heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx In a message dated 31/10/2004 11:49:40
GMT Standard Time, rossin@xxxxxx writes:
Dr Antonio Rossin writes:
Hi,
I insert some comments of mine in the intriguing text below.
At 7:00 -0400 25-10-2004, gevans613@xxxxxxx wrote:
> In a message dated 25/10/2004 05:53:08 GMT Standard Time,
> mjohnson@xxxxxxxxxx writes:
>
> On Oct 24, 2004, at 1:16 PM, GEVANS613@xxxxxxx wrote:
> > If an observer describes an object existing in the way
> > it exists as something existing in the way it exists, then
> > it is a truthful description.
> >
Antonio.
why, "truthful"? This quality implies two at least functions more:
- a second observer who observes the description;
- the consent of the second observer to the issued description
Hence, as far as the "truthful" quality depends on the observing
subject, not on the observed object, we could assume that the
truth is always subjective...
Jud: [Capitals for emphasis only as usual.]
This paragraph taken from my posting of Oct 24 is out of context and gives
the wrong impression of my position
for it is the *theoretical position* which is absolutely impossible in
reality. The paragraph that followed it makes my real position clear.
It is the way that first I set out my table as to the idealistic, hypothetic
view of
the IDEAL human sensorial perception of an object, positing the observation
that IF IT WERE POSSIBLE to produce an accurate
perception, understanding and description of a being [entity], then a
description of the way it actually exists would be the only true one.
Then I provide the actual facts of the matter, which is that any human
assessment of the way an object [being] exists is restricted
as being *FOR THE OBSERVER.* I mentioned *FOR THE OBSERVER* TWICE [read
the text again] in the appropriate paragraph because I was at pains to make
my position crystal clear.
> Johnson:
> Can some descriptions be MORE truthful than others?
> Can they encompass seemingly contradictory descriptions?
> When one description is understood as truth, what of the
> manifold possibilities that remain concealed?
>
Antonio.
Since the "truthful" quality of a description depends on the
observing subject's consent, the much many the subjects are
who give it consent, the more "true" the description is.
Jud:
The only *truth* {I prefer the word *actuality* is that object which is
actual or that entity which is true.
Truthful, real, actual, de facto, genuine, literal *truth* is entitic and
relates to the actual way
an object exists, and NOT TO the various opinions of human observers as to
the way it exists.
If a group of human observers observer and orange, and seven declare it to
be the colour orange,
whilst three declare it to be yellow, that does not make the entitic
actuality of the object any more actual,
but confirms that with the majority of human light-receptors of the human
eyeball interpretation of the incoming photonic waves from the surface of the
orange is different because a minority of human receptors the which arrive at
the human eyeball light-sensitive cells and triggering nerve impulses via the
optic nerve to the brain.
The retina is a complex tissue at the back of the eyeball containing
light-sensitive cells and triggering nerve impulses via the optic nerve to the brain
where the visual image is formed. No one human's sensory equipment is
exactly the same as any other on the planet. Therefore single human being sees an
object exactly the way another sees it. The light-sensitive cells are of two
types, rods and cones. The rods for dark and white intensities and the cones
for coloured light intensities. Rods predominate and are most sensitive to
reduced light intensities. Cones are more prominent during the day as for
colour perception. The sensitivity of the rods is about 10.000 times as the
cones. Therefore the differing results go to tell us more about the structure of
the human
.
Antonio.
As for the manifold possibilities that remain concealed, i.e.
the subjects who for some reason of their own don't apply
their consents to the issued description, they fall down in
the domain of statistics, or else of democracy, to form the
statistic - democratic minority.
Jud:
The crudity of the majority of seven designating *orange* as the colour as
opposed to the similar
crudity of the minority of three who say it is yellow, might make
*interesting* statistical reading,
but any worthwhile statistics would need to separate this into the different
gradations of *orange* and *yellow*
as perceived differently by every single human being on the planet. All this
would have no effect at all upon the
actual way that the orange existed for its *true* actuality* is NOT
ACCESSIBLE* to human kind
> Johnson:
> Can some descriptions be MORE truthful than others?
>
> Jud:
> An object exists in the way that it exists, all descriptions
> of the way it exists which differ from the way it exists
> are untruthful. Descriptions of entities cannot be MORE
> truthful or LESS truthful than the description which
> truthfully describes the way an entity exists. Descriptions
> of entities which correctly or incorrectly describe some
> features of the way an entity exists, but not others, are
> NOT truthful in relation to the way that the entity exists.
>
Antonio.
This "truth" sounds pretty tautology.
Jud:
Entitic truth IS A TAUTOLOGY. (logic) A statement that is necessarily true
always is.
If entitic truth was NOT tautologous, no objects would exist in the cosmos
[and neither would the cosmos].
> Johnson:
> Can they encompass seemingly contradictory descriptions?
>
> Jud:
> Entitic truth is an absolute. An object either exists in the
> way it exists - or it doesn't exist. There is no eisegesis or
> anagoges of truth.
> An entity either exists in the way it exists - or it cannot be
> referred to as an entity [see Parmenides] - but only as a
> human speculation signifying nothing. [see TS Eliot -
> Burnt Norton]
Antonio.
