Close Reading of BT II.2

I've finally gotten around to rereading Chapter 2 of
Division 2 of BT in light of David Schenk's "close
reading" post from last month (7/17/95, to be exact).
Here are my comments.

1. David writes:

>[BT312] Authentic being-one's-Self is an existentiell
>(ontical) modification of the "they", which is the
>inauthentic (existentiell also) mode of being-one's-Self
>(existential-ontological). So here the authentic is
>founded on the inauthentic."

I'm not sure I understand the existential/existentiell
distinction the same way David does. I may be overlooking
something, but I don't think it makes sense to say that
the authentic and inauthentic modes of being are purely
"existentiell."

As I read Heidegger, "existentiell" refers to the
understanding that each of us always has of our own
concrete, individual possibilities; "existential" on the
other hand refers to a philosophical understanding of
those possibilities. The "existentials" are the
_structures_ that are necessarily at work in our
existence, as disclosed in phenomenological analysis. The
point of the distinction is that we can understand the
phenomena of existence not only in a pre-philosophical
(existentiell) manner, but also in a philosophical
(existential) manner. As he says here, "authentic being-
one's-self" is an "existentiell modification" which must
nonetheless be "defined existentially." We somehow
understand the difference between being authentic and
being inauthentic long before we take up philosophy, but
it's in philosophy that we speak explicitly about this
distinction as something that necessarily pervades human
existence.

I'm not sure what David is getting at by saying that "here
the authentic is founded on the inauthentic." He seems to
be implying that elsewhere in the text the opposite is
asserted. If so, I'd appreciate references. My
understanding is that the authentic always emerges from
(and at least in that sense is "founded on") the
inauthentic. Inauthentic is what we are first off and for
the most part; authenticity always results from a kind of
transformation of the inauthentic mode of being.

2. David asks:

>Why does Heidegger think the doubtfulness of conscience
>and its status _proves_ that it is a "_primordial_
>phenomenon of Dasein"? [BT313/SZ268]

I agree with David's implication here that this is not a
very compelling "proof." It is interesting to note that
what seems to have persuaded Heidegger himself of its
primordiality was not the existence of disputes about
conscience, but rather the central role conscience played
in "primal Christianity" and in Christian (especially
Protestant) theology. See John van Buren's THE YOUNG
HEIDEGGER 186ff. for a good discussion of this point.
Surprisingly, Heidegger believed that even Aristotle,
whose practical writings provided the other principal
model for his analytic of Dasein, recognized the
phenomenon of conscience in what he termed phronesis,
practical wisdom.

3. David writes:

>The authentic Self that does the calling seems almost
>like a kind of transcendental ego in certain respects,
>though I should not want to carry the analogy too far.
>The Self is omnipresent, always calling fallen Dasein
>back to itself; the TE is also omnipresent....

Is it really the authentic Self that does the calling?
I've seen other commentators who also read Heidegger this
way, but I don't see any place in the text where Heidegger
says this explicitly. He does say that Dasein calls
itself: Dasein as caller "finds itself in the very depths
of its uncanniness"; it calls "out of the depths of this
kind of Being" (276,277/321,322). But this doesn't seem
to me to be equivalent to saying that the caller is the
authentic Self.

Where I'm going with this is that I _don't_ think the
authentic Self is omnipresent, in the way the Kantian
transcendental ego is. The authentic self is for the most
part _not_ actually present. It is somehow there, but
only as a possibility, not as something actual. And if
this is true, how could it make sense to say that it does
the calling?

4. David writes:

>[BT344/SZ298] "When dasein is resolute, it can become the
>'conscience' of Others."
>
>Now, how is this possible if in the moment of authentic
>existence one is utterly individuated down to oneself?
>If the source of all manifestations of conscience, even
>of its inauthentic manifestations, is exclusively the
>Self, which passes over everything of the they-self and
>of others, how on Earth could I ever "become" the
>conscience of another??? That makes absolutely no sense
>whatsoever.

What David says is correct...but I'm not sure Heidegger
meant the point to be taken quite this literally (hence
the quotes around "conscience"). Becoming the
"conscience" of another just means showing authentic
solicitude for another. Cf. SZ 122/BT 158f.

5. David asks:

>[BT345] Is there anything empirically-phenomenally
>_distinctive_ about anticipatory resoluteness? I mean,
>is there something about it that distinguishes it from
>our ordinary fallen existence? Or is it rather like
>Kierkegaard's knight of faith, indistinguishable from any
>twit in the crowd?

That's a good question, and I'm not sure I have a good
answer for it. I'm inclined to believe that the
difference is not so much in how we _act_ as in how we
_speak_ about what we're doing. Becoming resolute doesn't
mean that we stop being kind and just, or that we somehow
become more kind or more just. But it might well mean
that we no longer talk about such things in the way we do
when we're consumed by the public interpretations of them.
Seeing that we simply find ourselves in situations not of
our own making, that we must nonetheless opt for some
possibilities and exclude others, we can no longer go
along with the prevailing explanations of why certain
things ought to be done and others omitted. This seems to
me to be what Heidegger is getting at when he emphasizes
that "keeping silent" is a characteristic of authentic
existence.

But maybe others will have different ways of answering
David's question. I would like to hear them.

As usual, thanks to David for taking the lead in reading
this chapter and posting some thought-provoking comments
and questions.

-- Phil Miller



--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---

------------------

Partial thread listing: