On Sat, 24 Jun 1995 PhilMill@xxxxxxx wrote:
> I share the interest David Schenk has expressed in the early Heidegger. It
> seems to me that Heidegger usually has Husserl in the back of his mind during
> this period, working both against and with him. This is almost certainly
> true in regard to temporality, given Heidegger's role in editing Husserl's
> early lectures on internal time-consciousness, published in 1928.
>
> Although I don't know as much about his writings on temporality as I would
> like to, I have the sense that Heidegger is trying to set up a contrast
> between the noetic temporality studied by Husserl, and the more primordial,
> pre-theoretical form of temporality which Heidegger describes as "the
> ontological meaning of care." The futural orientation of Dasein seems to be
> an important step here. Eventually, he wants to show that Husserlian
> intentionality is derived from or founded on this deeper form of temporality
> (see note in BT Sec 69b).
>
> I look forward to future posts on this subject.
>
> -- Phil Miller
------------------------------------------
I think you're absolutely right about this. Especially with respect to
intentionality, Heidegger is explicit in his attempt to ground
intentionality in something more fundamental, namely, temporality
[zeitlichkeit], as you said. A lot is said about this in _Basic Problems
of Phenomenology_, as well as in $69.b and c of _BT_. As I understand it,
intentionality is grounded in transcendence, which in turn is then
grounded in temporality, since the temporalizing of temporality is
supposed to be "the primary ekstatikon," or "the outside-of-itself pure
and simple," or what have you. So Dasein is only intentional insofar as
it is outside of itself in the world (transcendent), and it only has the
character of transcendence insofar as it is, in its most basic essence,
temporal. I think this is what he's driving at when he says things like
"Dasein _is_ its time." (Quoted from the very end of _History of the
Concept of Time_.) This is indeed a very significant deviation from
Husserlian phenomenology, since Husserl took intentionality to be
absolutely basic. Intentionality did all the explaining; nothing
explained _it_.
What really gets fuzzy for me is how we are meant to understand this
peculiar "temporalizing of temporality" if it is nonsequential, not
reducible to all sorts of psychological stuff about memory and (ordinary)
anticipation of the future, not explained through intentionality, specific
to Dasein and not to the rest of being, and yet prior to everything of
human mental life. What in tarnation does it _mean_ to say "temporality
temporalizes"?? Does anyone understand this? i don't understand this. I
have never understood it. Somehow, we must make sense of it without
employing anything of our ordinary sequential understanding of time.
Indeed, originary temporality is supposed to explain sequential time. So
how are we supposed to understand this very basic "event" of temporality's
temporalizing itself without falling into some kind of metaphorical
understanding of it in terms of our ordinary grasp of events. I mean,
what does such a verb as "temporalizing" mean without the
"within-time-ness" of ordinary events?
Does anybody have ideas on this? I find it all terribly puzzling.
-David Schenk
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------
> I share the interest David Schenk has expressed in the early Heidegger. It
> seems to me that Heidegger usually has Husserl in the back of his mind during
> this period, working both against and with him. This is almost certainly
> true in regard to temporality, given Heidegger's role in editing Husserl's
> early lectures on internal time-consciousness, published in 1928.
>
> Although I don't know as much about his writings on temporality as I would
> like to, I have the sense that Heidegger is trying to set up a contrast
> between the noetic temporality studied by Husserl, and the more primordial,
> pre-theoretical form of temporality which Heidegger describes as "the
> ontological meaning of care." The futural orientation of Dasein seems to be
> an important step here. Eventually, he wants to show that Husserlian
> intentionality is derived from or founded on this deeper form of temporality
> (see note in BT Sec 69b).
>
> I look forward to future posts on this subject.
>
> -- Phil Miller
------------------------------------------
I think you're absolutely right about this. Especially with respect to
intentionality, Heidegger is explicit in his attempt to ground
intentionality in something more fundamental, namely, temporality
[zeitlichkeit], as you said. A lot is said about this in _Basic Problems
of Phenomenology_, as well as in $69.b and c of _BT_. As I understand it,
intentionality is grounded in transcendence, which in turn is then
grounded in temporality, since the temporalizing of temporality is
supposed to be "the primary ekstatikon," or "the outside-of-itself pure
and simple," or what have you. So Dasein is only intentional insofar as
it is outside of itself in the world (transcendent), and it only has the
character of transcendence insofar as it is, in its most basic essence,
temporal. I think this is what he's driving at when he says things like
"Dasein _is_ its time." (Quoted from the very end of _History of the
Concept of Time_.) This is indeed a very significant deviation from
Husserlian phenomenology, since Husserl took intentionality to be
absolutely basic. Intentionality did all the explaining; nothing
explained _it_.
What really gets fuzzy for me is how we are meant to understand this
peculiar "temporalizing of temporality" if it is nonsequential, not
reducible to all sorts of psychological stuff about memory and (ordinary)
anticipation of the future, not explained through intentionality, specific
to Dasein and not to the rest of being, and yet prior to everything of
human mental life. What in tarnation does it _mean_ to say "temporality
temporalizes"?? Does anyone understand this? i don't understand this. I
have never understood it. Somehow, we must make sense of it without
employing anything of our ordinary sequential understanding of time.
Indeed, originary temporality is supposed to explain sequential time. So
how are we supposed to understand this very basic "event" of temporality's
temporalizing itself without falling into some kind of metaphorical
understanding of it in terms of our ordinary grasp of events. I mean,
what does such a verb as "temporalizing" mean without the
"within-time-ness" of ordinary events?
Does anybody have ideas on this? I find it all terribly puzzling.
-David Schenk
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------