In a message dated 08/11/2004 03:02:17 GMT Standard Time, [email protected]_
(mailto:janstr@xxxxxxx) writes: Hi Jud,
Thanks for the piece on YHWH, it is interesting stuff and gives food for
further discussions, but for the rest of your post I'm quite disappointed. I
have asked three questions but you haven't really answered them.
Jud: Hi Jan,
Whether that be the case or not, and although you find yourself disappointed
in my responses hitherto, your questioning is free of bile and the questions
are intelligent parries rather than degenerating into the hateful,
non-thinking diatribe which I am used to. It is therefore a pleasure for me to respond
in a similar way.
Jan:
First I asked you about the big difference between materialism and your
nominalistic materialism, and all you said that it:
.... is not the normal materialist ontology of say Marx or Engels where
*material* whatever THAT is supposed to be is posited but reifications and
abstractions abound.
Jan:
Is this all? I expected a rigorous distinction between traditional
materialism (from the Greeks up to Heidegger) and nominalistic materialism, but I have
found nothing of that in your answers in this post.
Jud:
I'm afraid that your expectations of me writing a rigorous detailed history
of such philosophical developments and the diachronic differences and nuances
of meaning are not going to be satisfied Jan, for I have not got the time to
do that, nor do I have the inclination. The reason I am disinclined? I am
more interested in using the comparatively short time I have left to explore
the cutting-edge of ontology [in my small way] rather than reviewing the
historical aspects of materialism as opposed to full-blown nominalism over time.
The main modern difference, as I attempted to signal [in shorthand form]
above, is that materialist ontology has not totally shed the beliefs in the
existence of some abstractions, and claims that everything that exists is either
a material thing (a thing having spatial characteristics) or as a function,
quality, or property of a physical thing. This belief that functions, qualities
and properties exist is THE great divide between the two - although in many
cases this separation is a blurred one. Materialism is not doctrinal in the
same way as transcendentalism tends to be, nor does it have the special
language of Heideggerianism for example.
I am, of necessity, generalising of course, but whereas normally a
materialist explains every apparent instance of a mental phenomenon as a feature of
some physical object, my type of nominalist would say that the word *feature*
is a cop-out, and that neither the mental nor the phenomenal exist, but only
the human holism exists. I have many materialist friends who would say for
example that: *process* actually exists, whilst I would claim that only the
entities which exist in what we humans would describe as: *being situated in
certain spatial and contiguous relationships* exist.
Jud [earlier]
I don't believe that *Material* or *Matter* exists - but only that which is
entitic and/or that is an object of a force field.
Jan:
No long ago you claimed that there only existed matter/energy in the cosmos,
but now you don't seem to believe this any more; you say now that all is
"actual entitic" or "an object of a force field" or "energetic," etc.
Jud:
The words *matter* and *energy* are used by me as textual shortcuts to save
the wear and tear of my fingers on the keyboard. I have many times in the
past on this list explained this; [my explanations are all in the archives.] It
is a lot easier to type the six-letter word * Matter* rather than the longer:
*That which has mass and occupies space * or *the actually entitic, * or
*that which exists in the manner of a force field, * , etc. The main thing,
[again I have explained this over and over to MP on this list} is that addressees
understand that it is not the fact that such words are utilised by
nominalists, but that when a nominalist employs such words he employs them on the
basis that they are abstractions which STAND IN for the various entitic objects
that exist in the way that they exist, bearing in mind that they DO NOT exist
in actuality as *matter, * for *matter* does not really exist, [except as
pus] being only a verbal shortcut.
Jan:
But how do/could you know if something is or is not "actual entitic" if you
do not know what *matter* is, because it does not exist?
Jud:
I know that *matter* is a verbal/textual shortcut in the same way that I
know that the word *via* is a verbal/textual shortcut for the longer: *by way
of. * So I DO know what the word means, it betokens:
*That which has mass and occupies space, * and my pen is not made of: *that
which has mass and occupies space, * it is made of wood and graphite.
Jan:
And how do/could you know if something is or is not "energetic", if *energy*
does not exist? We are dealing here with the materialist principles of
classification and demarcation, and you can not evade them lest you're committing
the fallacy of ambiguity.
