On Fri, 4 Aug 1995 PhilMill@xxxxxxx wrote:
> David says (in reference to my previous post) that
> "one point where we might disagree is that I do not believe it
> is part of
> Heidegger's philosophy that being-towards possiblitites in
> general should be grounded in discourse. Rather, it is
> grounded in temporality, since it constitutes one of the
> structural components of care (namely, existence)."
> I'm not sure that care's groundedness in temporality
> would really settle the matter. Wouldn't Heidegger say
> that discourse is also grounded in temporality? And for
> that matter, _all_ of the existential structures discussed
> in BT? Being-towards could still be derived from
> discourse, even if both were in some sense grounded
> ultimately in temporality.
----------------------------------------------------
Sure. That's exactly what I'd expect him to say. But my only point here
is that being-towards-death is not grounded in our capacity for discourse
about death; rather, our capacity for such discourse is grounded in
being-towards-death, and our capacity for authenticity and inauthenticity
as modes of it also ground our possible uses of language, not the other
way 'round.
------------------------------------------------------------
> Regarding your suggestion that "experience and
> cognition are fundamental and language is derivative," I'm
> not sure quite how to respond. For Heidegger, neither
> "experience" nor "cognition" can be truly fundamental,
> since both emerge in a derivative, detached, theoretical
> stance toward the world, not in the practical involvement
> that characterizes what we are first off and for the most
> part. On the other hand, this involvement is somehow
> prior to language and discourse. Discourse is only the
> expression of what is understood in this involvement (sec.
> 34). In this sense language is, as you say, derivative.
> But in any case, I'm not sure that Heidegger would
> want to describe our pre-linguistic involvement with
> things as "authentic." It seems to me that authenticity
> is to be understood only as the undoing of inauthenticity,
> as "release from the illusions of the 'they.'" Authentic
> being-towards-death, in other words, emerges only through
> an overcoming of the everyday, discourse-based
> understanding of death. If we couldn't talk about death
> emptily and inauthentically, we couldn't be-towards-death
> authentically either. Authenticity implies a fulfillment
> of the intentionality that arises through discourse, not
> an ability to dispense with discourse.
-------------------------------------------------
Hm. Yes, I think you're right that cognition at least is not fundamental
for Heidegger, but hat do you mean when you say experience is not
fundamental for him? I do not speak of experience in terms of a nice
tidy, sharp subject/object distinction, but in terms of just that
fundamental being-there of Dasein's disclosedness. Is that not
fundamental, and what makes _BT_ a phenomenological philosophical piece of
work? I'm not trying to be snotty here-- the question is sincere.
Regardless, it does seem that authenticity is for H something much more
than just any linguistico-conceptually unmediated being-there. Still, I'd
like to know what you think of the suggestion that authenticity might be
quite specifically such an unmediated, visceral, and phenomenally vivid
form of being-towards-death (and not just of any unmediated form of
being-towards).
Could you elaborate on the claim that "authenticity is the fulfillment of
the intentionality that arises through discourse"? I'm not sure I
understand what you mean. If in authenticity Dasein overcomes or gets
beyond the everyday discursive way of being towards death, why would it be
unfair to say that one thereby does away with such a discursive
understanding and builds in its place a more genuine, clear and
perspicacious understanding?
Finally, while (I think I'm beginning to understand what you're doing with
this connection between death and discourse, and while I do in fact agree
that authenticity is founded on inauthenticity (after all, H is very
explicit that the one is but an existentiell modification of the other),
I'm not sure it's fair to then infer that authenticity is grounded in
discourse. I mean, inauthenticity is ultimately grounded in Dasein's
being-with, right? (I could be wrong about this, mind you-- it's been a
while since I read Div. I) And discourse has both authentic and
inauthentic modalizations that are possible for Dasein. So, while
authenticity _is_ grounded in inauthenticity, specifically in Dasein's
inauthentic forms of being-with, it's not clear to me that it must also be
grounded in the way of chattering about death that is specific to the
'they.' To be authentic, fallen Dasein must wrest itself from the they,
and this includes wresting itself from idle chatter, but that is only
derivative from the fundamental movement of tearing away from
self-definition through the with-world. Isn't it? Like I said, I could
be way off, here. I haven't looked at the section on language in some
time, and unfortunately I seem to hav forgotten to bring _BT_ with me on
my trip back to NY. I'm afraid I'm stranded without my notes, my
computer, and my books right now.
Anyway, lemme know what you think. For all that I have said, I must admit
that your account is beginning to look better and better to me, Phil.
