> >If I want to talk about death, my speaking will have been occasioned
> >from the proper pathos, because pathos is the ground of logos.
> >Love gives me no _reason_ to speak of (my own) death.
>
> I think you missed my point but... could you eleborate your last statement?
> I doubt that I agree with you but I must admit, I am not entirely sure how
> you mean this.
I mean it as an explanation of why Heidegger, reading Aristotle, would
not have thought of love as an appropriate ground for deliberating death.
Note that Heidegger invites comparison of _all_ of Section 30 in BT
with Rhetoric 2.5, which also concerns fear. Aristotle says fear is derived
>from the imagination of a potentially destructive evil. He also says that
fear is an occasion for much deliberation, because for there to be fear
there must also be hope. This, along with the statement in Rhetoric 1.3
that all speeches have their end in the hearer, explains why Heidegger
thinks that pathos is the ground for logos (cf. Kisiel's summary of SS 1924,
the course in which Heidegger sought to definitively work out his Aristotle
book and which not coincidentally focused on Rhetoric, book II). Heidegger
reformulates this in BT by saying hearing is constitutive for discourse.
In both SS 1924 and BT, Heidegger points out that fear is a modification
of anxiety; fear becomes the inauthentic ground for addressing the limit
of Dasein, anxiety the authentic ground.
Turning to Rhetoric 2.4, on Philia (by which Aristotle means "friendliness"
in this case, but no other kind of love is discussed), we find that love
means wanting for someone what you think are good things for that someone,
not good things for yourself, and also wanting what is potentially productive
of these good things for the other. So, love fundamentally has something
to do with the potentiality of the other. This _could_ mean sacrificing
yourself and, thus, your death. But it does _not_ mean love is the emotion
properly inspired by deliberating your own death. My favorite television
show has reminded me of Jesus in the garden of Gethsemane. Knowing that
he will die is an occasion for anxiety, but for love, he resolves to stay
and meet death. The emotion inspired by death is usually fear or anxiety.
The emotion associated with the potential well-being of the other is love.
Since pathos gives me reason to speak (logos -- in this case both "reason"
and "speech") about the potential that inspired the pathos, fear gives
me reason to speak of potentially destructive evil, and love gives me reason
to speak of the potential well-being of the other, but not vice versa!
The original question was, why does Heidegger choose death, fear, and anxiety?
Death -- to establish a definition of Dasein as a whole, which means its
having a limit (peras). Emotion in general -- because pathos is the ground
of logos. Fear specifically -- because inauthentically it is the emotion
derived from one's potential for being destroyed. Anxiety -- there is
probably more reason here, borrowed from Kierkegaard, for a deliberation of
ownmost potential through anxiety; but in relation to the question at hand,
because authentically it is the pathos derived from being finite.
Why not love? For Heideggerstotle, love is at best a step removed from any
emotion derived from death. Thus, it gives no _reason_ to speak of death
as an ownmost potential for being a whole, though it could give quite a
lot of reason to speak of an ownmost relation to the potentials of others,
which might coincide with death but is not inspired by it. In this matter,
Heidegger would not have said what Aristotle would not have said. That is
really the main point of all this, not what I would say myself.
Did I miss your point?
--
Christopher Pound (pound@xxxxxxxx)
Dept. of Anthropology, Rice University
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
> >from the proper pathos, because pathos is the ground of logos.
> >Love gives me no _reason_ to speak of (my own) death.
>
> I think you missed my point but... could you eleborate your last statement?
> I doubt that I agree with you but I must admit, I am not entirely sure how
> you mean this.
I mean it as an explanation of why Heidegger, reading Aristotle, would
not have thought of love as an appropriate ground for deliberating death.
Note that Heidegger invites comparison of _all_ of Section 30 in BT
with Rhetoric 2.5, which also concerns fear. Aristotle says fear is derived
>from the imagination of a potentially destructive evil. He also says that
fear is an occasion for much deliberation, because for there to be fear
there must also be hope. This, along with the statement in Rhetoric 1.3
that all speeches have their end in the hearer, explains why Heidegger
thinks that pathos is the ground for logos (cf. Kisiel's summary of SS 1924,
the course in which Heidegger sought to definitively work out his Aristotle
book and which not coincidentally focused on Rhetoric, book II). Heidegger
reformulates this in BT by saying hearing is constitutive for discourse.
In both SS 1924 and BT, Heidegger points out that fear is a modification
of anxiety; fear becomes the inauthentic ground for addressing the limit
of Dasein, anxiety the authentic ground.
Turning to Rhetoric 2.4, on Philia (by which Aristotle means "friendliness"
in this case, but no other kind of love is discussed), we find that love
means wanting for someone what you think are good things for that someone,
not good things for yourself, and also wanting what is potentially productive
of these good things for the other. So, love fundamentally has something
to do with the potentiality of the other. This _could_ mean sacrificing
yourself and, thus, your death. But it does _not_ mean love is the emotion
properly inspired by deliberating your own death. My favorite television
show has reminded me of Jesus in the garden of Gethsemane. Knowing that
he will die is an occasion for anxiety, but for love, he resolves to stay
and meet death. The emotion inspired by death is usually fear or anxiety.
The emotion associated with the potential well-being of the other is love.
Since pathos gives me reason to speak (logos -- in this case both "reason"
and "speech") about the potential that inspired the pathos, fear gives
me reason to speak of potentially destructive evil, and love gives me reason
to speak of the potential well-being of the other, but not vice versa!
The original question was, why does Heidegger choose death, fear, and anxiety?
Death -- to establish a definition of Dasein as a whole, which means its
having a limit (peras). Emotion in general -- because pathos is the ground
of logos. Fear specifically -- because inauthentically it is the emotion
derived from one's potential for being destroyed. Anxiety -- there is
probably more reason here, borrowed from Kierkegaard, for a deliberation of
ownmost potential through anxiety; but in relation to the question at hand,
because authentically it is the pathos derived from being finite.
Why not love? For Heideggerstotle, love is at best a step removed from any
emotion derived from death. Thus, it gives no _reason_ to speak of death
as an ownmost potential for being a whole, though it could give quite a
lot of reason to speak of an ownmost relation to the potentials of others,
which might coincide with death but is not inspired by it. In this matter,
Heidegger would not have said what Aristotle would not have said. That is
really the main point of all this, not what I would say myself.
Did I miss your point?
--
Christopher Pound (pound@xxxxxxxx)
Dept. of Anthropology, Rice University
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---