On Sun, 21 Jan 1996, Charles Thomas Mathewes wrote:
> I'm impressed at the account given. But I have a question: Do you think
> the Continental approach (of presenting radically fundamental critiques
> and offering radically different acc'ts) is a matter of chosen &
> necessary method--i.e., a method which is good in itself--or has it been
> forced on that tradition by its sense that the standard picture (whatever
> that is, just go with me a second here) is deeply & profoundly flawed?
> What I mean is, do you think there could be a sort of "normal science"
> w/in Cont. thought (as much analytic thought is) or must it (of
> definitional necessity) move forward by manifesto, so to speak?
I would love to be able to try an answer to this question, but my reading of
continential philosophy is much too limited. However, I will hazard
the claim that continental philosophy has remained much closer to
the Cartesian project of epistemological foundationalism than the
analytic tradition. This might seem a curious observation when
much of recent continental philosophy, is, how might one put it,
'deconstructionist'. But even the deconstructive position of Derrida
can be seen as a kind of negative foundationalism, as an expression
of the three hundred year pursuit of the Cartesian fantasy of knowledge
as pure presence to consciousness as having collapsed into a the
paradoxes resulting from its impossibility. Or at, least, in my
no doubt naive understanding, Derrida produces the paradoxes by
claiming that we can only attempt to speak of the failure of
presence to consciousness while assuming it in everything we
say and write.
Actually, I would like to see a Derrida-Quine debate. Wheeler,
in LePore, E.(ed.) 'Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives
on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson', (1986) pp. 398-416, argues
in favour of a number of similarities between the Quine/Davidson
position in regard to language and that of Derrida. However, there
is the glaring difference that Quine and Davidson both accept
naturalism while Derrida, as far as I know, is completely opposed.
Here, (and I really am bluffing quite a lot) it seems to me that
Derrida remains within the classical view of philosophy as the
epistemological master-discipline, while Quine accepts that as a
consequence of his own anti-foundationalism philosophy
can no longer claim any epistemological supremacy over the science.
So while Quine and Davidson can use naturalistic language to
replace the eliminated concepts of meanings, propositions and languages,
Derrida finds himself (or so it seems to me) obliged to try to
describe the incoherence of the Cartesian project even while
working within a basically Cartesian language game. The only way
he can do this is by resorting to paradoxes and word-plays
and allusions to mysterious unspeakable not-things such as
arch-writing and differance. But perhaps a Derridean response
would be along the lines of digging up the concealed presuppositions
in the naturalistic philosophers' writings. Given that I don't
know how that would be done I'll stick for the moment with my own
belief that Quine and Davidson have stolen a march on Derrida and
his fellow travellers.
But to return to my earlier observation (which got somewhat
lost in the Derridean digression) that continental philosophy
has been more true to the Cartesian project than analytic
philosophy, what I should have said is that it seems to me
that Russell and Moore willfully ignored many of the questions
and problems which had arisen in idealist philosophy and
that much of the history of analytic philosophy has been a
painful, and at times highly productive, rediscovery of the
discarded issues.
> I ask this b/c I think the material critiques made by many Cont. thinkers
> of many presuppositions which seem(ed) common to analytic phil (of a
> generation ago, T.W's right @ that) are genuine & proper; but I think
> that there are ways that, once philosophers see that, we can incorporate
> those critiques w/in a sort of hybrid project, a synthesis. I think (as
> I've said before) that John McDowell does this, to a degree; but that's
> another issue.
I take your point about McDowell. Rorty, for one, seems definitely
convinced that a hybrid project is viable, but his project
involves dropping most of the classical assumptions of the analytic
tradition and retaining only the naturalism and the clarity.
Putnam also seems to be moving towards a rapprochement, but again
he's dropped most of the assumptions. But then I guess that what
you get when you drop the assumptions and retain the naturalism
is pragmatism. I'll confess to knowing next to nothing about idealism
>from Hegel onwards, but from what little I know of the origins of
pragmatism could it perhaps be said, a little tongue in cheek, that
pragmatism is Hegelian idealism naturalised!?
> The main point here is whether or not the Cont. stance is one chosen b/c
> they think it's always the right way to go, or whether there's a way to
> see that choice as forced upon them some time ago. What do people think?
>From what little I know continental philosophers seem rather keen
on digging up the moments when choices were made (usually in a
somewhat unconscious manner) by their predecessors. What seems
to be characteristic is a relentless preoccupation with
reflection. Contrast that with Russell and Moore's early talk of
propositions. Russell may a little later have made sense data the
immediate objects of thought for epistemological reasons, but it's as if
he had forgotten all epistemology after Hume (OK I'm letting my
prejudices show). It is, of course, this passion for reflection which
leads continental philosophers to undermine the very core beliefs which
would otherwise make up a common and stable philosophical language. I
think the nearest equivalent coming from the analytic tradition is the
latter Wittgenstein.
> Chuck
>
I'll just finish with a plea for better informed folk out there to
come along and tell me that I'm getting all this wildly wrong (which
strikes me as plausibly the case)!
