>I do not have an answer to your question about the 1938-9 seminar on
>Nietzsche's Untimely Meditations, but I can say that he lectured on
>Nietzsche right up until the ban on his teaching was imposed in 1946.
>When in 1961 he published the two Nietzsche volumes they cover the
>following:
According to the Klostermann plan of the Gesamtausgabe, Heidegger lectured
on the Untimely Meditations in the Winter Semester 1938/9. This will be
published some day as volume 46, if all goes as planned.
>Does Heidegger ever break with Nietzsche in the way you suggest? I do not
>think so. I was last night re-reading parts of Zur Seinsfrage, an essay
>published originally in honour of Ernst Juenger in 1955, republished in
>1956 and first published in English in a bilingual edition in 1958 ("The
>Question of Being" New York, Twayne) where I would say that the question
>of what he calls "die Bewegung der Nihilismus" (movement of Nihilism)
>which still holds sway is still pitted against the possibility of another
>beginning. This movement of Nihilism has shifted from being a German to
>becoming a Global phenomenon, but his understanding of it remains firmly
>within the field he worked out in the course of his lectures on Nietzsche
>- indeed the whole of the understanding of En-framing, das Ge-stell can
>only be read this way.
I think what Iain was getting at was the break regarding Nietzsche within
the Nietzsche lectures themselves. Both Arendt and P=F6ggeler date the
"turn" in Heidegger's thinking to around 1937/8; the first lecture, "The
Will to Power as Art" would predate this. However it may be dated, by the
last lecture, the 1940 lecture on European Nihilism, Heidegger had
definitely placed Nietzsche as the last figure in the metaphysical
tradition which culminates in the dominance of technology. Iain is
adopting the view, given by P=F6ggeler among others, that Heidegger's
Nietzschean enthusiasm led him to fall in with the Nazis (early 1930's),
but he managed to disentangle himself later; the Nietzsche lectures chart,
so to speak, Heidegger's distantiation from his earlier Nietzscheanism.
As P=F6ggeler aptly puts it:
"For example, in the rector's address of 1933 which contained the first
decisive public reference to Nietzsche, Heidegger demands nothing more
decisive than the 'willing,' which intrinsically allows the essential, that
which matters, to come 'to power.' Yet in the first Nietzsche lecture he
belives that one can interpret the 'creation' of the 'superman' as
'preparing for the readiness for the gods, the yes to being.'(NI, 254)
However, Heidegger's examination of Nietzsche finally comes to the
experience that precisely the will and its wanting to create, as it becomes
dominant in modern times, hinder an experience of the truth of being and
thereby obstruct being open for what is essential, indeed the
divine."(Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking, p.86)
In essence, what changes is the attitude Heidegger adopts towards
Nietzsche: in the early 1930's Nietzsche was one who pointed to way to a
new metaphysics "preparing for the readiness for the gods," whereas after
1940 he was the most radical example of Ge-stell.
Where I disagree with Iain (and P=F6ggeler) is that I believe only the
attitude towards Nietzsche changed, not the direction in which Heidegger
wanted thinking to change.
_______________________________________________________________________
We will stand nowhere, where the flamethrower has not completed through
annihilation the great cleansing. - Ernst Juenger
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