Mr Scheetz:
>I was intending to oppose Dasein's ontology a "reason of the heart", ...to
>the >cool analytic/synthetic theory of pure >cartesian cerebration...could
>you >instance for me how H is cartesian?
For my reading, the analytic of Dasein is at least in part Heidegger's
existential interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology, something like a
transcendental 'demonstration' of the intentionality of ego cogito in an
attempt to collapse the subject/world dualism. In the sense that *B&T* is
dealing with the possibility of ego cogito as world it might be called a
Cartesian critique. Yet 'mood' is also an essential aspect of 'intentional
consciousness' or Dasein and is equiprimordial with understanding. Rather
than an opposition I would read a synthesis of 'heart' and thinking,
although of course H then goes and emphasizes the revelatory importance of
Angst and in that case I guess either reading is possible.
>H claims that the moods, or intentional or affective states... dispose or
>>project Dasein, i.e. consciousness, the transcendantal ego, soul, etc.
>beyond >or beneath the secondary truth of facticity...into an unmediated
>grasping, or >knowing, of being.
I'm not sure if Dasein can be reduced to consciousness, ego etc. unless its
world is brought along with it, and facticity belongs to the world.
Facticity,the multitude of beings given to experience, is an existential
structure of Dasein and so I don't know in what sense it can be thought of
as secondary. As for an unmediated grasping of being, Angst is supposed to
open into the ec-static temporality of the being of Dasein, or at least
give it as an ontological possibility. I suppose this is unmediated by the
understanding or does authentic understanding provide the ground for the
projection of Angst? Yet this doesn't 'grasp' being itself because the
analytic of Dasein only prepared the way for the possibility of grasping
the sense or meaning of being, and *B&T* failed to do this. The kehre then
seems to dispense with this notion of an abstract concept of being, and
with it the grasping gesture of thinking (as in 'What is called thinking').
>And what is uncovered or disclosed is (1) self-awareness
>(2)of one's own existence, (3)the stunning uncanniness of it
Yes, I read the authentic projection as a willfully defamiliarizing
projection of Angst. Is this a problem? I always thought that being was the
closest, the most familiar, and this impassioned Angst seems to be a world
away from Gelassenheit.
>... why, especially post-Freud, isn't H under a like cloud, that would
>have the >effect of bringing on H's "ontological thinking" a Kant-like
>judgement of >subjective circularity?
Subjective circularity seems to be a pre-requisite of H's overtly Kantian
transcendental method outlined in the intro to *B&T*. We can only start
questioning from where we already find ourselves, as situated historical
Dasein. Yet he seeks to 'demonstrate' the a priori structures of his
interpretation of Dasein using phenomenological methods. I guess it's a
form of ethical argument in a sense, and we can either agree or not (as
usual). For me, H's 'reactionary' relation to the they-self seems to be a
rather subjective or existentiell committment on his part. Beyond *B&T*
(the culmination of his 'immature' work) Heidegger drops the Kantian
terminology for a poetics of thinking.
************************************************
Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it
face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by
concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned
*freedom towards death* - a freedom which has been released from the
illusions of the 'they', and which is factical, certain of itself, and
anxious.
Heidegger, Being and Time, p.
311.
************************************************
Malcolm Riddoch
Murdoch University
Western Australia
Ph: + 61 9 228 0232
Email: riddoch@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>I was intending to oppose Dasein's ontology a "reason of the heart", ...to
>the >cool analytic/synthetic theory of pure >cartesian cerebration...could
>you >instance for me how H is cartesian?
For my reading, the analytic of Dasein is at least in part Heidegger's
existential interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology, something like a
transcendental 'demonstration' of the intentionality of ego cogito in an
attempt to collapse the subject/world dualism. In the sense that *B&T* is
dealing with the possibility of ego cogito as world it might be called a
Cartesian critique. Yet 'mood' is also an essential aspect of 'intentional
consciousness' or Dasein and is equiprimordial with understanding. Rather
than an opposition I would read a synthesis of 'heart' and thinking,
although of course H then goes and emphasizes the revelatory importance of
Angst and in that case I guess either reading is possible.
>H claims that the moods, or intentional or affective states... dispose or
>>project Dasein, i.e. consciousness, the transcendantal ego, soul, etc.
>beyond >or beneath the secondary truth of facticity...into an unmediated
>grasping, or >knowing, of being.
I'm not sure if Dasein can be reduced to consciousness, ego etc. unless its
world is brought along with it, and facticity belongs to the world.
Facticity,the multitude of beings given to experience, is an existential
structure of Dasein and so I don't know in what sense it can be thought of
as secondary. As for an unmediated grasping of being, Angst is supposed to
open into the ec-static temporality of the being of Dasein, or at least
give it as an ontological possibility. I suppose this is unmediated by the
understanding or does authentic understanding provide the ground for the
projection of Angst? Yet this doesn't 'grasp' being itself because the
analytic of Dasein only prepared the way for the possibility of grasping
the sense or meaning of being, and *B&T* failed to do this. The kehre then
seems to dispense with this notion of an abstract concept of being, and
with it the grasping gesture of thinking (as in 'What is called thinking').
>And what is uncovered or disclosed is (1) self-awareness
>(2)of one's own existence, (3)the stunning uncanniness of it
Yes, I read the authentic projection as a willfully defamiliarizing
projection of Angst. Is this a problem? I always thought that being was the
closest, the most familiar, and this impassioned Angst seems to be a world
away from Gelassenheit.
>... why, especially post-Freud, isn't H under a like cloud, that would
>have the >effect of bringing on H's "ontological thinking" a Kant-like
>judgement of >subjective circularity?
Subjective circularity seems to be a pre-requisite of H's overtly Kantian
transcendental method outlined in the intro to *B&T*. We can only start
questioning from where we already find ourselves, as situated historical
Dasein. Yet he seeks to 'demonstrate' the a priori structures of his
interpretation of Dasein using phenomenological methods. I guess it's a
form of ethical argument in a sense, and we can either agree or not (as
usual). For me, H's 'reactionary' relation to the they-self seems to be a
rather subjective or existentiell committment on his part. Beyond *B&T*
(the culmination of his 'immature' work) Heidegger drops the Kantian
terminology for a poetics of thinking.
************************************************
Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it
face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by
concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned
*freedom towards death* - a freedom which has been released from the
illusions of the 'they', and which is factical, certain of itself, and
anxious.
Heidegger, Being and Time, p.
311.
************************************************
Malcolm Riddoch
Murdoch University
Western Australia
Ph: + 61 9 228 0232
Email: riddoch@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---