Michael,
>Nik. I agree with Chris about death and Dasein. The death sections in
>B&T are pretty straightforward about this, I think, but I don't know how
>well I can summarize them here. Death is Dasein's completion, it is not
>just one of the possibilities Dasein presses forward into, it is the
>termination and completion of all those possibilites, and thus is the
>moment in which Dasein finally ceases to be "in advance" if itself. So,
>what I think you mean by Dasein's "structure" is something like what for
>Heidegger would be Dasein always verging on the new, on something that
>lies outside and just ahead of it. Death is not a part of this
>structure, but is its terminus and completion.
I would have to disagree vehemont... vehemontel... *really* strongly.
Dasein has no "completion" (no point of completion anyway). Heidegger is
extremely clear on this point. More to the point, however, is that Dasein
does not "press forward into possibilities". That would to instill
Heidegger with a Whiteheadian (to pick someone who does a good job with
possibilities) metaphysics that would be unwelcome to Heidegger. Dasein
*is* its possibilities. Dasein's possibilities are not something that
exists *outside* of Dasein that can be "pressed into". Dasein is its
"not-yet". Dasein is already its Death. Even more moreover, Heidegger is
even more clear about the fact that Dasein can not "cease to be in advance
of itself". To cease to be in advance of itself (to stop being its
not-yet") would require Dasein to no longer be Dasien. Being its "not-yet"
is definitive of Dasein and to speak of Dasein ceasing to be its "not-yet"
would be not to be speaking of Dasein. Heidegger says that we create this
idea (of the end in the way you seem to be stating it) by watching the
deaths of others but it is not something that is an option for us (Dasein).
That was my whole point: Death is our ownmost potentiality for being. It is
something that we already are. We can not "be" or "not be". We can only
"be". In being this (in existing), we are already our ownmost possibility,
which is death.
As for structures, they can not be something that lies ahead of
Dasein. They are what (or "how" - to stick with words that Christian and I
are discussing) Dasein is. Dasein is "being in the world", "Being with
others", "State of Mind", "Understanding", "being towards the end", etc.
etc. These are teh structures which are definitive (constitutive) of
Dasein. It is how Heidegger has chosen (?) to formally describe Dasein.Our
"Ownmost potentiality for being" is that structure which allows Dasein to be
seen in its entirety because it takes in Dasein as a whole. To get to this,
death (as a concept) is necessary. Death is, I would say, therefore, a part
of the whole. A structure of Dasein.
I'm not sure if that clarify's my position any better but I hope it does.
Sorry that Got confusing near the end of the first paragraph.. It is tricky
to get around (less tricky in German I am told). If you insist on seeing
possibility as something we "move into" then I would suggest a re-read of
the part of B&T on "Understanding". Our possibilities are part of us, not
some metaphysical structure outside of us. If you are still seeing a
possibility of Dasein not being its "not-yet" (ceasing to be ahead of
itself) then the section on Death in Division two should clear it up (and
isn't too bad a read).
I am certainly happy to willingly entertain arguments that state that Death
is not a "structure" of Dasein (and especially that it is not "simply
another structure" - I think I so foolishly said). Death is a very relevant
and extremely strange structure of Dasein. I have even read arguments that
it has no existentiell-Ontical side to it. I am even happy to entertain
arguments that are like yours above (just not so willingly - smile).
Sorry to come off so strongly but Death is the only section of Heidegger
that I know REALLY well (The part in B&T anyway). I do not mean to sound
like I am spitting at you, my writing just comes out that way a bit more
when I am (over?) confident in what I am talking about (smile). I could
forward you a pretty bad essay on the topic if you like.
>I think that to understand this would be also to understand the nature of
>care, and why angst is privileged over love for Heidegger. There is a
>great meditation on Heidegger's notion of death in the early writings of
>Maurice Blanchot, which have taught me a lot -- especially his essay
>"Literature and the Right to Death," which is in _De Kafka a Kafka_, and
>has been translated and anthologized a couple of times.
I have always found that existentialists in general (and literary
existentialists in particular) place too much emphasis on the role of Death
in Heidegger's B&T. Death becomes this all important "category" that we
must understand in order to be authentic. I just do not see this as the
case (In Heidegger). It is midway in the formal pathway to understanding
authentic existence, but is not something that needs be mulled over or
feared. Quite the contrary. How can we fear something that we already are?
Anyway Michael, once again, sorry for comming down so strongly.
Pre-drinking before a referendum party I am attending probably ain't helping
(smile).
