't
know them from BT or the handful of other work I've read. Are they from
Levinas? Could you explain their meaning, because now your thoughts are
less comprensible to me - 'you have long known what they refer to, but I
myself find that I have long since forgotten' [cute, huh?].
>Authenticity depends on creativity, on Dasein's being able to move into
>authenticity by chosing itself as its own basis and realilzing that he
>himself must create his ownmost meaning out of nothing, from nothing.
>(Nothing is now natality, the anarchich origin, and not death.)
Can you explain to me your reasoning for boldly stating that Dasein must
CREATE its ownmost meaing? I imagine you equate "meaning" with
"possibility," which seems reasonable. Why do you connect nullity/nothing
with this creativity?
>Heidegger could have gotten at temporality via natality and creativity,
>but does not. WHY? WHY DEATH AND DYING AS A FOCUS, AS MEANINGFUL? What
>does this say about Heidegger, that he was apparently blind to this
>possibility, and what does it say about phenomenology?
In my hubris I think I understand the reasoning for the choice of death as
the phenomenon to analyze. I hope this doesn't sound too facile.
Heidegger has made his project the analysis of existential phenomena of
Dasein's being in the world. Through exposition of e.g. idle talk, das
Man, and anxiety he is giving a presentation of the way Dasein conceives of
its being and the was it IS in the world. But how can such analysis grasp
the whole being of Dasein? As there-being, its being is encapsulated by
birth and death, which are at least prima facie the ontic limits of Dasein.
(I've wondered why he didn't touch the phenomenon of birth, which probably
is as dificult to think as is death.) Several people on this channel have
suggested alternate phenomena, such as love or boredom (which H later
analyses), but it seems clear that neither of these pertain to an
incapsulation of Dasein's being in the way that the examination of its
actual limit (death) does. (Neither could help us get at Dasein's being as
a whole, because neither display the actual limits of Dasein's being. Who
knows what he might have to say on love or hatred.
To talk of the 'meaningfulness' of death is something I'm quite
weary to do, because to my recollection he doesn't write of it as
meaningful, but rather as a possibility which if anticipated leads to an
individualization of Dasein and a displacement of das Man-Selbst, hence
authenticity. Which leads me back to the earlier question, why it is that
you place nothing and natality as the locus for CREATING meaning. I don't
read authenticity as the creation of meaning but rather the acceptance of
the meaningfulness of equipment (which might be what Gelassenheit refers
to).
Sorry about the longwindedness of this stuff.
Thanks, Colin
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>As briefly as I can, I believe that Heidegger leaves open the
>possibility of this reading where he makes it clear that the call of
>conscience calls Dasein back in calling it forth. Back to what, is my
>question? To natality and creativity. Death is grounded in natality,
>which is as inexplicable, and the force of which is, for me, the driving
>force -- as opposed to death and/or dying. Death already is in virtue of
>natality, and any account of death and dying is incomplete without an
>account of natality. More so, death in unintelligible without natality,
>in virtue of which it is. His emphasis on death covers over this fact.
>
>I have changed my terms, from creativity to natality. Natality is the
>locus of creativity, and creativity is needed for an account of change
>through time. What Heidegger does is bring the subject, Dasein, together
>into one moment, through protention and retention, where Dasein is pure
>and momentary present. That is, present-to-itself, consciousness. But
>then, He cannot escape himself, he is caught up in himself, tripping over
>himself, unable to see beyond the momentary present measured by the march
>of his feet. Temporality depends on natality, and creativity or change
>through time is the very essence of temporality -- beyond the pure and
>momentary presence where the ego is 'coiled in on himself.' (Levinas.)
Where do these concepts of natality, protention, retention and
present-to-itself come from? Are they in regards to temporality? I don't
know them from BT or the handful of other work I've read. Are they from
Levinas? Could you explain their meaning, because now your thoughts are
less comprensible to me - 'you have long known what they refer to, but I
myself find that I have long since forgotten' [cute, huh?].
>Authenticity depends on creativity, on Dasein's being able to move into
>authenticity by chosing itself as its own basis and realilzing that he
>himself must create his ownmost meaning out of nothing, from nothing.
>(Nothing is now natality, the anarchich origin, and not death.)
Can you explain to me your reasoning for boldly stating that Dasein must
CREATE its ownmost meaing? I imagine you equate "meaning" with
"possibility," which seems reasonable. Why do you connect nullity/nothing
with this creativity?
>Heidegger could have gotten at temporality via natality and creativity,
>but does not. WHY? WHY DEATH AND DYING AS A FOCUS, AS MEANINGFUL? What
>does this say about Heidegger, that he was apparently blind to this
>possibility, and what does it say about phenomenology?
In my hubris I think I understand the reasoning for the choice of death as
the phenomenon to analyze. I hope this doesn't sound too facile.
Heidegger has made his project the analysis of existential phenomena of
Dasein's being in the world. Through exposition of e.g. idle talk, das
Man, and anxiety he is giving a presentation of the way Dasein conceives of
its being and the was it IS in the world. But how can such analysis grasp
the whole being of Dasein? As there-being, its being is encapsulated by
birth and death, which are at least prima facie the ontic limits of Dasein.
(I've wondered why he didn't touch the phenomenon of birth, which probably
is as dificult to think as is death.) Several people on this channel have
suggested alternate phenomena, such as love or boredom (which H later
analyses), but it seems clear that neither of these pertain to an
incapsulation of Dasein's being in the way that the examination of its
actual limit (death) does. (Neither could help us get at Dasein's being as
a whole, because neither display the actual limits of Dasein's being. Who
knows what he might have to say on love or hatred.
To talk of the 'meaningfulness' of death is something I'm quite
weary to do, because to my recollection he doesn't write of it as
meaningful, but rather as a possibility which if anticipated leads to an
individualization of Dasein and a displacement of das Man-Selbst, hence
authenticity. Which leads me back to the earlier question, why it is that
you place nothing and natality as the locus for CREATING meaning. I don't
read authenticity as the creation of meaning but rather the acceptance of
the meaningfulness of equipment (which might be what Gelassenheit refers
to).
Sorry about the longwindedness of this stuff.
Thanks, Colin
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---