Re: das Man--Husserl/authenti...

Chris Hargens asked for references to back up my previous
post on theoretical authenticity in Husserl.

Husserl first introduced the concept of intellectual authenticity
in the _Philosophy of Arithmetic_, which begins with a study of the
concept of number insofar it "authentically given" or "authentically
presented," that is, given without the help of symbols. But it was in
the _Logical Investigations_ that Husserl broadened this into a study of
authentic thinking as such (and of course, approached it in a more
rigorous, genuinely phenomenological manner). The Sixth Investigation,
in particular, is intended to elucidate the distinction between
authentic and inauthentic thinking. Husserl's clearest statement of
authenticity as the telos of thinking is perhaps the following: "The
perfection of thought lies doubtless in intuitive, i.e. in 'authentic'
thinking, in that knowledge in which our thought-intention is
'satisfied' (as it were) by passing over into intuition.... Not mere
intuition, but adequate, categorially formed intuitions, completely
accommodated to thought, or conversely, thought which draws its evidence
from intuition, constitute the goal of true knowledge" (LI 388; cf. 393,
671, 823).

It is interesting to note, by the way, that Heidegger studied the
_Logical Investigations_ closely, not only as a student, but also well
into the 1920's, when Husserl himself regarded this work as having been
superseded by the transcendental perspective of the _Ideas_. In a 1925
lecture Heidegger called it "the fundamental book of phenomenology." He
regarded Husserl's study of categorial intuition, i.e. authentic
thinking, in LI VI as its most important contribution.

Heidegger's lectures of this period make it clear, by the way,
that his goal was to trace the theoretical structures identified by
Husserl, especially in LI, back to more primordial structures in pre-
theoretical life. This doesn't really come clear in BT itself, but it
was something he had planned to do in the never-published Division
Three. See the note in sec. 63: "That the intentionality of
'consciousness' is _grounded_ in the ecstatical unity of Dasein, and how
this is the case, will be shown in the following Division."

As this note suggests, the whole analysis of care as "the being of
Dasein" and of temporality as "the ontological meaning of care," was
intended to set up a detailed study of the roots of Husserlian
intentionality. BT can't be understood fully without putting the
analytic of Dasein in this context.

Phil Miller



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