Any "entity that exists in the way it exists" cannot be
referred to any else way but by a subject who sees it.
Jud:
I am not concerned at this moment with what human beings refer to an object
as,
or even if there are no human beings in the universe to see and comment upon
an object.
I am concerned with the way any entity in the cosmos exists - and the way it
exists
is the way it exists.
HUMAN INTERPRETATIONS of the way an object exists, and opinions as to the
various ways
that humans observe and attempt to describe the different opinions they
have, is a matter for, physics,
for audiologists, optometrists, nerve-specialists, [neuroscientists like
yourself] and for scientists of quantum physics, etc.
For what needs to be investigated is not the way an objects exists
entitically [for that is an unchanging absolute]
but the differing ways that humans transact their perceptions and why they
are all different.
Antonio.
Or who thinks of it. Thus it becomes an observation, i.e.
an human speculation signifying something that can be
adjudged "truthful" according to the consent of the
(majority of) observers themselves who observe the
observation.
Jud:
It is true that there is a general concessus that oranges are usually orange
in colour, but again
this addresses the way in which HUMANS exist rather than the way oranges
exist.
It is possible to make a generalised statement along the lines of:
"Members of the fruit family *orange* have a skin with a light-reflective
surface which emits light
waves which are interpreted by the human brain as corresponding to what
humans have designated to be a colour
which is usually described with the word *orange.* "
But this has no bearing on the way the orange actually exists in the way it
exists - it only has a bearing
on the subjectivity of the human observers. Whilst it may appear to
6-billion humans that way - it might appear to 1000-billion insects in an entirely
different way - so the way objects appear and descriptions of those perceptions
are ALWAYS subjective and NEVER entitically true.
>
> Johnson:
> When one description is understood as truth, what of
> the manifold possibilities that remain concealed?
>
>
> Jud:
> There are no *manifold possibilities that remain
> concealed,* for inanimate objects lack conscious design
> or purpose, to either *remain concealed* or to *terminate
> their concealment and show themselves,* and they are
> incapable intent, and are not in the business of concealment.
Antonio.
"concealed", to whom? To the observer, eventually.
Thus, the "concealed" concept is a function of the
observer subject -- not of just the object which can be
observed or not
Jud:
This is my point - insensate object NEVER conceal themselves,
(Jud)
> If an object is not observed by a human being - it is
> the human's being's *fault* for either:
>
> (a) Not being in the spatial position which would enable
> him to observe the object.
> (b) Not realising that an object is located in a certain place.
> (c) Not recognising an object as an object.
Antonio.
Or else,
(d) the wanted object did not exist at all. I mean, the
above (a), (b) and (c) "faults" imply the existence of one
more human being-subject -- better if more than one --
who observed, or observes, or will observe that object.
Jud:
Objects do not exist in a state of being wanted of not.
The child's doll does not exist as a wanted doll.
The child exists in a state of wanting it.
In the case of (a) (b) and (c) objects do not NEED humans at all.
Objects exist in the way that they exist whether there are human beings or
no human beings.
(Jud)
> If an object is hidden, the hiding is done by a human hider
> and not by the hidden object. If an object is revealed - the
> revealing is done by a human revealer, and any *revelation*
> that takes place occurs in the brain of the human to whom
> the object has been revealed. The moon does not *hide*
> the stars which it obscures from human view, the human is
> simply in the wrong place to see them.
>
> If Weapons of Mass destruction WERE hidden in Iraq, it
> would not be the *fault* of the WOMD that they were
> concealed from human view - it would be the *fault* of
> Saddam's men who hid them, and/or Bushes men who
> couldn't find them.
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Jud
>
Antonio.
May we conclude -- q.e.d. -- that the truth is always
subjective?
Jud:
Only partly - HUMAN TRUTH is always subjective - ENTITIC TRUTH [ACTUALITY]
never is.
Antonio:
Because depending on the observer subject
(a human being, usually) and not on the truthfulness of
the (observed) object? And that "truthfulness" of any
observation is an attribute it is given by the observer of
the observation itself, and not of the object observed ?
Jud:
Yes you are correct here - but there is ONE EXCEPTION to the rule that the
"truthfulness" of any
observation is an attribute it is given by the observer of the observation
itself, and not of the object observed ?
And that is the observation - the beautiful - perfectly logical observation
- that an entity always exists in the way it
exists rather in the way that humans say it exists.
This has tremendous negative implications for Heideggerians and other
transcendental fantasists, for the transcendentalising of the objects of
their observations into *Being* becomes the biggest lie in
tranniedom/christendom, for what they are stuffing into *The Warehouse of *Being*
is a lot of worthless illegitimate copies - such as the false, counterfeit
Dior perfume we may buy at a *Car Boot Sale.*
(of course, here I used the terms "subject" and "object"
according with the Latin parse, not just the English)
I enjoyed your post very much Antonio.
Regards,
Jud
Personal Website:
_http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm_
(http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm)
E-mail Discussion List:
nominalism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
--- StripMime Warning -- MIME attachments removed ---
This message may have contained attachments which were removed.
Sorry, we do not allow attachments on this list.
--- StripMime Report -- processed MIME parts ---
multipart/alternative
text/plain (text body -- kept)
text/html
---
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---