jlelson@xxxxxxxxxxxx writes:
>I have often been tempted to ask if "does Heidegger's emphasis upon Being
>entail that he continues to believe in grammar?" To what degree is
>this emphasis of he determined/conditioned/informed by his theism?
>I ask these questions since I do think H. ever adequately addressed
>them or considered the possibility that N. might be correct about
>the notion/concept of Being.
My sense is that Heidegger and Nietzsche both are concerned with the question
of Being, but approach it from different perspectives, with different
hermeneutical machinery. My take on Heidegger is that he is a
phenomenologist who approaches the notion of Being roughly as a cipher for
whatever Husserl would call the essential structures of intentionality.
Being is always operative wherever Dasein is found. Heidegger doesn't
believe in grammar, in the sense of naively hewing to its metaphysical cues.
Rather, in a sense roughly analogous to Husserl, he brackets it, but lets it
operate in ways which allow it to deconstruct itself, carving out a path
toward what might be beyond the ready-to-handedness of its propositional
logic.
>I have often been tempted to ask if "does Heidegger's emphasis upon Being
>entail that he continues to believe in grammar?" To what degree is
>this emphasis of he determined/conditioned/informed by his theism?
>I ask these questions since I do think H. ever adequately addressed
>them or considered the possibility that N. might be correct about
>the notion/concept of Being.
My sense is that Heidegger and Nietzsche both are concerned with the question
of Being, but approach it from different perspectives, with different
hermeneutical machinery. My take on Heidegger is that he is a
phenomenologist who approaches the notion of Being roughly as a cipher for
whatever Husserl would call the essential structures of intentionality.
Being is always operative wherever Dasein is found. Heidegger doesn't
believe in grammar, in the sense of naively hewing to its metaphysical cues.
Rather, in a sense roughly analogous to Husserl, he brackets it, but lets it
operate in ways which allow it to deconstruct itself, carving out a path
toward what might be beyond the ready-to-handedness of its propositional
logic.