>
> Iain. I have a quick question about emergence. (I was too quick with
> the delete key and have lost the first post from jb -- sorry, jb.) But,
> with the problems and qualifications you bring up, the word seems to work
> pretty well.
>
> You say "Emergence is not a bad translation for being as phusis," but
> isn't phusis already being as a being (or beings), .i.e., to be *as*
> phusis isn't it already necessary for a being to be what it is in its
> ownmost? Similarly, isn't the emergence or advance into intelligibility
> already (always already) a being as something? The value of the word to
> me seems to be that it forces an emphasis on one of H's central problems:
> that beings are intelligible as bearers of properties, and that this mode
> of being is the one in which the being as what it is can emerge as itself
> in its ownmost.
Do you mean that this is a problem *for* Heidegger, or a problem
that he frequently addresses? I don't think you can mean the
latter, and the former seems easy tyo answer within Heid's story of
the history of being: beings as the bearers of properties get named
into being by Locke (among others), and then Descartes inverts this
picture of a thing with properties when he thinks of the self as an
ego directed upon its own representations (the mental
theatre)--Olafson's book is very good here, _Heidegger and the
Philosophy of Mind_. And then the point would be that a being
showing up as a bearer of properties is not showing itself in its
ownmost, as you put it; rather, it rests on a phenomenological
mistake, presupposing the untenable metaphysics of the
subject/object dichotomy.
Phusis, as one of the first ways in which being shows itself, is
ostensively closer to an authentic understanding of being than is
the Cartesian understanding, filtered as it is by many generations
of metaphysical filtering. While being can never be named (that it
could be is the mistake upon which the metaphysical ambition rests),
i.e., can never be captured by a single name, or exhausted by an
overarching conceptual scheme, the return to phusis is useful to the
recovery of something of the fuller sense being had near its
origins; as Heidegger reads it (as "self-emerging blossoming") it
gets at something of the temporal dynamism implicit in the Greek
origins (before this temporal dynamism gets ossified in the ousia,
hyle, and the later metaphysics of substance--including the
Cartesian res and thus the res cogitans--which develop out of this
earlier understanding of being). >
> I'm trying to avoid the phenomenological line "emerge to Dasein" or
> "emerge to intelligence," because I think such a way of framing the
> question would already take an edge off H's way of asking the question.
I'm afraid I don't understand this. Presence is 'presence as.'
This is one of the central insights of the phenomenological
tradition, and i don't think Heidegger ever relinquishes it.
Something can only be intelligible to or for someone (Dasein). This
is why 'being needs man.'
> But I don't think "emergence" has to subordinate the idea of "ownmost" to
> a phenomenological exchange -- things emerge as what they are, their
> emergence catches up the movement into (their appropriation) of their own
> (propriate) mode of being. The other advantage of emergence, understood
> in terms of the issues you rightly raise, is that it would carry the
> force of aletheia's structure, namely that discoveredness or unveiling is
> always the disclosure of some-thing.
>
> This is a pretty rough run-through, but I hope it makes some kind of
> sense. Anyway, "emergence" is a term that has a lot of interesting
> possibilities, and one that carries a nuance that the others (propriate,
> empropriation, endowment, etc.) can't advance by themselves.
>
> Michael Harrawood
>
>
Yes, emergence is certainly interesting. What's its etymology?
What I don't like about it, compared to enowning, emporopriation, is
what seems to be a sacrifice in the specificity of structure
(although maybe the etymology would rectify this objection). It has
the same advantages of phusis (raised above; combatting reification
of substance ontology, reintroducing the temporal dynamism implicit
in the Greek origins), but what does it contribute to an
understanding of the structure of Ereignis? I read Ereignis as
attempting to answer the Q of metaphysics: why is there being
rather than nothing, or how do beings come into being--thus I read
Ereignis as conditioning the possibility of intelligibility, and the
etymological clues to its structure are crucial in this respect.
And 'emergence' isn't much of an answer to the Q: how do beings
come into being? They emerge (?!) While it has the advantages of
phusis (but here being as phusis already does this, Ereignis should
be true of all namings of being, it risks a return to Medieval
theories of emanation and mystical hand-waving (the word 'emergence'
has this connotation in cog sci circles already, although in another
context--how does intentionality emerge out of brain-processes?)
There's a lot more to be said about this; Qs of t5ranslation are
central to understanding, I take it.
BTW, Hodge's new book translated Wesen by 'emergence'!
