On Heidegger and the attempt to descredit his work based on a perceived
affinity for Nazism:
Looked at from a certain angle, doesn't it seem a bit anthropocentric
to expect that we could derive an ethics or a politics based on
something like fundamental ontology? Are we really so arrogant (to
use a morally loaded term) as to think that Being itself, or the
ontological structure of existence, even specifically human existence,
is going to accomodate itself around our (perceived) need for such
a system? Isn't it possible that Heidegger, and those working in
his shadow, are unable to derive such a system from his ontology
because the subject matter of ontology itself, namely Being, simply
is _not_ related to this kind of concern?
Even if such an ontological ground in which to embed ethics is
locatable, why do we assume a priori that it is going to give us
something like 'it is inherent in the very structure of existence
itself that we should go around being nice to people, treating
them as our moral equals, respecting their beliefs, etc.,' in
other words, that it should tell us what we already believe?
Isn't it possible that the structure of Being just might not
be very, shall we say, benevolent?
I remember a professor back when I was an undergrad making the
comment that most ethical theorists usually wound up providing
a rational justification for whatever was commonly considered
moral behaviour in their particular historical context. Aristotle,
at least, is forthright about this - the _Nichomachean Ethics_
is quite plainly a distillation and codification of what 'we,
the Greeks, the only ones that count, think is right.' Nietzsche
makes the point somewhere (in _Die froehliche Wissenschaft_, I
think, but don't quote me on this) that second _Critique_ simply
repeated what the ordinary person believed in terms that the
ordinary person could never understand. (That's KANT'S second
critique, sorry, can't backspace on this damn thing).
My point is this, said much more succinctly: it takes a hell of
lot of gall to think that the structure of Being is such that
its investigation and study is going to be able to give us finite
beings a guide as to how to live properly, and to simply think
that we can toss out any philosophical system that doesn't tell
us that the world is the way that we would like it be.
Christopher Doss
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
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affinity for Nazism:
Looked at from a certain angle, doesn't it seem a bit anthropocentric
to expect that we could derive an ethics or a politics based on
something like fundamental ontology? Are we really so arrogant (to
use a morally loaded term) as to think that Being itself, or the
ontological structure of existence, even specifically human existence,
is going to accomodate itself around our (perceived) need for such
a system? Isn't it possible that Heidegger, and those working in
his shadow, are unable to derive such a system from his ontology
because the subject matter of ontology itself, namely Being, simply
is _not_ related to this kind of concern?
Even if such an ontological ground in which to embed ethics is
locatable, why do we assume a priori that it is going to give us
something like 'it is inherent in the very structure of existence
itself that we should go around being nice to people, treating
them as our moral equals, respecting their beliefs, etc.,' in
other words, that it should tell us what we already believe?
Isn't it possible that the structure of Being just might not
be very, shall we say, benevolent?
I remember a professor back when I was an undergrad making the
comment that most ethical theorists usually wound up providing
a rational justification for whatever was commonly considered
moral behaviour in their particular historical context. Aristotle,
at least, is forthright about this - the _Nichomachean Ethics_
is quite plainly a distillation and codification of what 'we,
the Greeks, the only ones that count, think is right.' Nietzsche
makes the point somewhere (in _Die froehliche Wissenschaft_, I
think, but don't quote me on this) that second _Critique_ simply
repeated what the ordinary person believed in terms that the
ordinary person could never understand. (That's KANT'S second
critique, sorry, can't backspace on this damn thing).
My point is this, said much more succinctly: it takes a hell of
lot of gall to think that the structure of Being is such that
its investigation and study is going to be able to give us finite
beings a guide as to how to live properly, and to simply think
that we can toss out any philosophical system that doesn't tell
us that the world is the way that we would like it be.
Christopher Doss
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------