On Tue, 6 Jun 1995, Chris Hargens wrote:
> On 6/6/95 Christopher Rickey wrote:
>
> >Good, now my problem. If das Man is really a category and contains all
> >of the possibilities of the set of public life, it also designates a
> >particular subset of these possibilities, mainly the covered over,
> >average ones. Heidegger opposes the interpretations of death and
> >history, for example, offered by das Man to his own (I would presume
> >these would be the authentic ones); if there is a difference between
> >interpretations (possibilities) given by das Man, and those given in an
> >authentic disclosure, I can't see how these second possibilities can be
> >part of the first set. In short, he would be using the same term for
> >both the full set and a subset of this set, a confusion that, in my
> >honest opinion, would go beyond terminological confusion and into
> >conceptual confusion.
>
> It seems to me that one could argue that the difference is not "between
> interpretations (possibilities) given by das Man, and those given in an
> authentic disclosure" but, rather, between inauthentic (or
> undifferentiated) and authentic self-understandingings in terms of the SAME
> interpretations (possibilities). On this view, when these interpretations
> (possibilities) are taken up inauthentically (or undifferentiatedly) they
> are levelled, averaged-out, covered-up, etc.. When they are taken up
> authentically, however, they are encountered, if you will, in their
> original lived form. Although he wasn't addressing this issue, I think Phil
> Mill's posting of 6/1/95 sheds some light here:
This still doesn't address my problem. For one thing, I'm not
differentiating between understanding and interpretation. I'm not sure
if Heidegger does either. For another, and somewhat more seriously, my
objection is that one cannot take up an inauthentic interpretation
without changing it into something else. Death is my example. Das Man
interprets death in a calming way. Heidegger calls that inauthentic. He
contrasts that to his own authentic interpretation of death. It is not
calming. My point is that different interpretations of death yield two
different possibilities of living which are exclusive. One cannot
appropriate (Aneignen) das Man's intepretation and get to the other
possibility, because to appropriate das Man's interpretation would be to
live according to it, which is to say, inauthentically.
>
> Oh, yes. Two questions.
>
> To Christopher Rickey:
> You write "that the operative opposition is not between public and
> private, but between two types of publicness." What are these "two types of
> publicness"? Are you referring to your earlier distinction--"community
> versus society"?
Yes. I can sharpen the distinction. Society=bourgois society and
community=non-bourgoise society.
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