To expand on my point from my last missive, the relationship of
disclosure and what is disclosed is similar to the relationship of Kant's
transcendental I and the given, or also the relationship of the
transcendental I and the finite I (an ambiguity of terms that caused Kant
and all of German Idealism endless headaches). In the early days of
German Idealism (Kant, Fichte, Schelling), the transcendental Ich or
absolute Ich are productive; there is no thing in itself outside of the
absolute Ich. However, all make a distinction between this producing Ich
and the empirical, finite Ich, which is receptive and not productive. I
realize most people think Fichte especially was an idiot, but he was well
aware of the need to account for the fact that I can't walk through a
wall. The distinction between the Ich's is supposed to account for that.
Now on to Heidegger's Dasein. If the disclosure gives what is as it is,
then it is productive. To equate Dasein with its disclosure is to say
that Dasein is the equivalent of the productive, absolute Ich of German
Idealism. However, Heidegger also says that Dasein is finite. The two
together make Heidegger's Dasein even more subjective in a respect than even
those "wackos" of German Idealism; especially if Dasein is individual (as
seems implied by his analysis of death), the danger of solipsism seems
rank (with the danger of absurdity not far behind).
There are ways out of this dilemma. One would be to say that the
disclosure reveals the whole that was previously hidden behind das Man or
our practical dealings in the world of things. In this sense, disclosure
reveals and uncovers rather than produces; this would fit with
Heidegger's terminology of Entdecktheit (discoveredness) and Enthullung
(revealing) contrasted to the Verdecktheit (coveredness) of das Man. It
also fits with his later terminology of revealing and concealing of Aletheia.
Another way, not really at odds with the last mentioned, would be to
restore the finite/absolute distinction. In this restoration, the
productive "Ich" is das Ereignis or the groundless ground (as even Fichte
called it) while the finite Ich is the mortal human, who can only respond
to the sendings of Beying. Concealing and unconcealing is shifted from
Dasein to being itself, whose sendings or productions are never under the
control of humans. This would be Heidegger's attempt to break up the
subjectivity in Being and Time.
Chris
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