On Wed, 12 Apr 1995, Christopher Rickey wrote:
> The german word that is translated as "comportment" is Verhalten, which
> means relating. The related word Verhaeltnis means a relation in the
> sense of a ratio.
>
> This puts in a nutshell the problem I had with Dreyfus' explanation of
> how Verhaeltnis overcomes the subject-object split: yes, the subject
> might no longer be detached (whatever that could mean in Descartes
> system - seeing something is still a relation), but there still is in the
> word Verhalten two things that relate. It seems that Heidegger is
> talking about two (or possibly more) kinds of comporting, one of which is
> superior (or more originary, if you like) than the other. (As long as I
> mentioned Dreyfus, what I take to be his "other" comportment, to
> a world of Zuhanden things, is also not originary; rather the most originary
> is a comportment to being itself.)
I am rather uneasy (as I think Heidegger would be) by your
interpreting 'Verhalten' in terms of the more "philosophical" term
'Verhaeltnis' and interpreting that in terms of Latinate philosophical
terms like 'relation' and 'ratio'. This wariness of the word 'relation'
seems to have been shared by Sallis when he translated 'Verhaeltnis' as
'bearing' in the passage in question. Yes, there is a sense of "relation"
in 'Verhalten', but definitely not one of correspondence (on the originary
level), but one of openness to beings. What we should avoid is the sense
of the "relation" of two self-subsistent entities (subject and object)
that relate in some kind of mutuality or reciprocity that is present in
the notion of correspondence. Your suggestion of kinds of comporting here
seems to be basically right. I am unsure from your post whether you are
claiming Heidegger has a problem here.
Martin
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