-Nik
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------
>Nik. I agree with Chris about death and Dasein. The death sections in
>B&T are pretty straightforward about this, I think, but I don't know how
>well I can summarize them here. Death is Dasein's completion, it is not
>just one of the possibilities Dasein presses forward into, it is the
>termination and completion of all those possibilites, and thus is the
>moment in which Dasein finally ceases to be "in advance" if itself. So,
>what I think you mean by Dasein's "structure" is something like what for
>Heidegger would be Dasein always verging on the new, on something that
>lies outside and just ahead of it. Death is not a part of this
>structure, but is its terminus and completion.
I would have to disagree vehemont... vehemontel... *really* strongly.
Dasein has no "completion" (no point of completion anyway). Heidegger is
extremely clear on this point. More to the point, however, is that Dasein
does not "press forward into possibilities". That would to instill
Heidegger with a Whiteheadian (to pick someone who does a good job with
possibilities) metaphysics that would be unwelcome to Heidegger. Dasein
*is* its possibilities. Dasein's possibilities are not something that
exists *outside* of Dasein that can be "pressed into". Dasein is its
"not-yet". Dasein is already its Death. Even more moreover, Heidegger is
even more clear about the fact that Dasein can not "cease to be in advance
of itself". To cease to be in advance of itself (to stop being its
not-yet") would require Dasein to no longer be Dasien. Being its "not-yet"
is definitive of Dasein and to speak of Dasein ceasing to be its "not-yet"
would be not to be speaking of Dasein. Heidegger says that we create this
idea (of the end in the way you seem to be stating it) by watching the
deaths of others but it is not something that is an option for us (Dasein).
That was my whole point: Death is our ownmost potentiality for being. It is
something that we already are. We can not "be" or "not be". We can only
"be". In being this (in existing), we are already our ownmost possibility,
which is death.
As for structures, they can not be something that lies ahead of
Dasein. They are what (or "how" - to stick with words that Christian and I
are discussing) Dasein is. Dasein is "being in the world", "Being with
others", "State of Mind", "Understanding", "being towards the end", etc.
etc. These are teh structures which are definitive (constitutive) of
Dasein. It is how Heidegger has chosen (?) to formally describe Dasein.Our
"Ownmost potentiality for being" is that structure which allows Dasein to be
seen in its entirety because it takes in Dasein as a whole. To get to this,
death (as a concept) is necessary. Death is, I would say, therefore, a part
of the whole. A structure of Dasein.
I'm not sure if that clarify's my position any better but I hope it does.
Sorry that Got confusing near the end of the first paragraph.. It is tricky
to get around (less tricky in German I am told). If you insist on seeing
possibility as something we "move into" then I would suggest a re-read of
the part of B&T on "Understanding". Our possibilities are part of us, not
some metaphysical structure outside of us. If you are still seeing a
possibility of Dasein not being its "not-yet" (ceasing to be ahead of
itself) then the section on Death in Division two should clear it up (and
isn't too bad a read).
I am certainly happy to willingly entertain arguments that state that Death
is not a "structure" of Dasein (and especially that it is not "simply
another structure" - I think I so foolishly said). Death is a very relevant
and extremely strange structure of Dasein. I have even read arguments that
it has no existentiell-Ontical side to it. I am even happy to entertain
arguments that are like yours above (just not so willingly - smile).
Sorry to come off so strongly but Death is the only section of Heidegger
that I know REALLY well (The part in B&T anyway). I do not mean to sound
like I am spitting at you, my writing just comes out that way a bit more
when I am (over?) confident in what I am talking about (smile). I could
forward you a pretty bad essay on the topic if you like.
>I think that to understand this would be also to understand the nature of
>care, and why angst is privileged over love for Heidegger. There is a
>great meditation on Heidegger's notion of death in the early writings of
>Maurice Blanchot, which have taught me a lot -- especially his essay
>"Literature and the Right to Death," which is in _De Kafka a Kafka_, and
>has been translated and anthologized a couple of times.
I have always found that existentialists in general (and literary
existentialists in particular) place too much emphasis on the role of Death
in Heidegger's B&T. Death becomes this all important "category" that we
must understand in order to be authentic. I just do not see this as the
case (In Heidegger). It is midway in the formal pathway to understanding
authentic existence, but is not something that needs be mulled over or
feared. Quite the contrary. How can we fear something that we already are?
Anyway Michael, once again, sorry for comming down so strongly.
Pre-drinking before a referendum party I am attending probably ain't helping
(smile).
-Nik
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------