David says (in reference to my previous post) that
"one point where we might disagree is that I do not believe it
is part of
Heidegger's philosophy that being-towards possiblitites in
general should be grounded in discourse. Rather, it is
grounded in temporality, since it constitutes one of the
structural components of care (namely, existence)."
I'm not sure that care's groundedness in temporality
would really settle the matter. Wouldn't Heidegger say
that discourse is also grounded in temporality? And for
that matter, _all_ of the existential structures discussed
in BT? Being-towards could still be derived from
discourse, even if both were in some sense grounded
ultimately in temporality.
Regarding your suggestion that "experience and
cognition are fundamental and language is derivative," I'm
not sure quite how to respond. For Heidegger, neither
"experience" nor "cognition" can be truly fundamental,
since both emerge in a derivative, detached, theoretical
stance toward the world, not in the practical involvement
that characterizes what we are first off and for the most
part. On the other hand, this involvement is somehow
prior to language and discourse. Discourse is only the
expression of what is understood in this involvement (sec.
34). In this sense language is, as you say, derivative.
But in any case, I'm not sure that Heidegger would
want to describe our pre-linguistic involvement with
things as "authentic." It seems to me that authenticity
is to be understood only as the undoing of inauthenticity,
as "release from the illusions of the 'they.'" Authentic
being-towards-death, in other words, emerges only through
an overcoming of the everyday, discourse-based
understanding of death. If we couldn't talk about death
emptily and inauthentically, we couldn't be-towards-death
authentically either. Authenticity implies a fulfillment
of the intentionality that arises through discourse, not
an ability to dispense with discourse.
-- Phil Miller
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------
"one point where we might disagree is that I do not believe it
is part of
Heidegger's philosophy that being-towards possiblitites in
general should be grounded in discourse. Rather, it is
grounded in temporality, since it constitutes one of the
structural components of care (namely, existence)."
I'm not sure that care's groundedness in temporality
would really settle the matter. Wouldn't Heidegger say
that discourse is also grounded in temporality? And for
that matter, _all_ of the existential structures discussed
in BT? Being-towards could still be derived from
discourse, even if both were in some sense grounded
ultimately in temporality.
Regarding your suggestion that "experience and
cognition are fundamental and language is derivative," I'm
not sure quite how to respond. For Heidegger, neither
"experience" nor "cognition" can be truly fundamental,
since both emerge in a derivative, detached, theoretical
stance toward the world, not in the practical involvement
that characterizes what we are first off and for the most
part. On the other hand, this involvement is somehow
prior to language and discourse. Discourse is only the
expression of what is understood in this involvement (sec.
34). In this sense language is, as you say, derivative.
But in any case, I'm not sure that Heidegger would
want to describe our pre-linguistic involvement with
things as "authentic." It seems to me that authenticity
is to be understood only as the undoing of inauthenticity,
as "release from the illusions of the 'they.'" Authentic
being-towards-death, in other words, emerges only through
an overcoming of the everyday, discourse-based
understanding of death. If we couldn't talk about death
emptily and inauthentically, we couldn't be-towards-death
authentically either. Authenticity implies a fulfillment
of the intentionality that arises through discourse, not
an ability to dispense with discourse.
-- Phil Miller
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------