Jud:
I know that *energy* is a verbal/textual shortcut for the capacity of a
physical system to exert force; the units of which energetic force are described
as joules or ergs etc.: Therefore it is more convenient for me to employ the
word *energy,* rather than spouting the long sentence which is necessary to
identify the physical system being responsible for existing in this way,
manner, modality or state.
Regarding the fact that I am *classifying/defining* what is referred to as
*energy or force* as *a physical system existing in the manner of exerting
force,* does not mean that: *classes* or *classifications or definitions* exist,
but only that the classifier/definer, Jud, exists as he can be found in the
modality of classifying and/or defining
Jan:
But let me try to explain where I think your reasoning goes astray. If you
look at the logical structure of a materialist epistemology, you will see they
only claim three types of arguments as valid:
Identity principle: a description of a symmetrical relationship between two
(sets of) elements, incl. its reversibility: f. e. "a proton exists as two
up-quarks and one down-quark" [two up-quarks and one down-quark exist as a
proton]; "a neutron exists as two down- quarks and one up-quark"; "Jan is a son
of Jan", etc. etc. [two up-quarks and one down-quark exist as a proton]; "a
neutron exists as two down- quarks and one up-quark"; "Jan is a son of Jan",
etc. etc.
Jud:
I am not THEY Jan. We are not discussing materialist ontology any more than
I would claim to be discussing Heideggerian philosophy but using all the
concepts and principles of Husserlian philosophy or phenomenology. As I keep
saying Jan, I am not JUST a materialist. The only reason which I refer to myself
as a *materialist* is partly convention, in that the average person
understands this term better that the term *nominalist* and also that *materialism*
(used as a shortcut) is one of the perceived components of the nominalist
ontology like many aspects of Heideggerianism contain elements of Husserlianism.
A more accurate description of my ontology would be that of an eliminative
nominalist, but not many would even know what that means.
But taking them in turn, as regards to the question of "identity" the whole
point of my ontology is to identify the entity as being existentially
congruent with the way it exists. In other words, the way an object exists equals
the object. In the traditional materialist version of identity you quote it is
very similar, for in that version that which we call a "proton" exists as
that which we call "two up-quarks and one down-quark." Plainly the "two
up-quarks and one down-quark" alternate description of a "proton" is no different
procedurally from my that which we call an "entity" as being an alternate
description of "that which exists in the way it exists" version. To repeat it
again for clarity. In the same way that *that which we call a proton* can be
alternatively identified as that which we call: "two up-quarks and one
down-quark," that which we call an "entity" can be alternately described as that which
we call: "That which exists in the way it exists."
Jan:
Class inclusion: an ascription of properties or qualities to an element or
set of elements, not reversible: f. e. "a proton is a heavy particle" [i. e.
it possesses quarks]; "electrons are light particles" [i. e. they do not
possess quarks]; "Michael is bald", etc.
Jud:
As I say and have said many times before, I have no argument with the
practice of the ascription to objects [entities] of properties or qualities in the
manner of traditional materialists/transcendentalist for purposes of
classification, as long as these verbal conveniences are not taken as existing in
themselves.
Thus the classification of heaviness or lightness does not exist, but only
heavy or light particles exist, or Michael's baldness does not exist - only
the bald Michael exists.
Jan:
(c) Class membership: a description of an asymmetrical relationship between
two (sets of) elements, not reversible: f. e. "all baryons are conglomerates
of quarks"; "a foton is an elementary particle"; "Jud is a human being".
Jud:
Like I said elsewhere, for me the abstractions: time, number, class, shape,
[the circle example] are convenient and very important abstractions that
allow us to bring order into the chaos of our lives.
They are ontological shortcuts, which help us avoid exhaustive and
repetitive periphrasis and circumlocution. Even the abstraction “chaos,” which I
have just used in the above sentence, is such a verbal shortcut, which allows me
to avoid a long description such as: “the existential states of entities
which are perceived by humans as being in extreme confusion and disorder, or the
formless and disordered state of “matter” before the change of state into
what humans perceive as a more “orderly cosmos. Again - for the nominalist
only the human classifier exists - not the classificational data, which exists
as the classifying human brain in its modality of classification.
Jan again:
Jud, imho these are the only valid lines of argumantation in which
materialist use the verbal phrasings of "is", "are", "exist as". They will never say
or claim something like "an entity exists in the way it exists" or feel
satisfied with such as some necessary truism.
Jud:
Why? I have [with certain important ontological reservations] just agreed
with them?