Iain
> --- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------
> Iain. I have a quick question about emergence. (I was too quick with
> the delete key and have lost the first post from jb -- sorry, jb.) But,
> with the problems and qualifications you bring up, the word seems to work
> pretty well.
>
> You say "Emergence is not a bad translation for being as phusis," but
> isn't phusis already being as a being (or beings), .i.e., to be *as*
> phusis isn't it already necessary for a being to be what it is in its
> ownmost? Similarly, isn't the emergence or advance into intelligibility
> already (always already) a being as something? The value of the word to
> me seems to be that it forces an emphasis on one of H's central problems:
> that beings are intelligible as bearers of properties, and that this mode
> of being is the one in which the being as what it is can emerge as itself
> in its ownmost.
Do you mean that this is a problem *for* Heidegger, or a problem
that he frequently addresses? I don't think you can mean the
latter, and the former seems easy tyo answer within Heid's story of
the history of being: beings as the bearers of properties get named
into being by Locke (among others), and then Descartes inverts this
picture of a thing with properties when he thinks of the self as an
ego directed upon its own representations (the mental
theatre)--Olafson's book is very good here, _Heidegger and the
Philosophy of Mind_. And then the point would be that a being
showing up as a bearer of properties is not showing itself in its
ownmost, as you put it; rather, it rests on a phenomenological
mistake, presupposing the untenable metaphysics of the
subject/object dichotomy.
Phusis, as one of the first ways in which being shows itself, is
ostensively closer to an authentic understanding of being than is
the Cartesian understanding, filtered as it is by many generations
of metaphysical filtering. While being can never be named (that it
could be is the mistake upon which the metaphysical ambition rests),
i.e., can never be captured by a single name, or exhausted by an
overarching conceptual scheme, the return to phusis is useful to the
recovery of something of the fuller sense being had near its
origins; as Heidegger reads it (as "self-emerging blossoming") it
gets at something of the temporal dynamism implicit in the Greek
origins (before this temporal dynamism gets ossified in the ousia,
hyle, and the later metaphysics of substance--including the
Cartesian res and thus the res cogitans--which develop out of this
earlier understanding of being). >
> I'm trying to avoid the phenomenological line "emerge to Dasein" or
> "emerge to intelligence," because I think such a way of framing the
> question would already take an edge off H's way of asking the question.
I'm afraid I don't understand this. Presence is 'presence as.'
This is one of the central insights of the phenomenological
tradition, and i don't think Heidegger ever relinquishes it.
Something can only be intelligible to or for someone (Dasein). This
is why 'being needs man.'
> But I don't think "emergence" has to subordinate the idea of "ownmost" to
> a phenomenological exchange -- things emerge as what they are, their
> emergence catches up the movement into (their appropriation) of their own
> (propriate) mode of being. The other advantage of emergence, understood
> in terms of the issues you rightly raise, is that it would carry the
> force of aletheia's structure, namely that discoveredness or unveiling is
> always the disclosure of some-thing.
>
> This is a pretty rough run-through, but I hope it makes some kind of
> sense. Anyway, "emergence" is a term that has a lot of interesting
> possibilities, and one that carries a nuance that the others (propriate,
> empropriation, endowment, etc.) can't advance by themselves.
>
> Michael Harrawood
>
>
Yes, emergence is certainly interesting. What's its etymology?
What I don't like about it, compared to enowning, emporopriation, is
what seems to be a sacrifice in the specificity of structure
(although maybe the etymology would rectify this objection). It has
the same advantages of phusis (raised above; combatting reification
of substance ontology, reintroducing the temporal dynamism implicit
in the Greek origins), but what does it contribute to an
understanding of the structure of Ereignis? I read Ereignis as
attempting to answer the Q of metaphysics: why is there being
rather than nothing, or how do beings come into being--thus I read
Ereignis as conditioning the possibility of intelligibility, and the
etymological clues to its structure are crucial in this respect.
And 'emergence' isn't much of an answer to the Q: how do beings
come into being? They emerge (?!) While it has the advantages of
phusis (but here being as phusis already does this, Ereignis should
be true of all namings of being, it risks a return to Medieval
theories of emanation and mystical hand-waving (the word 'emergence'
has this connotation in cog sci circles already, although in another
context--how does intentionality emerge out of brain-processes?)
There's a lot more to be said about this; Qs of t5ranslation are
central to understanding, I take it.
BTW, Hodge's new book translated Wesen by 'emergence'!
Iain
> --- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------