Re: Heideggerian temporality

Chris,

you said:

> what i am unable to get clear is whether heidegger
> conceives of time as the thing in which Being is, the
> thing in which Being occur[s]. this conception may well be
> unitary, but it remains a thought of time as form
> because time is the principle [of] individuation itself.

This is precisely Levinas' critique. Heidegger doesn't get away from the
"metaphysics-of-things-ish" conception of temporality he so eschews elsewhere in
his attack on traditional Western metaphysics. So, I would agree, it would seem
that it is a thought of time as form, the space, or at least an aspect of the
space, where Being discloses itself. However, this kind of a temporal
metaphysic positions time under the larger (at least for Heidegger) rubric of
ontology. Putting primacy upon Dasein asking the question of what it means to
Be presupposes an individual Dasein. In other words, Dasein is, by definition,
individual, and since Dasein is the central figure in Heideggerian ontology,
discussions of temporality within this ontology occlude notions that time could
ever be otherwise than formal, or a kind of Kantian metaphysic, as you suggest.
It is in this way that time becomes the principle of individuation.

Todd.




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