I am trying to work out some thoughts on the relationship between
language and discourse in Heidegger and Derrida, and I would like to get
some comments and suggestion on the line I'm pursuing.
I find it helpful to start with Saussure's distinction between
language (_langue_) and speech or discourse (_parole_). For Saussure,
speech is possible only on the basis of language. Language is the pre-
existing, underlying system of differences which makes speech possible.
When we speak, we make meaningful expressions by playing upon this
system; we make use of the system of differences--though of course we
don't actually understand it as a system. The understanding of the
system is achieved only in linguistic science.
The Heidegger of BT has a very different view of the relationship
between speech or discourse and language. For him, language is founded
on discourse, rather than the other way around. From his
phenomenological perspective, it is discourse that comes first; language
is a kind of deposit or sediment that discourse leaves behind. "The way
in which discourse gets expressed [die Hinausgesprochenheit der Rede] is
language" (BT 204). In other words, discourse is what we experience in
everyday existence, not language; language may indeed be the object of
linguistic science, but the philosophical task to is to explain language
in terms of discourse, not to explain discourse in terms of language.
But what about Derrida: is he more Saussurian or more Heideggerian
in his view of the relation between language and discourse? To me he
seems more Saussurian. Of course he criticizes Saussure (and Heidegger
too) for his "phonocentrism," i.e. for making speech prior to writing.
But this has to do with what is prior within the realm of discourse; it
does not challenge Saussure's more basic thesis that language as the
system of differences is prior to all discourse, spoken or written.
Indeed, it seems to me that Derrida's "differance" is simply a
radicalization of Saussure's notion of difference: if meaning is created
by playing on an underlying system of differences, Derrida argues, then
meaning must always be deferred. The meaning of what is said is never
fully present to the speaker, and thus all speech is "writing" (as it
has traditionally been conceived).
But if I'm right that Derrida is simply working out the
implications of a Saussurian view of language, isn't his apparent
radicalism really only apparent? Isn't he implicitly accepting the
authority of linguistic science, rather than questioning its
presuppositions? Doesn't Heidegger give us a more philoscphically
nuanced treament of discourse precisely because he starts with the
everday phenomenon (discourse) rather than with the scientific construct
(language)?
Comments and suggestions welcome.
-- Phil Miller
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------
language and discourse in Heidegger and Derrida, and I would like to get
some comments and suggestion on the line I'm pursuing.
I find it helpful to start with Saussure's distinction between
language (_langue_) and speech or discourse (_parole_). For Saussure,
speech is possible only on the basis of language. Language is the pre-
existing, underlying system of differences which makes speech possible.
When we speak, we make meaningful expressions by playing upon this
system; we make use of the system of differences--though of course we
don't actually understand it as a system. The understanding of the
system is achieved only in linguistic science.
The Heidegger of BT has a very different view of the relationship
between speech or discourse and language. For him, language is founded
on discourse, rather than the other way around. From his
phenomenological perspective, it is discourse that comes first; language
is a kind of deposit or sediment that discourse leaves behind. "The way
in which discourse gets expressed [die Hinausgesprochenheit der Rede] is
language" (BT 204). In other words, discourse is what we experience in
everyday existence, not language; language may indeed be the object of
linguistic science, but the philosophical task to is to explain language
in terms of discourse, not to explain discourse in terms of language.
But what about Derrida: is he more Saussurian or more Heideggerian
in his view of the relation between language and discourse? To me he
seems more Saussurian. Of course he criticizes Saussure (and Heidegger
too) for his "phonocentrism," i.e. for making speech prior to writing.
But this has to do with what is prior within the realm of discourse; it
does not challenge Saussure's more basic thesis that language as the
system of differences is prior to all discourse, spoken or written.
Indeed, it seems to me that Derrida's "differance" is simply a
radicalization of Saussure's notion of difference: if meaning is created
by playing on an underlying system of differences, Derrida argues, then
meaning must always be deferred. The meaning of what is said is never
fully present to the speaker, and thus all speech is "writing" (as it
has traditionally been conceived).
But if I'm right that Derrida is simply working out the
implications of a Saussurian view of language, isn't his apparent
radicalism really only apparent? Isn't he implicitly accepting the
authority of linguistic science, rather than questioning its
presuppositions? Doesn't Heidegger give us a more philoscphically
nuanced treament of discourse precisely because he starts with the
everday phenomenon (discourse) rather than with the scientific construct
(language)?
Comments and suggestions welcome.
-- Phil Miller
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------