>If onne's own death is inaccessible phenomenologically,
>can it ontologically matter at all?
>
>Chris
One's own death, as the possibility of the impossibility of Dasein (or
situated intentional experience), as something that can never be
actualized, calls into question the play of possibility itself (oneself?).
As an anticipation of the possible, death was to provide the 'ontological
possibility' for the methodological access to 'temporalizing temporality'
given in resolute anticipation (Being and Time, Div II, chpt 1-3).
Ontologically, death grounds the authentic projection of the being of
Dasein, in terms of existential phenomenology as method.
Malcolm
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>can it ontologically matter at all?
>
>Chris
One's own death, as the possibility of the impossibility of Dasein (or
situated intentional experience), as something that can never be
actualized, calls into question the play of possibility itself (oneself?).
As an anticipation of the possible, death was to provide the 'ontological
possibility' for the methodological access to 'temporalizing temporality'
given in resolute anticipation (Being and Time, Div II, chpt 1-3).
Ontologically, death grounds the authentic projection of the being of
Dasein, in terms of existential phenomenology as method.
Malcolm
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---