Yes, the eternal recurrence is said in many ways:
Have you ever said Yes to a single joy? O my friends, then you said Yes to
all woe. All things are entangled, ensnared, enamoured; if ever you wanted
one thing twice, if ever you said, "You please me, happiness! Abide,
moment!" then you wanted all back. All anew, all eternity, all entangled,
ensnared, enamoured - oh, then you loved the world. Eternal ones, love it
eternally and evermore; and to woe too, you say: go, but return! For all
joy wants - eternity (Zarathustra, p. 435).
However I'm still not sure amor fati is a joyful acceptance of one's place
but rather a willful reactionary negation of the late 19th century
bourgeois herd morality in which Nietzsche found himself immersed. Although
perhaps this is an overly pessimistic 'Heideggerean' reading; Nietzsche as
the ultimate priest of resentiment; it is the one that I am attempting to
read in the relation between authenticity and falling (although of course
Kirkegaard also influenced Heidegger here). There does seem to be an
ambiguity in this willful relation in *B&T* that is perhaps not resolved
until H's fascist involvement and the lectures on Nietzsche from 1936 on.
So I would more or less agree that:
>Heidegger never fully worked out this problematic, which creates the
>confusion in his works between grasping new possibilities of being and
>grasping those possibilities into which one is already thrown, both of
>which Heidegger seems to think result from authentic revelation.
As far as this ambiguity goes, I am interested in the willful projection of
authenticity as in some sense a negation of an a priori existential
structure of being in the world, which seems to me to be an oxymoron. Yet
how does one fall authentically? If falling is defined specifically as an
absorption in the they (or herd), this just doesn't seem possible. And then
in another sense there is only the they self, of which authenticity is an
existentiell modification etc. Authenticity prescribes a relation to being,
in the sense of the Da of Dasein, and even at this early stage of H's path
of thinking *die Lichtung* seems to be intimately caught up in the problem
of will.
************************************************
The willing here referred to, which neither merely applies knowledge nor
divides beforehand, is thought in terms of the basic experience of thinking
in Being and Time. Knowing that remains a willing, and willing that remains
a knowing, is the existent human being's ecstatic entry into the
unconcealment of Being. The resoluteness intended in Being and Time is not
the deliberate action of a subject but the opening up of human being, out
of its captivity in beings, to the openness of Being (Heidegger, 'Origin of
the Work of Art', c. 1935).
************************************************
Malcolm Riddoch
Murdoch University
Western Australia
Email: riddoch@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
Have you ever said Yes to a single joy? O my friends, then you said Yes to
all woe. All things are entangled, ensnared, enamoured; if ever you wanted
one thing twice, if ever you said, "You please me, happiness! Abide,
moment!" then you wanted all back. All anew, all eternity, all entangled,
ensnared, enamoured - oh, then you loved the world. Eternal ones, love it
eternally and evermore; and to woe too, you say: go, but return! For all
joy wants - eternity (Zarathustra, p. 435).
However I'm still not sure amor fati is a joyful acceptance of one's place
but rather a willful reactionary negation of the late 19th century
bourgeois herd morality in which Nietzsche found himself immersed. Although
perhaps this is an overly pessimistic 'Heideggerean' reading; Nietzsche as
the ultimate priest of resentiment; it is the one that I am attempting to
read in the relation between authenticity and falling (although of course
Kirkegaard also influenced Heidegger here). There does seem to be an
ambiguity in this willful relation in *B&T* that is perhaps not resolved
until H's fascist involvement and the lectures on Nietzsche from 1936 on.
So I would more or less agree that:
>Heidegger never fully worked out this problematic, which creates the
>confusion in his works between grasping new possibilities of being and
>grasping those possibilities into which one is already thrown, both of
>which Heidegger seems to think result from authentic revelation.
As far as this ambiguity goes, I am interested in the willful projection of
authenticity as in some sense a negation of an a priori existential
structure of being in the world, which seems to me to be an oxymoron. Yet
how does one fall authentically? If falling is defined specifically as an
absorption in the they (or herd), this just doesn't seem possible. And then
in another sense there is only the they self, of which authenticity is an
existentiell modification etc. Authenticity prescribes a relation to being,
in the sense of the Da of Dasein, and even at this early stage of H's path
of thinking *die Lichtung* seems to be intimately caught up in the problem
of will.
************************************************
The willing here referred to, which neither merely applies knowledge nor
divides beforehand, is thought in terms of the basic experience of thinking
in Being and Time. Knowing that remains a willing, and willing that remains
a knowing, is the existent human being's ecstatic entry into the
unconcealment of Being. The resoluteness intended in Being and Time is not
the deliberate action of a subject but the opening up of human being, out
of its captivity in beings, to the openness of Being (Heidegger, 'Origin of
the Work of Art', c. 1935).
************************************************
Malcolm Riddoch
Murdoch University
Western Australia
Email: riddoch@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---