Jud:
For me *Matter exists as Matter* is the same sort of nonsense statement as
(2+2=5)=(2+2=5); it is not classed as a tautology at all - but is meaningless
noise.
Jan:
No, (2+2=5)=(2+2=5) is a perfect tautology, look at the definition you gave
in your previous post.
Jud:
No, (2+2=5)=(2+2=5) is a perfect (1) type tautology in which the predicate
asserts no more than is contained in the meaning of the subject. Therefore it
adds no new information. Look again at the definition I gave in my previous
post regarding the difference between (1) type tautologies and c (2) typesBecause I do not accept the doctrine that all items in the world are
composed of matter.
The only entity which I accept as being: “matter” is the use of the word in
northern [and perhaps southern English too?] as an alternative name for the
pus or purulence that forms on a wound as part of the healing process. Other
than in that identificatory example for me matter does not exist, and
therefore does not qualify ontologically as a (2) type candidate which can be used
in ontologically true tautologous statements, which requires it to be a
logical statement that is necessarily true, or an instance of a valid formula of
propositional logic. Perhaps you are unaware that there is a tendency for
traditional materialism to be replaced by the related philosophy of physicalism,
which claims that all items in the world are physical entities and has tended
to replace crude materialism. I see this as a progression of coarse
materialism towards the more cogent and refined philosophy of nominalism as the final,
ultimate and unique philosophy of actuality and anti-transcendentalism.
Jan:
But maybe you can give me some meaningful examples of how a
(nominalist) materialist would use tautologies in his thinking?
Jud:
The tautology: *an entity exists in the way that it exists,* is the only one
that I use than I can recall to mind right now. I'll try to think of some
more for you.
Jan:
This was my second question, but you're only repeating yourself and bring
nothing new, or it must be what you wrote to Michael: "King Henry the Eighth's
crown existed in the way that it existed." or that "Entities will exist in
the way that they will exist" are your meaningful examples? Please Jud, you can
do better than that, I'm waiting ....
Jud:
All type (2) tautologies are generally acceptable [depending upon context]
to a nominalist as long as the caveats regarding matter and material are in
place. In other words all logical statements that are necessarily true, or are
instances of a valid formula of propositional logic. So in order to put an
end to your waiting just pick up any book you like on propositional logic
Jud: For me the [whole] human holism derives its meaning from any given
source of information - not just one of its five sensors.
Jan: What other sources of information do you mean here, given the fact that
you claim that there exist only matter/energy in the cosmos?
Jud: Only that which is entitic - that which is energetic. Other sources of
info? The human voice, books, traffic signs, TV pictures, computers,
rock-carvings, tapes, maps - all the same sources that you receive information from.
Jan:
Now you've lost me completely. What I asked for here where your other
sources of information that "derives its meaning from ... - not just one of its
five sensors" ? All you come up with is a list of media. When you wrote: "*not
just* one of its five sensors" I was expecting you had some new knowledge
about a six or seven sensor?
Jud:
I responded in this way because of your strange suggestion which you made on
the 6th of November in which you wrote:
“i.e. the meaning of a proposition about some state or aspect of the world
is derived from experience
via (one of) our five senses.
The reason for my list of media was to refute this mono-sensorial suggestion
by demonstrating that information can not just be gained from ONE of our
five senses, but from ALL of our senses in various combinations. I don't believe
that there any more sensorial elements to our human holism.
Jud: [earlier]
I'm afraid that you are wrong here Jan. There was no questioning of *Being*
in BT at all. Read the opening chapters again. *Being* is accepted as an a
priori. or as a given. It is the *problem* or the *question* of how *Being* has
been dealt with from the Pre-.........
Jan:
No Jud, you are wrong. If in philosophy something is called "a priori" than
it means that it is un-questionable and un-problematic, because there is no
thinking way to go beyond or beneath it.
Jud:
A priori doesn't mean that Jan. A priori means involving deductive reasoning
from a general principle to a necessary effect; not supported by fact. Based
on hypothesis or theory rather than experiment. Derived without observed
facts. Acquired by the mind or reasoning alone independently of (in the sense of
not being justified by) sense experience, referring to knowledge or
justification or hypotheses such as those of arithmetic and logic. (That 2+2=4 and
that all equilateral triangles are equiangular may be suggested by sensory
experience but their justification or mathematical proof in no way invokes this
experience.) Traditionally, some a priori truths (axioms or first principles)
are held to be directly intuited; the rest are supposed to be deducible from
these. Euclid's geometry provides the model for this traditional conception.
