"When Heidegger states that time is the condition of the possibility
of care, so to speak its constitutive structure, he is basically
still within the Kantian framework which principally asks the
question: "What makes X possible?"
Later Stambaugh writes that Heidegger perhaps leave metaphysics
behind when he speaks of 'Appropriation' rather than Being and
Time. My concern is principally with Heidegger's concept of
time, not the rhetoric of overcoming or leaving behind metaphysics.
It is clear that time as the structure of care is Kantian (at least
it's clear to seveal Heideggerian commentators).
Does anyone have any thoughts on this and any possible relationship
of this to Nietzsche's eternal recurrence?
chris
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of care, so to speak its constitutive structure, he is basically
still within the Kantian framework which principally asks the
question: "What makes X possible?"
Later Stambaugh writes that Heidegger perhaps leave metaphysics
behind when he speaks of 'Appropriation' rather than Being and
Time. My concern is principally with Heidegger's concept of
time, not the rhetoric of overcoming or leaving behind metaphysics.
It is clear that time as the structure of care is Kantian (at least
it's clear to seveal Heideggerian commentators).
Does anyone have any thoughts on this and any possible relationship
of this to Nietzsche's eternal recurrence?
chris
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
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