Colin. A way of answering your second question -- about the "saying" of
being (If I'm understanding you right) -- would be to look at the way the
opening of Book Theta of Aristotle's Metaphysics usually gets
translated. Apostle, following the dominant neo-Kantian reading of the
Metaphysics for his time, has: "For it is in virtue of the formula of
substance that each of the others, such as quantities and qualities and
the like, is called "a being". . . " Heidegger will translate the above
as "Being is said in many ways," following much more closely Aristotle's
text, and he will argue, Aristotle's sense: the word "substance" in
Apolstle's translation above, for example, translates Aristotle's
"ousia," which closes precisely the gap Heidegger (thinks that Aristotle)
wants to open for questioning.
The ancient formula "Being is said in many ways," becomes critical to
Heidegger's discussion of language, Dasein, being, etc. The question is:
How does it work? How is it that, to try quoting you from memory, man
dwells in the house of being, which is language? What is it about Dasein
that makes it "feel right" -- makes it feel like Being to us? I don't
think Heidegger ever got past the reduction implied in his famous
"Language is the House of Being" line. Language is being; being is language.
Michael Harrawood
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------
being (If I'm understanding you right) -- would be to look at the way the
opening of Book Theta of Aristotle's Metaphysics usually gets
translated. Apostle, following the dominant neo-Kantian reading of the
Metaphysics for his time, has: "For it is in virtue of the formula of
substance that each of the others, such as quantities and qualities and
the like, is called "a being". . . " Heidegger will translate the above
as "Being is said in many ways," following much more closely Aristotle's
text, and he will argue, Aristotle's sense: the word "substance" in
Apolstle's translation above, for example, translates Aristotle's
"ousia," which closes precisely the gap Heidegger (thinks that Aristotle)
wants to open for questioning.
The ancient formula "Being is said in many ways," becomes critical to
Heidegger's discussion of language, Dasein, being, etc. The question is:
How does it work? How is it that, to try quoting you from memory, man
dwells in the house of being, which is language? What is it about Dasein
that makes it "feel right" -- makes it feel like Being to us? I don't
think Heidegger ever got past the reduction implied in his famous
"Language is the House of Being" line. Language is being; being is language.
Michael Harrawood
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------