With a posteriori knowledge or statements, on the other hand, justification
does invoke sensory experience either directly via perception or indirectly via
induction. The ontological argument for the existence of God is deemed a
priori.
Where is suggestion in these definitions that a priori means that it is
un-questionable and un-problematic?
Where is the suggestion that Being is unquestionable as a theory just
because Heidegger classifies it as being an a priori and unproblematic - if it is
unproblematic as you claim why does Heidegger constantly refer to the problem
of *Being?
If a priori is taken to be a sentence, proposition, thought or judgement if
its truth is not dependent on how our actual experience (experiment and
observation) happens to turn out, how does Heidegger justify his investigations if
part of the definition of an a priori is because there is no thinking way to
go beyond or beneath it if it is as you say “un-questionable and
un-problematic,”
Many have thought that the truths of logic and mathematics are a priori,
though J. S. Mill and W. V. O. Quine might be thought to maintain the contrary
position.
Jan:
For Heidegger to pick up the ancient question "nach dem Sinn fom Sein" is a
thinking necessity, because all western philosophy drew in some or other way
inspiration from it. It is an unending quest, an open project, which
Heidegger is very anxious to keep open and questionable: Heidegger never gives a
definite answer or un-ambigious definition of (what) "Sein" (is), and he never
used the notion "a priori" in relation to a given "Sein", not in SuZ and not
elsewhere as far as I know; but it maybe that you have found it, if so please
let us know.
Jud:
My ontology in general opposes western philosophy of the transcendentalist
type. For me the project concerning Being is a non-project based upon an
ontological/linguistic misunderstanding.
Although Heidegger is careful not to use the term a priori, his
unquestioning acceptance of Being as a legitimate subject/item/concept for his open
project proves that he accepts the notion of Being unquestioningly.
Heidegger from BT: opening chapters]
"Being" is the most "universal" concept: To on esti malista katholou panton,
Iiiud quod primo cadit sub apprehensione ets cuius intellectus includitur in
omnibus, quaecumque quis aprehendit.
"An understanding of Being is always already contained in everything we
apprehend in
beings. But the "universality" of "Being" is not that of genus. "Being"
does not delimit the
highest region of beings so far as they are conceptually articulated
according to genus and
species: oute to on genos ["Being is not a genus"]. The "universality" of
Being "surpasses." of genus.
This is no questioning of the universal concept of Being - this is a
statement of unquesting acceptance of it.
Jud:
My wife is colour-blind as a matter of fact [although I am a Negro - she
thinks I am a white man. {No, I'm only joking) so the *Being* of the furnishing
in our home, and the *Being* of our children's eyes are quite different for
her and for me. [Etc.]
Jan:
Ahhh, here your getting close to a Heideggerian sensitivity of the way
*Being* is granted to us in myriad of infinite different moments of life and joy;
and that is what Heidegger is trying to tell us in SuZ, namely that being and
time are not some kind of reified abstractions or a priori given faculties,
no being and time should provisionally be conceived as our coordinates of
freedom and openness ......
Jud:
Then Being is *granted to us in a bastard format for it is perceived by us
through the imperfect instrumentality of our senses as transacted by the
*consciousness* as per the infamous theory of *object givenness.* [although why a
toilet-pan would want to *give itself* to a human being nobody knows]
Any confused version of perceived freedom and openness is not worth the
activity of the neurones that transact them, for the result is falsity and an
imagined freedom. Nor are the results of *object givenness* and the
psuedo-version of *Being* it generates worth the paper it is written on. One man's
perceived freedom is another's perceived non-self-determination - one women's
perceived openness is another women's perceived sly unreceptivity.
I am still waiting patiently for your explanation as how the truth of Being
can be accessed from the multitudinous throng of individually transacted
versions of it, and how on earth it can be accessed via the non-existent [and
thereby non-conscious - non-instantiating] Dasein with a spurious universal
version of the truth of Being that immediately nullifies, invalidates negates
and renders useless the individual with his or her differing versions?
Please answer this profound criticism.
