Re: on the other hand...

CR wrote:
the relationship of

disclosure and what is disclosed is similar to the relationship of
Kant's

transcendental I and the given...

Hmmn. There is no transcendental I in Heidegger, no apperceptice
unity, no self-positing subject, in short, none of the idealist's
hyperperbolic versions of the Cartesian subject. Heidegger, even in
B&T, is careful to put "subject" in quotes. To read a subjectivism,
or worse, a solipsism into his thinking is, at best, to put him
right back into the tradition he deconstructs.

So what alternative conception of the self does he create
the space for, if not fully envision? The self as one aspect of the
being of the there and the there of being? What in our experience
really belongs to us? Death (and here the internal subversion of
Das Man). I don't see how the analogies with idealsim help (except
for the idea that there is something like a split between
receptivity and creativity, the former doing far more work than the
latter, at least for those of us who aren't Hoelderlin. But rather
than import Fichte's terminology, why not explain this in terms of
the work of the clearing, the clearing as noun and as verb--see
_What is Called Thinking_, 220).

Here it seems that the distinction you make between
"disclosure and what is disclosed" is of the utmost importance. Can
this be unpacked in a phenomenologically sensitive way that doesn't
import ready-made distinctions from the tradition (and the
metaphyscial baggage they inevitably presuppose)?

I. Thomson
UCSD Philo



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