On Fri, 14 Jul 1995 PhilMill@xxxxxxx wrote:
> toward what is perceptually present. Heidegger, for his part, wants to
> show that it is not just noetic consciousness that exhibits this
> temporal structure, but everday, pre-theoretical existence as well.
> Even in practical life, before we have made the shift to the detached,
> noetic contemplation of the world which Husserl studied, what is past
> and what is futural nonetheless have a way of being an integral,
> contemporaneous part of the present.
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Surely so. I think it even goes much deeper than that, though. I should
like to see how literally we can take Heidegger's assertion in _History
of the Concept of Time_ that "Dasein _is_ its time."
It is not just that Dasein has a special temporal structure whereby all
three fundamental ecstases operate together at any particular 'now'.
Rather, the ontological ground of Dasein is temporality; temporality just
_is_ the metaphysics of existence, and clearly Heidegger thinks this
thesis can be borne out existentielly in concrete elements of Daseinal
experience. Also, I do not think it is accidental that Heidegger starts
to ground the being of Dasein in temporality only after his chapters on
death, guilt, and conscience, only after the chapters wherein he
establishes the possibility and manner of getting Dasein _phenomenally_
(not just theoretically) into view as a whole. I think it is through this
maneuver that he paves the way for showing how Dasein is not just
something that perdures within time, but rather _is_ a kind of time on the
metaphysical level in the form of temporality, Zeitlichkeit, or whatever.
Now, for us, cashing out this very dramatic way of speaking is going to be
awfully tricky...
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> This seems to me to be the underlying reason for the introduction
> of the themes of death and authenticity in Division Two: Heidegger needs
> them to make a concrete case for his view of temporality as a unity of
> what is past and what is futural within the present moment of existence.
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Yeah, that's also what William Blattner argues in part in his excellent
paper "Existential Temporality in _Being and Time_" (in _Heidegger: A
Critical Reader_, eds. Dreyfus and Hall). The more I read this material,
the more I think that argument is right.
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> In his post, David asks a question about the shift from the
> authentic mode of being to the inauthentic: "What precipitates this
> shift, what allows it to happen?" The question is a good one, provided
> it is understood in the right way. What is called for, in a
> phenomenological context, is _not_ a psychological explanation or
> demonstration of the possibility of this shift. Phenomenology's role is
> simply to point out what is obvious in itself, though not in fact always
> seen. Heidegger didn't think he "discovered" authenticity. The term
> comes from Kierkegaard, but the thing itself, Heidegger believed, was
> recognized not only by some Christian thinkers, but also by the ancient
> Greeks (or at least by Aristotle).
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Absolutely right. A psychological answer is the last thing we should look
for here. The way I intended the question, it is rather a query about the
metaphysics of Dasein whereby these sorts of shifts from authentic to
inauthentic existence and vice versa are even _possible_. If fallenness
is a fundamental element of Dasein and not just some accident of it, and
if the same is true of authenticity as an existentiell modification of it,
such that authenticity is a genuine existentiell possibility of all Dasein
and not just of those lucky few who are born with such-and-such a
psychological make-up, genetic code, or whatever, then there _must_ be
something in the metaphysics of Dasein whereby these shifts from authentic
to inauthentic or inauthentic to authentic modes of existence are made
possible _in general_. That's what I'm worried about. How could be that
at one moment so-and-so exists authentically and at another moment
inauthentically? That's my puzzle.
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> The real question here, as I see it, pertains to possibility of
> inauthenticity and authenticity alike. Why are we subject to this
> disjunction in the first place? Is it possible, from Heidegger's
> perspective, to say what this either-or rests on? I think it is. The
> answer, I believe, is _discourse_. It is because we are defined or
> constituted by discourse that we inevitably exist in either the
> authentic or the inauthentic mode. But perhaps this is not the place
> for me to pursue this thought in greater detail. I'll save it for a
> more appropriate moment.
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Whoa! Now that sounds fascinating. Could you elaborate on your thoughts,
here? I don't think it would be out of place or a digression at all. I
think it would be a great strand to pursue, especially since I don't know
so very much about Heidegger's views on language.
These are great messages you've been posting, Phil. I get a lot from
them.
Yours,
David Schenk.
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