Waiting patiently,
I remain,
Jud
yours, Jan
Regards,
Jud
Personal Website:
_http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm_
(http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm)
E-mail Discussion List:
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(mailto:janstr@xxxxxxx) writes: Hi Jud,
Thanks for the piece on YHWH, it is interesting stuff and gives food for
further discussions, but for the rest of your post I'm quite disappointed. I
have asked three questions but you haven't really answered them.
Jud: Hi Jan,
Whether that be the case or not, and although you find yourself disappointed
in my responses hitherto, your questioning is free of bile and the questions
are intelligent parries rather than degenerating into the hateful,
non-thinking diatribe which I am used to. It is therefore a pleasure for me to respond
in a similar way.
Jan:
First I asked you about the big difference between materialism and your
nominalistic materialism, and all you said that it:
.... is not the normal materialist ontology of say Marx or Engels where
*material* whatever THAT is supposed to be is posited but reifications and
abstractions abound.
Jan:
Is this all? I expected a rigorous distinction between traditional
materialism (from the Greeks up to Heidegger) and nominalistic materialism, but I have
found nothing of that in your answers in this post.
Jud:
I'm afraid that your expectations of me writing a rigorous detailed history
of such philosophical developments and the diachronic differences and nuances
of meaning are not going to be satisfied Jan, for I have not got the time to
do that, nor do I have the inclination. The reason I am disinclined? I am
more interested in using the comparatively short time I have left to explore
the cutting-edge of ontology [in my small way] rather than reviewing the
historical aspects of materialism as opposed to full-blown nominalism over time.
The main modern difference, as I attempted to signal [in shorthand form]
above, is that materialist ontology has not totally shed the beliefs in the
existence of some abstractions, and claims that everything that exists is either
a material thing (a thing having spatial characteristics) or as a function,
quality, or property of a physical thing. This belief that functions, qualities
and properties exist is THE great divide between the two - although in many
cases this separation is a blurred one. Materialism is not doctrinal in the
same way as transcendentalism tends to be, nor does it have the special
language of Heideggerianism for example.
I am, of necessity, generalising of course, but whereas normally a
materialist explains every apparent instance of a mental phenomenon as a feature of
some physical object, my type of nominalist would say that the word *feature*
is a cop-out, and that neither the mental nor the phenomenal exist, but only
the human holism exists. I have many materialist friends who would say for
example that: *process* actually exists, whilst I would claim that only the
entities which exist in what we humans would describe as: *being situated in
certain spatial and contiguous relationships* exist.
Jud [earlier]
I don't believe that *Material* or *Matter* exists - but only that which is
entitic and/or that is an object of a force field.
Jan:
No long ago you claimed that there only existed matter/energy in the cosmos,
but now you don't seem to believe this any more; you say now that all is
"actual entitic" or "an object of a force field" or "energetic," etc.
Jud:
The words *matter* and *energy* are used by me as textual shortcuts to save
the wear and tear of my fingers on the keyboard. I have many times in the
past on this list explained this; [my explanations are all in the archives.] It
is a lot easier to type the six-letter word * Matter* rather than the longer:
*That which has mass and occupies space * or *the actually entitic, * or
*that which exists in the manner of a force field, * , etc. The main thing,
[again I have explained this over and over to MP on this list} is that addressees
understand that it is not the fact that such words are utilised by
nominalists, but that when a nominalist employs such words he employs them on the
basis that they are abstractions which STAND IN for the various entitic objects
that exist in the way that they exist, bearing in mind that they DO NOT exist
in actuality as *matter, * for *matter* does not really exist, [except as
pus] being only a verbal shortcut.
Jan:
But how do/could you know if something is or is not "actual entitic" if you
do not know what *matter* is, because it does not exist?
Jud:
I know that *matter* is a verbal/textual shortcut in the same way that I
know that the word *via* is a verbal/textual shortcut for the longer: *by way
of. * So I DO know what the word means, it betokens:
*That which has mass and occupies space, * and my pen is not made of: *that
which has mass and occupies space, * it is made of wood and graphite.
Jan:
And how do/could you know if something is or is not "energetic", if *energy*
does not exist? We are dealing here with the materialist principles of
classification and demarcation, and you can not evade them lest you're committing
the fallacy of ambiguity.
Jud:
I know that *energy* is a verbal/textual shortcut for the capacity of a
physical system to exert force; the units of which energetic force are described
as joules or ergs etc.: Therefore it is more convenient for me to employ the
word *energy,* rather than spouting the long sentence which is necessary to
identify the physical system being responsible for existing in this way,
manner, modality or state.
