On Mon, 12 Feb 1996, chris rickey wrote:
> >To say that the changing cannot be understood through the unchanging is to
> >pass over the momentous shift that took place at the birth of modern
> >physics, which was precisely to translate movement into mathematical
> >(arithmatical) figures; in other words to translate change into the
> >unchanging, because mathematical laws never change. It was possible to
> >give mathematically precise descriptions of movement, which could thus be
> >described as natural laws.
> >
> >I am not saying Heidegger was unaware of this; far from it, he always
> >insisted on the fundamentally mathematical nature of modern science. It
> >does put a finger on the point that most bothered Heidegger, and also gives
> >credence to his objections to modern science. Not only does modern science
> >necessarily limit its description of the thing to what it can comprehend
> >mathematically (because only that can be certain), but it is WRONG.
First, real scientists like the language of math in large part because it is
one of the few languages that allows _precise description and
prediction_, not _certainty_. I can say "There is a linear relationship
between birth weight and drinking habits", and you'll kind of know what
I mean. But if I say "The relationship between birth weight (y) and
drinking (x, say in oz. alcohol/day) is:
y = 1.3 + 4.0x,
I have given a _precise description_ of the relationship as well as a tool
for _exact predictions_, neither of which you would be afforded with the
handwaving natural language description. Similar for F=ma or
Shrodinger's equation: you get _precise, testable_ predictions. Of
course, if they are wrong, the equations need to be changed. So we have
a picture of an adapting mathematical architecture, adapting to
constraints provided by experiment.
Modern
> >science commits what for Aristotle is the fundamental scientific error of
> >metabolis, or understanding something through categories not meant for it.
> >It is a category mistake to understand change mathematically. That it can
> >be done is beside the point; to do it is bad science. The problem with
> >modern science is not that it is insufficiently grounded, but rather that
> >it is incorrectly grounded.
This somehow is supposed to follow from the fact that mathematical
regularities are unchanging? I just can't see this. What is wrong with
the representation of change by derivitives in calculus and its cognates?
What about evolutionary biology and its description of changes in gene
frequencies over time?
Does anyone out there have ANY specific ideas about how specific sciences
(esp. physics and biology where I have some knowledge) would be changed
with this reworking of our fundamental ontology?
I don't see how H's ideas about this get any credence. I would need to
see an unpacking of the notion that describing change in terms of
unchanging equations is misguided. Your argument seems to hinge on this
leap, which seems confused.
Regards,
Eric
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