Nick Reeves
nick@xxxxxxxxxxx
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
> I'm impressed at the account given. But I have a question: Do you think
> the Continental approach (of presenting radically fundamental critiques
> and offering radically different acc'ts) is a matter of chosen &
> necessary method--i.e., a method which is good in itself--or has it been
> forced on that tradition by its sense that the standard picture (whatever
> that is, just go with me a second here) is deeply & profoundly flawed?
> What I mean is, do you think there could be a sort of "normal science"
> w/in Cont. thought (as much analytic thought is) or must it (of
> definitional necessity) move forward by manifesto, so to speak?
I would love to be able to try an answer to this question, but my reading of
continential philosophy is much too limited. However, I will hazard
the claim that continental philosophy has remained much closer to
the Cartesian project of epistemological foundationalism than the
analytic tradition. This might seem a curious observation when
much of recent continental philosophy, is, how might one put it,
'deconstructionist'. But even the deconstructive position of Derrida
can be seen as a kind of negative foundationalism, as an expression
of the three hundred year pursuit of the Cartesian fantasy of knowledge
as pure presence to consciousness as having collapsed into a the
paradoxes resulting from its impossibility. Or at, least, in my
no doubt naive understanding, Derrida produces the paradoxes by
claiming that we can only attempt to speak of the failure of
presence to consciousness while assuming it in everything we
say and write.
Actually, I would like to see a Derrida-Quine debate. Wheeler,
in LePore, E.(ed.) 'Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives
on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson', (1986) pp. 398-416, argues
in favour of a number of similarities between the Quine/Davidson
position in regard to language and that of Derrida. However, there
is the glaring difference that Quine and Davidson both accept
naturalism while Derrida, as far as I know, is completely opposed.
Here, (and I really am bluffing quite a lot) it seems to me that
Derrida remains within the classical view of philosophy as the
epistemological master-discipline, while Quine accepts that as a
consequence of his own anti-foundationalism philosophy
can no longer claim any epistemological supremacy over the science.
So while Quine and Davidson can use naturalistic language to
replace the eliminated concepts of meanings, propositions and languages,
Derrida finds himself (or so it seems to me) obliged to try to
describe the incoherence of the Cartesian project even while
working within a basically Cartesian language game. The only way
he can do this is by resorting to paradoxes and word-plays
and allusions to mysterious unspeakable not-things such as
arch-writing and differance. But perhaps a Derridean response
would be along the lines of digging up the concealed presuppositions
in the naturalistic philosophers' writings. Given that I don't
know how that would be done I'll stick for the moment with my own
belief that Quine and Davidson have stolen a march on Derrida and
his fellow travellers.
But to return to my earlier observation (which got somewhat
lost in the Derridean digression) that continental philosophy
has been more true to the Cartesian project than analytic
philosophy, what I should have said is that it seems to me
that Russell and Moore willfully ignored many of the questions
and problems which had arisen in idealist philosophy and
that much of the history of analytic philosophy has been a
painful, and at times highly productive, rediscovery of the
discarded issues.
> I ask this b/c I think the material critiques made by many Cont. thinkers
> of many presuppositions which seem(ed) common to analytic phil (of a
> generation ago, T.W's right @ that) are genuine & proper; but I think
> that there are ways that, once philosophers see that, we can incorporate
> those critiques w/in a sort of hybrid project, a synthesis. I think (as
> I've said before) that John McDowell does this, to a degree; but that's
> another issue.
I take your point about McDowell. Rorty, for one, seems definitely
convinced that a hybrid project is viable, but his project
involves dropping most of the classical assumptions of the analytic
tradition and retaining only the naturalism and the clarity.
Putnam also seems to be moving towards a rapprochement, but again
he's dropped most of the assumptions. But then I guess that what
you get when you drop the assumptions and retain the naturalism
is pragmatism. I'll confess to knowing next to nothing about idealism
>from Hegel onwards, but from what little I know of the origins of
pragmatism could it perhaps be said, a little tongue in cheek, that
pragmatism is Hegelian idealism naturalised!?
> The main point here is whether or not the Cont. stance is one chosen b/c
> they think it's always the right way to go, or whether there's a way to
> see that choice as forced upon them some time ago. What do people think?
>From what little I know continental philosophers seem rather keen
on digging up the moments when choices were made (usually in a
somewhat unconscious manner) by their predecessors. What seems
to be characteristic is a relentless preoccupation with
reflection. Contrast that with Russell and Moore's early talk of
propositions. Russell may a little later have made sense data the
immediate objects of thought for epistemological reasons, but it's as if
he had forgotten all epistemology after Hume (OK I'm letting my
prejudices show). It is, of course, this passion for reflection which
leads continental philosophers to undermine the very core beliefs which
would otherwise make up a common and stable philosophical language. I
think the nearest equivalent coming from the analytic tradition is the
latter Wittgenstein.
> Chuck
>
I'll just finish with a plea for better informed folk out there to
come along and tell me that I'm getting all this wildly wrong (which
strikes me as plausibly the case)!
Nick Reeves
nick@xxxxxxxxxxx
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---