Regarding the fact that I am *classifying/defining* what is referred to as
*energy or force* as *a physical system existing in the manner of exerting
force,* does not mean that: *classes* or *classifications or definitions* exist,
but only that the classifier/definer, Jud, exists as he can be found in the
modality of classifying and/or defining
Jan:
But let me try to explain where I think your reasoning goes astray. If you
look at the logical structure of a materialist epistemology, you will see they
only claim three types of arguments as valid:
Identity principle: a description of a symmetrical relationship between two
(sets of) elements, incl. its reversibility: f. e. "a proton exists as two
up-quarks and one down-quark" [two up-quarks and one down-quark exist as a
proton]; "a neutron exists as two down- quarks and one up-quark"; "Jan is a son
of Jan", etc. etc. [two up-quarks and one down-quark exist as a proton]; "a
neutron exists as two down- quarks and one up-quark"; "Jan is a son of Jan",
etc. etc.
Jud:
I am not THEY Jan. We are not discussing materialist ontology any more than
I would claim to be discussing Heideggerian philosophy but using all the
concepts and principles of Husserlian philosophy or phenomenology. As I keep
saying Jan, I am not JUST a materialist. The only reason which I refer to myself
as a *materialist* is partly convention, in that the average person
understands this term better that the term *nominalist* and also that *materialism*
(used as a shortcut) is one of the perceived components of the nominalist
ontology like many aspects of Heideggerianism contain elements of Husserlianism.
A more accurate description of my ontology would be that of an eliminative
nominalist, but not many would even know what that means.
But taking them in turn, as regards to the question of "identity" the whole
point of my ontology is to identify the entity as being existentially
congruent with the way it exists. In other words, the way an object exists equals
the object. In the traditional materialist version of identity you quote it is
very similar, for in that version that which we call a "proton" exists as
that which we call "two up-quarks and one down-quark." Plainly the "two
up-quarks and one down-quark" alternate description of a "proton" is no different
procedurally from my that which we call an "entity" as being an alternate
description of "that which exists in the way it exists" version. To repeat it
again for clarity. In the same way that *that which we call a proton* can be
alternatively identified as that which we call: "two up-quarks and one
down-quark," that which we call an "entity" can be alternately described as that which
we call: "That which exists in the way it exists."
Jan:
Class inclusion: an ascription of properties or qualities to an element or
set of elements, not reversible: f. e. "a proton is a heavy particle" [i. e.
it possesses quarks]; "electrons are light particles" [i. e. they do not
possess quarks]; "Michael is bald", etc.
Jud:
As I say and have said many times before, I have no argument with the
practice of the ascription to objects [entities] of properties or qualities in the
manner of traditional materialists/transcendentalist for purposes of
classification, as long as these verbal conveniences are not taken as existing in
themselves.
Thus the classification of heaviness or lightness does not exist, but only
heavy or light particles exist, or Michael's baldness does not exist - only
the bald Michael exists.
Jan:
(c) Class membership: a description of an asymmetrical relationship between
two (sets of) elements, not reversible: f. e. "all baryons are conglomerates
of quarks"; "a foton is an elementary particle"; "Jud is a human being".
Jud:
Like I said elsewhere, for me the abstractions: time, number, class, shape,
[the circle example] are convenient and very important abstractions that
allow us to bring order into the chaos of our lives.
They are ontological shortcuts, which help us avoid exhaustive and
repetitive periphrasis and circumlocution. Even the abstraction “chaos,” which I
have just used in the above sentence, is such a verbal shortcut, which allows me
to avoid a long description such as: “the existential states of entities
which are perceived by humans as being in extreme confusion and disorder, or the
formless and disordered state of “matter” before the change of state into
what humans perceive as a more “orderly cosmos. Again - for the nominalist
only the human classifier exists - not the classificational data, which exists
as the classifying human brain in its modality of classification.
Jan again:
Jud, imho these are the only valid lines of argumantation in which
materialist use the verbal phrasings of "is", "are", "exist as". They will never say
or claim something like "an entity exists in the way it exists" or feel
satisfied with such as some necessary truism.
Jud:
Why? I have [with certain important ontological reservations] just agreed
with them?