Yours,
David Schenk.
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------
> David says (in reference to my previous post) that
> "one point where we might disagree is that I do not believe it
> is part of
> Heidegger's philosophy that being-towards possiblitites in
> general should be grounded in discourse. Rather, it is
> grounded in temporality, since it constitutes one of the
> structural components of care (namely, existence)."
> I'm not sure that care's groundedness in temporality
> would really settle the matter. Wouldn't Heidegger say
> that discourse is also grounded in temporality? And for
> that matter, _all_ of the existential structures discussed
> in BT? Being-towards could still be derived from
> discourse, even if both were in some sense grounded
> ultimately in temporality.
----------------------------------------------------
Sure. That's exactly what I'd expect him to say. But my only point here
is that being-towards-death is not grounded in our capacity for discourse
about death; rather, our capacity for such discourse is grounded in
being-towards-death, and our capacity for authenticity and inauthenticity
as modes of it also ground our possible uses of language, not the other
way 'round.
------------------------------------------------------------
> Regarding your suggestion that "experience and
> cognition are fundamental and language is derivative," I'm
> not sure quite how to respond. For Heidegger, neither
> "experience" nor "cognition" can be truly fundamental,
> since both emerge in a derivative, detached, theoretical
> stance toward the world, not in the practical involvement
> that characterizes what we are first off and for the most
> part. On the other hand, this involvement is somehow
> prior to language and discourse. Discourse is only the
> expression of what is understood in this involvement (sec.
> 34). In this sense language is, as you say, derivative.
> But in any case, I'm not sure that Heidegger would
> want to describe our pre-linguistic involvement with
> things as "authentic." It seems to me that authenticity
> is to be understood only as the undoing of inauthenticity,
> as "release from the illusions of the 'they.'" Authentic
> being-towards-death, in other words, emerges only through
> an overcoming of the everyday, discourse-based
> understanding of death. If we couldn't talk about death
> emptily and inauthentically, we couldn't be-towards-death
> authentically either. Authenticity implies a fulfillment
> of the intentionality that arises through discourse, not
> an ability to dispense with discourse.
-------------------------------------------------
Hm. Yes, I think you're right that cognition at least is not fundamental
for Heidegger, but hat do you mean when you say experience is not
fundamental for him? I do not speak of experience in terms of a nice
tidy, sharp subject/object distinction, but in terms of just that
fundamental being-there of Dasein's disclosedness. Is that not
fundamental, and what makes _BT_ a phenomenological philosophical piece of
work? I'm not trying to be snotty here-- the question is sincere.
Regardless, it does seem that authenticity is for H something much more
than just any linguistico-conceptually unmediated being-there. Still, I'd
like to know what you think of the suggestion that authenticity might be
quite specifically such an unmediated, visceral, and phenomenally vivid
form of being-towards-death (and not just of any unmediated form of
being-towards).
Could you elaborate on the claim that "authenticity is the fulfillment of
the intentionality that arises through discourse"? I'm not sure I
understand what you mean. If in authenticity Dasein overcomes or gets
beyond the everyday discursive way of being towards death, why would it be
unfair to say that one thereby does away with such a discursive
understanding and builds in its place a more genuine, clear and
perspicacious understanding?
Finally, while (I think I'm beginning to understand what you're doing with
this connection between death and discourse, and while I do in fact agree
that authenticity is founded on inauthenticity (after all, H is very
explicit that the one is but an existentiell modification of the other),
I'm not sure it's fair to then infer that authenticity is grounded in
discourse. I mean, inauthenticity is ultimately grounded in Dasein's
being-with, right? (I could be wrong about this, mind you-- it's been a
while since I read Div. I) And discourse has both authentic and
inauthentic modalizations that are possible for Dasein. So, while
authenticity _is_ grounded in inauthenticity, specifically in Dasein's
inauthentic forms of being-with, it's not clear to me that it must also be
grounded in the way of chattering about death that is specific to the
'they.' To be authentic, fallen Dasein must wrest itself from the they,
and this includes wresting itself from idle chatter, but that is only
derivative from the fundamental movement of tearing away from
self-definition through the with-world. Isn't it? Like I said, I could
be way off, here. I haven't looked at the section on language in some
time, and unfortunately I seem to hav forgotten to bring _BT_ with me on
my trip back to NY. I'm afraid I'm stranded without my notes, my
computer, and my books right now.
Anyway, lemme know what you think. For all that I have said, I must admit
that your account is beginning to look better and better to me, Phil.
Yours,
David Schenk.
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------