The question concerns:
>the ontological ground of the possibility of shifting from inauthentic to
>authentic existence ... what in the ontology of Dasein makes possible the
>existentiell-ontical shifts from one mode to the other? - Schenk 20/7
where:
>Dasein can be inauthentic only insofar as fallenness into the they-self is
>part of its basic constitution, and it can be authentic only insofar as it
>is also essentially a kind of self-understanding - Schenk 22/7
I personally consider the question concerning authenticity to be at the
heart of what is both most interesting and yet disturbingly problematic in
the thinking of being. I also agree totally that self-understanding and
falling thrownness are the matter for thinking here, especially as concerns
the possibilities of a 'transcendence' of this entanglement. For if thrown
falling being-in-the-world has already come to an understanding of this
world in which it exists along with others, then it is in terms of this
'pre-ontological' understanding that any notion of 'Dasein' (being-here),
'existence' or 'being' will be understood. Therefore, if "Dasein itself ...
is to be 'given' to Dasein to understand" (BT, p. 312) in the authentic
projection, then this already understanding must understand its _self_. It
is in this sense that I take the analytic of Dasein as a reinterpretation
of _ego cogito_ where the self-understanding of the authentic projection
takes as its 'subject' its own thrown fallenness. And this seems to me to
be something of the hermeneutic circle (or perhaps a spiral?) because there
can be no fixed or stable ground for authenticity beyond dedicating itself
to its own indeterminacy.
In support of this proposition, and according to Heidegger (BT, p. 168),
"authentic Being-one's Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of
the subject, a condition that has been detached from the 'they'; it is
rather an existentiell modification of the 'they' - of the 'they' as an
existentiale".
Authenticity can thus only be conceived in terms of a 'shift' from an
inauthentic absorption in our daily affairs, a shift 'out of' our familiar
indifference to being and into the 'truth' of what really is, if this shift
_dwells_ within its own essential inauthenticity. There would not be a
shift between two separate experiences but rather an appreciation of
existence as essentially falling, where the ontological structure of
falling that is the being of the 'here/there' (Da) is to be understood in a
temporal sense (and is this at all possible?). According to this reading of
BT, it is only in this attempt to disclose the existential temporal
structures of care that constantly constitute who we are always already
coming to be, that one lays the ground for any possibility of
'being-authentic'.
However, this constant return to Dasein and our essential lostness in its
'they/one-self' seems to me to be at odds with the 'transcendental'
methodology of BT, which takes me back again to the defamiliarizing
meditation on death and the possibility of ecstatic temporality. What I
would like to ask is - is it possible that the move from _Zeitlichkeit_
(the temporality of Dasein) to _Temporalitaet_ (the temporality of being as
such) that characterizes not only BT but Heidegger's entire career, is a
contradiction of the terms of the fundamental ontology grounded in the
analytic of Dasein?
Thanks,
Malcolm Riddoch.
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------
>the ontological ground of the possibility of shifting from inauthentic to
>authentic existence ... what in the ontology of Dasein makes possible the
>existentiell-ontical shifts from one mode to the other? - Schenk 20/7
where:
>Dasein can be inauthentic only insofar as fallenness into the they-self is
>part of its basic constitution, and it can be authentic only insofar as it
>is also essentially a kind of self-understanding - Schenk 22/7
I personally consider the question concerning authenticity to be at the
heart of what is both most interesting and yet disturbingly problematic in
the thinking of being. I also agree totally that self-understanding and
falling thrownness are the matter for thinking here, especially as concerns
the possibilities of a 'transcendence' of this entanglement. For if thrown
falling being-in-the-world has already come to an understanding of this
world in which it exists along with others, then it is in terms of this
'pre-ontological' understanding that any notion of 'Dasein' (being-here),
'existence' or 'being' will be understood. Therefore, if "Dasein itself ...
is to be 'given' to Dasein to understand" (BT, p. 312) in the authentic
projection, then this already understanding must understand its _self_. It
is in this sense that I take the analytic of Dasein as a reinterpretation
of _ego cogito_ where the self-understanding of the authentic projection
takes as its 'subject' its own thrown fallenness. And this seems to me to
be something of the hermeneutic circle (or perhaps a spiral?) because there
can be no fixed or stable ground for authenticity beyond dedicating itself
to its own indeterminacy.
In support of this proposition, and according to Heidegger (BT, p. 168),
"authentic Being-one's Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of
the subject, a condition that has been detached from the 'they'; it is
rather an existentiell modification of the 'they' - of the 'they' as an
existentiale".
Authenticity can thus only be conceived in terms of a 'shift' from an
inauthentic absorption in our daily affairs, a shift 'out of' our familiar
indifference to being and into the 'truth' of what really is, if this shift
_dwells_ within its own essential inauthenticity. There would not be a
shift between two separate experiences but rather an appreciation of
existence as essentially falling, where the ontological structure of
falling that is the being of the 'here/there' (Da) is to be understood in a
temporal sense (and is this at all possible?). According to this reading of
BT, it is only in this attempt to disclose the existential temporal
structures of care that constantly constitute who we are always already
coming to be, that one lays the ground for any possibility of
'being-authentic'.
However, this constant return to Dasein and our essential lostness in its
'they/one-self' seems to me to be at odds with the 'transcendental'
methodology of BT, which takes me back again to the defamiliarizing
meditation on death and the possibility of ecstatic temporality. What I
would like to ask is - is it possible that the move from _Zeitlichkeit_
(the temporality of Dasein) to _Temporalitaet_ (the temporality of being as
such) that characterizes not only BT but Heidegger's entire career, is a
contradiction of the terms of the fundamental ontology grounded in the
analytic of Dasein?
Thanks,
Malcolm Riddoch.
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------