Jud:
For me *Matter exists as Matter* is the same sort of nonsense statement as
(2+2=5)=(2+2=5); it is not classed as a tautology at all - but is meaningless
noise.
Jan:
No, (2+2=5)=(2+2=5) is a perfect tautology, look at the definition you gave
in your previous post.
Jud:
No, (2+2=5)=(2+2=5) is a perfect (1) type tautology in which the predicate
asserts no more than is contained in the meaning of the subject. Therefore it
adds no new information. Look again at the definition I gave in my previous
post regarding the difference between (1) type tautologies and c (2) typesBecause I do not accept the doctrine that all items in the world are
composed of matter.
The only entity which I accept as being: “matter” is the use of the word in
northern [and perhaps southern English too?] as an alternative name for the
pus or purulence that forms on a wound as part of the healing process. Other
than in that identificatory example for me matter does not exist, and
therefore does not qualify ontologically as a (2) type candidate which can be used
in ontologically true tautologous statements, which requires it to be a
logical statement that is necessarily true, or an instance of a valid formula of
propositional logic. Perhaps you are unaware that there is a tendency for
traditional materialism to be replaced by the related philosophy of physicalism,
which claims that all items in the world are physical entities and has tended
to replace crude materialism. I see this as a progression of coarse
materialism towards the more cogent and refined philosophy of nominalism as the final,
ultimate and unique philosophy of actuality and anti-transcendentalism.
Jan:
But maybe you can give me some meaningful examples of how a
(nominalist) materialist would use tautologies in his thinking?
Jud:
The tautology: *an entity exists in the way that it exists,* is the only one
that I use than I can recall to mind right now. I'll try to think of some
more for you.
Jan:
This was my second question, but you're only repeating yourself and bring
nothing new, or it must be what you wrote to Michael: "King Henry the Eighth's
crown existed in the way that it existed." or that "Entities will exist in
the way that they will exist" are your meaningful examples? Please Jud, you can
do better than that, I'm waiting ....
Jud:
All type (2) tautologies are generally acceptable [depending upon context]
to a nominalist as long as the caveats regarding matter and material are in
place. In other words all logical statements that are necessarily true, or are
instances of a valid formula of propositional logic. So in order to put an
end to your waiting just pick up any book you like on propositional logic
Jud: For me the [whole] human holism derives its meaning from any given
source of information - not just one of its five sensors.
Jan: What other sources of information do you mean here, given the fact that
you claim that there exist only matter/energy in the cosmos?
Jud: Only that which is entitic - that which is energetic. Other sources of
info? The human voice, books, traffic signs, TV pictures, computers,
rock-carvings, tapes, maps - all the same sources that you receive information from.
Jan:
Now you've lost me completely. What I asked for here where your other
sources of information that "derives its meaning from ... - not just one of its
five sensors" ? All you come up with is a list of media. When you wrote: "*not
just* one of its five sensors" I was expecting you had some new knowledge
about a six or seven sensor?
Jud:
I responded in this way because of your strange suggestion which you made on
the 6th of November in which you wrote:
“i.e. the meaning of a proposition about some state or aspect of the world
is derived from experience
via (one of) our five senses.
The reason for my list of media was to refute this mono-sensorial suggestion
by demonstrating that information can not just be gained from ONE of our
five senses, but from ALL of our senses in various combinations. I don't believe
that there any more sensorial elements to our human holism.
Jud: [earlier]
I'm afraid that you are wrong here Jan. There was no questioning of *Being*
in BT at all. Read the opening chapters again. *Being* is accepted as an a
priori. or as a given. It is the *problem* or the *question* of how *Being* has
been dealt with from the Pre-.........
Jan:
No Jud, you are wrong. If in philosophy something is called "a priori" than
it means that it is un-questionable and un-problematic, because there is no
thinking way to go beyond or beneath it.
Jud:
A priori doesn't mean that Jan. A priori means involving deductive reasoning
from a general principle to a necessary effect; not supported by fact. Based
on hypothesis or theory rather than experiment. Derived without observed
facts. Acquired by the mind or reasoning alone independently of (in the sense of
not being justified by) sense experience, referring to knowledge or
justification or hypotheses such as those of arithmetic and logic. (That 2+2=4 and
that all equilateral triangles are equiangular may be suggested by sensory
experience but their justification or mathematical proof in no way invokes this
experience.) Traditionally, some a priori truths (axioms or first principles)
are held to be directly intuited; the rest are supposed to be deducible from
these. Euclid's geometry provides the model for this traditional conception.
