Re: division two, chapter i

On Wed, 19 Jul 1995 PhilMill@xxxxxxx wrote:

> The one point I do have trouble with is the
> statement that "Without the ekstatic ahead-of-itself-ness
> of Dasein, Dasein simply could not be-_towards_ anything."
> Not all being-towards is being-towards a possibility. I
> can also be-towards a thing, like a picture on the wall
> (cf. SZ 217f/BT 260). I don't think this is a trivial
> point, for unless we put being-towards-death in the
> broader context of being-towards-anything, I think we miss
> some of the subtleties of what Heidegger is doing here.
> Heidegger's phenomenology of discourse and truth is in the
> background of the whole of Chapter I, and at one point, in
> section 52, it comes quite explicitly to the foreground
> 256/300).
> -- Phil Miller

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True enough. I misspoke somewhat at that point-- implicit in my comment
was its restriction to possibilities of Dasein. I should have been
explicit about that.

Now, in connection with the worry I raised about the ontological ground of
the possibility of shifting from inauthentic to authentic existence and
vice versa, perhaps I can clarify. I am not inquiring as to what
phenomenological experience preciptates such a shift. I am asking what in
the ontology of Dasein, what fundamental structure of Dasein, makes such
shifts possible and _thus_ how they are precipitated. These shifts are
manifestly contingent, but the ground of Dasein's authentic and
inauthentic modes are necessary ontological structures of Dasein. Surely
Dasein's ability to exist in either mode at any given time must also be
grounded in its ontology. So my question is, what in the ontology of
Dasein makes possible the existentiell-ontical shifts from one mode to the
other? I should think Heidegger owes us an explanation for at least this
much. As with most everything he wrote, I also suspect the answer is in
there somewhere, but finding it is rather tricky. I have now heard two
suggestions, though I confess I don't really understand either of them.
Phil suggested that discourse somehow accomlishes this task, and Dave
Black has suggested finitude does it. I find both suggestions intriguing.
Dave, Phil, if you could clarify and develop your suggestions for me, that
would be great. As I said before, I've been away from much of this
material for a long time, plus I never did study Heidegger's philosophy of
language and discourse very carefully...


Thanks,

David Schenk.


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