Re: Authenticity and consciousness

>
> In _Being and Time_, Heidegger "subverts the Cartesian subject with the
> phenomenological-existential analyses of Da-sein" (to borrow the words of
> Iain Thomson). Dasein, authentic or not, is not a Cartesian subject. Now
> implicit in Heidegger's critique of the Cartesian subject is a critique of
> both the ontological and epistemological privileging of
> consciousness--"existence" and "knowledge" are neither founded upon nor
> reducible to the conscious subject. All of this makes sense to
> me--Heidegger supplies some powerful arguments/analyses to support his
> view. What I'm wondering about, however, is authenticity. It seems to me
> that authenticity involves Dasein in a recognition and appropriation of its
> own mode of Being--again, a mode Being that Heidegger makes clear is not
> that of the Cartesian subject. But does "becoming" authentic require
> certain acts of consciousness? Does Heidegger subtly (or not so subtly?)
> reprivilege theory over praxis in his treatment of authenticity?
> Christopher Rickey's summary of GA 34 suggests that this might be the case.
> Any thoughts?
>
> Chris Hargens
>
>
Does it matter that Heid abandoned the use of the word authenticity?
He kept 'authentic' as a description of various things, but dropped
authenticity as a mode of existing. Why? Perhaps because of some
of the objections that have been raised along this string; but there
are other reasons as well. Here Derrida's _Aporias_ is excellent.
Der uses Blanchot's Kafka-esque treatment of the tragic
impossibility of my own death to interpret the aporias (logical
conundrums that cannot be escaped but must be passed through) that
arise out of a careful reading of the existential analysis of death
in B&T. If death is the possibility of an impossibility, than how
can for-running this pos of an impos be Dasein;'s eigenste
seinkoennen (ownmost/most proper/most authenticating[?]
ability-to-be).
That 'death is the shrine of the nothing' is one answer
here, but not one that appears in B&T.

Derrida acknowledges that Heidegger's PhG of death is
incontestible, that nothing can testify against it (though he
briefly raises some Levinasian worries about the 'this-siededness' of
the existential analysis, i.e., that Heid doesn't consider death
from the other side... But as Der implies, an other-sided anysis of
death isn't a phenomenological possbility for Dasein). Anyway, the
issues are too complex to attempt to summarize them here; but the
upshot is that the relationship between authenticity and death is
profoundly problematic.

Iain
>
>
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