David S. wrote:
"Both authenticity and inauthenticity are grounded in fixed,
constant, ontological structures of Dasein, and so they in themselves
will never be enough to explain how it is that Dasein can have these
contingent shifts in its basic ways of being. So there must be something
else in Dasein's fundamental structure whereby this becomes possible."
--- Clearly, for Heidegger, the condition of possibility for
the shift lies in the possibility of anticipation and
resoluteness. This would seem to be a kind of gathering of
the self, of will, even: concentration, various specific
"procedures" or "actions" of leaving aside (worldly things,
etc.), of categorically *recognizing* idle talk as such, for
example. It seems as much as anything else to be rooted in
*desire*, wanting, having, experience, comportment,
choosing, picking, acting, enacting and some kind of
"executive" status/function in Dasien. I think he is so
carefully to avoid simple formations of egoity that this
aspect is in a certain way untouched. We know he avoids
reification of the ego, but who and how does resoluteness
happen? Who is resolute? "Dasein". But this Dasein has a
certain priviledged structure of an "I": I am resolute. I
make a series of decisions which ontologically and
categorically prioritize and limit work, absorbtion,
curiosity, fascination, forgetfulness. This is founded on
the action of "de-prioritization", somehow. Nietzsche, among
others, opened this up when, in speaking of the moral
decision, he responded to his "straw man" English (?)
moralist: "But you have performed three actions, not one!"
he replies, theatrically, to the moralist. This space of
action is the space which Heidegger activates. These
"actions" do not enter into the world to solve problems, to
work out a new part for a piece of equipment, etc. Again, it
breaks down for its neglect of what else Dasein is doing,
like: getting into an argument with a boyfriend or
girlfriend, making friends, helping a friend through a hard
time, etc.
This "self" or "ego" is there in BT. Dasein "mastering"
"it's" moods, for example. This happening of mastery is
wholly of the "egoity" in some way, even if its being and
truth can be verified only *by* other or self-same egos, but
then, that's the whole point of phenomenology and its good
faith.
Now, it seems to me that one of the conditions of
possibility of the shift, even simply the Being of the
difference between authenticity and inauthenticity is the
very "theme" of authenticity itself. In this respect, you
may be perhaps recapitulating the wrong-headed (if
intellectually well-intentioned) attempt to avoid
"tautology" or circular reasoning. Heidegger *might* say,
"authenticity is actual", just as Kant says that
"metaphysics is actual". Or he might say: it is primordial,
in which case the thing to do is not determine *its*
conditions of possibility but rather let it be one of the
conditions of possibility of other things, in showing and
explaining *their* Being.
Again, I'm suggesting that there is some sense of *egoity*,
and simply that Heidegger is so careful to avoid reification
and other miconceptions that he never comes out and posits
it. Or, it may be that his example is (at least) an example
of what you get when you leave "egoity" to its authentic
being and avoid notions of the "subject".
One might want to hold this "ego complex" of Heidegger
against the backdrop of Husserl. Husserl's "ego" is
*supremely* enactive, so that even various modes of presence
take the name "enpresenting". And of course each and every
action of the intuiting ego is, like Descarte's "doubt",
precisely that: action. And: we must guess that there is
doubt, there is choice, and again there is will, and so
forth, for Heidegger.
---
There is no path to peace. Peace is the path.
Tom Blancato
tblancato@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Eyes on Violence (nonviolence and human rights monitoring in Haiti)
Thoughtaction Collective (reparative justice project)
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------
"Both authenticity and inauthenticity are grounded in fixed,
constant, ontological structures of Dasein, and so they in themselves
will never be enough to explain how it is that Dasein can have these
contingent shifts in its basic ways of being. So there must be something
else in Dasein's fundamental structure whereby this becomes possible."
--- Clearly, for Heidegger, the condition of possibility for
the shift lies in the possibility of anticipation and
resoluteness. This would seem to be a kind of gathering of
the self, of will, even: concentration, various specific
"procedures" or "actions" of leaving aside (worldly things,
etc.), of categorically *recognizing* idle talk as such, for
example. It seems as much as anything else to be rooted in
*desire*, wanting, having, experience, comportment,
choosing, picking, acting, enacting and some kind of
"executive" status/function in Dasien. I think he is so
carefully to avoid simple formations of egoity that this
aspect is in a certain way untouched. We know he avoids
reification of the ego, but who and how does resoluteness
happen? Who is resolute? "Dasein". But this Dasein has a
certain priviledged structure of an "I": I am resolute. I
make a series of decisions which ontologically and
categorically prioritize and limit work, absorbtion,
curiosity, fascination, forgetfulness. This is founded on
the action of "de-prioritization", somehow. Nietzsche, among
others, opened this up when, in speaking of the moral
decision, he responded to his "straw man" English (?)
moralist: "But you have performed three actions, not one!"
he replies, theatrically, to the moralist. This space of
action is the space which Heidegger activates. These
"actions" do not enter into the world to solve problems, to
work out a new part for a piece of equipment, etc. Again, it
breaks down for its neglect of what else Dasein is doing,
like: getting into an argument with a boyfriend or
girlfriend, making friends, helping a friend through a hard
time, etc.
This "self" or "ego" is there in BT. Dasein "mastering"
"it's" moods, for example. This happening of mastery is
wholly of the "egoity" in some way, even if its being and
truth can be verified only *by* other or self-same egos, but
then, that's the whole point of phenomenology and its good
faith.
Now, it seems to me that one of the conditions of
possibility of the shift, even simply the Being of the
difference between authenticity and inauthenticity is the
very "theme" of authenticity itself. In this respect, you
may be perhaps recapitulating the wrong-headed (if
intellectually well-intentioned) attempt to avoid
"tautology" or circular reasoning. Heidegger *might* say,
"authenticity is actual", just as Kant says that
"metaphysics is actual". Or he might say: it is primordial,
in which case the thing to do is not determine *its*
conditions of possibility but rather let it be one of the
conditions of possibility of other things, in showing and
explaining *their* Being.
Again, I'm suggesting that there is some sense of *egoity*,
and simply that Heidegger is so careful to avoid reification
and other miconceptions that he never comes out and posits
it. Or, it may be that his example is (at least) an example
of what you get when you leave "egoity" to its authentic
being and avoid notions of the "subject".
One might want to hold this "ego complex" of Heidegger
against the backdrop of Husserl. Husserl's "ego" is
*supremely* enactive, so that even various modes of presence
take the name "enpresenting". And of course each and every
action of the intuiting ego is, like Descarte's "doubt",
precisely that: action. And: we must guess that there is
doubt, there is choice, and again there is will, and so
forth, for Heidegger.
---
There is no path to peace. Peace is the path.
Tom Blancato
tblancato@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Eyes on Violence (nonviolence and human rights monitoring in Haiti)
Thoughtaction Collective (reparative justice project)
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------