With a posteriori knowledge or statements, on the other hand, justification
does invoke sensory experience either directly via perception or indirectly via
induction. The ontological argument for the existence of God is deemed a
priori.
Where is suggestion in these definitions that a priori means that it is
un-questionable and un-problematic?
Where is the suggestion that Being is unquestionable as a theory just
because Heidegger classifies it as being an a priori and unproblematic - if it is
unproblematic as you claim why does Heidegger constantly refer to the problem
of *Being?
If a priori is taken to be a sentence, proposition, thought or judgement if
its truth is not dependent on how our actual experience (experiment and
observation) happens to turn out, how does Heidegger justify his investigations if
part of the definition of an a priori is because there is no thinking way to
go beyond or beneath it if it is as you say “un-questionable and
un-problematic,”
Many have thought that the truths of logic and mathematics are a priori,
though J. S. Mill and W. V. O. Quine might be thought to maintain the contrary
position.
Jan:
For Heidegger to pick up the ancient question "nach dem Sinn fom Sein" is a
thinking necessity, because all western philosophy drew in some or other way
inspiration from it. It is an unending quest, an open project, which
Heidegger is very anxious to keep open and questionable: Heidegger never gives a
definite answer or un-ambigious definition of (what) "Sein" (is), and he never
used the notion "a priori" in relation to a given "Sein", not in SuZ and not
elsewhere as far as I know; but it maybe that you have found it, if so please
let us know.
Jud:
My ontology in general opposes western philosophy of the transcendentalist
type. For me the project concerning Being is a non-project based upon an
ontological/linguistic misunderstanding.
Although Heidegger is careful not to use the term a priori, his
unquestioning acceptance of Being as a legitimate subject/item/concept for his open
project proves that he accepts the notion of Being unquestioningly.
Heidegger from BT: opening chapters]
"Being" is the most "universal" concept: To on esti malista katholou panton,
Iiiud quod primo cadit sub apprehensione ets cuius intellectus includitur in
omnibus, quaecumque quis aprehendit.
"An understanding of Being is always already contained in everything we
apprehend in
beings. But the "universality" of "Being" is not that of genus. "Being"
does not delimit the
highest region of beings so far as they are conceptually articulated
according to genus and
species: oute to on genos ["Being is not a genus"]. The "universality" of
Being "surpasses." of genus.
This is no questioning of the universal concept of Being - this is a
statement of unquesting acceptance of it.
Jud:
My wife is colour-blind as a matter of fact [although I am a Negro - she
thinks I am a white man. {No, I'm only joking) so the *Being* of the furnishing
in our home, and the *Being* of our children's eyes are quite different for
her and for me. [Etc.]
Jan:
Ahhh, here your getting close to a Heideggerian sensitivity of the way
*Being* is granted to us in myriad of infinite different moments of life and joy;
and that is what Heidegger is trying to tell us in SuZ, namely that being and
time are not some kind of reified abstractions or a priori given faculties,
no being and time should provisionally be conceived as our coordinates of
freedom and openness ......
Jud:
Then Being is *granted to us in a bastard format for it is perceived by us
through the imperfect instrumentality of our senses as transacted by the
*consciousness* as per the infamous theory of *object givenness.* [although why a
toilet-pan would want to *give itself* to a human being nobody knows]
Any confused version of perceived freedom and openness is not worth the
activity of the neurones that transact them, for the result is falsity and an
imagined freedom. Nor are the results of *object givenness* and the
psuedo-version of *Being* it generates worth the paper it is written on. One man's
perceived freedom is another's perceived non-self-determination - one women's
perceived openness is another women's perceived sly unreceptivity.
I am still waiting patiently for your explanation as how the truth of Being
can be accessed from the multitudinous throng of individually transacted
versions of it, and how on earth it can be accessed via the non-existent [and
thereby non-conscious - non-instantiating] Dasein with a spurious universal
version of the truth of Being that immediately nullifies, invalidates negates
and renders useless the individual with his or her differing versions?
Please answer this profound criticism.
Waiting patiently,
I remain,
Jud
yours, Jan
Regards,
Jud
Personal Website:
_http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm_
(http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/index.htm)
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