In _Being and Time_, Heidegger "subverts the Cartesian subject with the
phenomenological-existential analyses of Da-sein" (to borrow the words of
Iain Thomson). Dasein, authentic or not, is not a Cartesian subject. Now
implicit in Heidegger's critique of the Cartesian subject is a critique of
both the ontological and epistemological privileging of
consciousness--"existence" and "knowledge" are neither founded upon nor
reducible to the conscious subject. All of this makes sense to
me--Heidegger supplies some powerful arguments/analyses to support his
view. What I'm wondering about, however, is authenticity. It seems to me
that authenticity involves Dasein in a recognition and appropriation of its
own mode of Being--again, a mode Being that Heidegger makes clear is not
that of the Cartesian subject. But does "becoming" authentic require
certain acts of consciousness? Does Heidegger subtly (or not so subtly?)
reprivilege theory over praxis in his treatment of authenticity?
Christopher Rickey's summary of GA 34 suggests that this might be the case.
Any thoughts?
Chris Hargens
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
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phenomenological-existential analyses of Da-sein" (to borrow the words of
Iain Thomson). Dasein, authentic or not, is not a Cartesian subject. Now
implicit in Heidegger's critique of the Cartesian subject is a critique of
both the ontological and epistemological privileging of
consciousness--"existence" and "knowledge" are neither founded upon nor
reducible to the conscious subject. All of this makes sense to
me--Heidegger supplies some powerful arguments/analyses to support his
view. What I'm wondering about, however, is authenticity. It seems to me
that authenticity involves Dasein in a recognition and appropriation of its
own mode of Being--again, a mode Being that Heidegger makes clear is not
that of the Cartesian subject. But does "becoming" authentic require
certain acts of consciousness? Does Heidegger subtly (or not so subtly?)
reprivilege theory over praxis in his treatment of authenticity?
Christopher Rickey's summary of GA 34 suggests that this might be the case.
Any thoughts?
Chris Hargens
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------