what i am unable to get clear is whether heidegger conceives of time
as the thing in which Being is, the thing in which Being occur. this
conception may well be unitary, but it remains a thought of time
as form because time is the principle fo individuation itself. this
is doubtless related to what you called individualistic time. thus
time is thought as the fundamental determination of being-in-the-world.
now, to me, this sounds very kantian, like kant's temporalization of
the cogito. heidegger of course does not so much think in terms of
the cogito, but, as you pointed out, he does seem to think of time
as the determinating factor of selfhood (minus the cartesian baggage).
if i understand nietzsche correctly, as Stambaugh explains it, he specifically
rejects THe notion of time as the _form_ of subjectivity or anytHING
that could be related to individuation. this is clear even in
_The Birth of Tragedy_. we are not in time, nor is time in us as
such: time is force, and the reverse too. concepts like individual
determined in time, freedom, etc., are eliminated. the individual does
not return, is not _there_, is NOT in short. what is, so to speak, is
the positivity of force.
"There is no time flux _there_, outside of which the moment could then
result. Outside and inside are spatial categories. The "being-in"
peculiar to time exists precisely in that it does not admit this
_simultaneity of two time structures from which the idea of inside
and outside emerges." _Problem of Time in Nietzsche_, p. 183
thus nietzsche does not think in terms of da-sein precisely because
it established the false notion of time as flow. time does not
flow from one point to another. to the extent that there is a point,
it is time, not in time. heidegger, however, appears to reject
the notion of time as movement only to return to the idea while
denying it. this is obvious as late as _On Time and Being_, where
the 'est gebt' is invoked and time as something of the being
of mortals appears. it seems to me that this notin of time still
relates time to form as being in something.
chris
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
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as the thing in which Being is, the thing in which Being occur. this
conception may well be unitary, but it remains a thought of time
as form because time is the principle fo individuation itself. this
is doubtless related to what you called individualistic time. thus
time is thought as the fundamental determination of being-in-the-world.
now, to me, this sounds very kantian, like kant's temporalization of
the cogito. heidegger of course does not so much think in terms of
the cogito, but, as you pointed out, he does seem to think of time
as the determinating factor of selfhood (minus the cartesian baggage).
if i understand nietzsche correctly, as Stambaugh explains it, he specifically
rejects THe notion of time as the _form_ of subjectivity or anytHING
that could be related to individuation. this is clear even in
_The Birth of Tragedy_. we are not in time, nor is time in us as
such: time is force, and the reverse too. concepts like individual
determined in time, freedom, etc., are eliminated. the individual does
not return, is not _there_, is NOT in short. what is, so to speak, is
the positivity of force.
"There is no time flux _there_, outside of which the moment could then
result. Outside and inside are spatial categories. The "being-in"
peculiar to time exists precisely in that it does not admit this
_simultaneity of two time structures from which the idea of inside
and outside emerges." _Problem of Time in Nietzsche_, p. 183
thus nietzsche does not think in terms of da-sein precisely because
it established the false notion of time as flow. time does not
flow from one point to another. to the extent that there is a point,
it is time, not in time. heidegger, however, appears to reject
the notion of time as movement only to return to the idea while
denying it. this is obvious as late as _On Time and Being_, where
the 'est gebt' is invoked and time as something of the being
of mortals appears. it seems to me that this notin of time still
relates time to form as being in something.
chris
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------