----- Original Message -----
From: "Tympan Plato" <daxsein@xxxxxxxxxxx>
To: <heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Friday, November 19, 2004 3:48 PM
Subject: Re: nietzsche's secret
>
> john writes:
>
> This notion of ground as 'fundamentum' has no phenomenal verity. I asked
> too, and thought, if there is a fundamental ground, but there is not, at
> least not phenomenally. That would be a contradiction to 'subsistence' and
> 'persistence' and why?
>
> Well because within what exists, in consciousness, not the simple
abstract,
> reflective sort, but what supports the existence of consciousness, or in
> pure phenomenal 'presence', there can be nothing more primary than what
> 'subsists' and 'persists, the mere stratum of being there, dasein. This is
> why the truth is both simple and real. There are no 'complex' forms of
> truth, which rely on other supporting truths which have not be 'tested.'
>
> Kenoth is absolute right.
>
> A white sheet cannot exist in perception without something else there
which
> is just as real; no inference can be valid without its existence being
> there, equally present; Heidegger may have believed that there was a
> 'fundamentum', but it has no phenomenal reality, rather it is an
> 'approbrium' of reflection, or a form of inferential wisdom. Inferential
> wisdom is not the knowledge of what is there, but rather a product of
> disciplined reasoning, sometimes valid and sometimes not. The *problem*
with
> reason lies in it's 'universality' which merely stated [a term meaning
> absolute] is dependent on an 'interpretation' of 'related' phenomenon,
which
> in most cases is: (1) social, (2) cultural, (3), individualized, et
cetera.
>
> This is why in the Meditations, Decartes, states that what exists in
> consciousness, in mentation, is what persists and subsists. Niether of
that
> which persists and subsists is a ground or fundamental 'thing'. Ground or
> fundamentum cannot be a thing, rather an 'arrangement', a classification,
or
> heirarchy. There is no hierarchy in perception or consciousness, because
> consciousness is in 'itself' a whole, and cannot be divided.
>
>
> Hi john,
>
> I take it you are addressing your thoughts and ways of using words. What
I
> find interesting is your notion of persistence and subsistence. Okay I
> 'understand' it for the simplicity that it is and that it indicates the
> wholeness of consciousnes but I wonder if one can describe this thinking
as
> completely lacking discipline?
Ari,
pardon my style for the moment. Occassionally when thoughts are expressed on
paper the words are arranged into some order in an attempt to 'merely'
capture the very small content sense which exists there. I don't know what I
exactly mean by referring to that which subsists and persists in
'consciousness', a term which Heidegger rarely uses. What is within
consciousness is not some simple 'reflection' or image or notion, et cetera,
precisely, but rather 'object' like things. They are like objects separated
in space and time, if not in other ways; they are also separated by 'mood'
and 'state of mind'.
I would therefore call those objects, or that object, which persists in
space and in time [the temporal and spatial] instantiations of primarily
common objects such as feelings of 'relation' towards others, anticipations
such as 'waking up'. Thus it is not exactly it self 'knowledge' and
'certainty' which is the content of consciousness, but something more: "in
state" relations.
Anyway these 'objects' during the most immediate and indeterminate moments
of being are not thought of as being real; they are not subject to any test
of reality or reality test. They are the 'simple and real truth' about
being. That is they have their own truth which transcends 'interpretation'
and so on.
The objects are in a sense 'indeterminate' since they cannot be moved about
like furniture, wild horses, or perhaps they are like soft fluffy clouds,
subject to extraordinary breezes, gasps out of the gulf. They are
indeterminate because they are absolutely immediate: the first raindrop or
snowflake is like that, perhaps the first of anything. The 'thing' is
primary because it is the only real object which can change what is inside.
These objects during their moment of vision are not sensed as objects but as
the thing which is touched, or which touch has suffered.
What is therefore fundamental within consciousness [being] is an object-like
thing, or thing like object, but not simply any object but our ownmost
object; the one which cannot be outstripped from ourselves.
No,
John
Just the act of separating it from a another
> invalid approach to thinking already involves abstraction or cutting away
> that as you say gets you finally knowledge of what is really real. There
is
> then labour and discipline although perhaps it can be described as
negative.
> There is a "contradiction" as you say. Something here offers resistance
and
> conflict because it always has a tendency to operate? Okay and if it is
> inoperative 'what' is supposed to be that which is "in mentation" in
> Descartes?? Are you or Descartes saying that consciousness is human or is
it
> more than that? Where is the whole "in" which there is mentation and out
of
> which presumably there is 'nothing'??
>
>
>
> I'm just curious about what you really think John.
>
> regards,
> tympan
>
>
>
> chao
>
> jhon
>
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