Re: Death and falling


Chris, I would argue against the notion that

>the distinction must
>be objective, in a certain sense, in the same way that we can tell when
>someone is mad although they believe they are sane,

Isn't it precisely the indeterminate difference between the authenticity of
being and an inauthentic absorption in beings, or ontological difference,
that opens the existential analytic? As for madness and sanity, apart from
the judicial and psychiatric discourses functioning in the mental health
sector, I would say that the two terms are entirely subjective.

Rather than an ethics of possible relations to the grounds (or nullity) of
'mineness', I am interested in the possibility that the authentic
projection is posiited as a reaction against falling. And if so, could such
a reactionary relation claim to be an a priori or 'objective' truth, or
must it remain H's own subjective relation to being (perhaps following the
detours of a Nietzschean aversion for the bourgeois herd)?



************************************************

Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it
face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by
concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned
*freedom towards death* - a freedom which has been released from the
illusions of the 'they', and which is factical, certain of itself, and
anxious.

Heidegger, Being and Time, p.
311.

************************************************


Malcolm Riddoch
Murdoch University
Western Australia
Ph: + 61 9 228 0232
Email: riddoch@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx




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