A follow-up to several comments in Christopher Rickey's most recent
message. Christopher writes:
"Heidegger thought that modern science was specifically mathematical
because the ancients did experiments as well. Since Bacon recommended
experimentation as the way to unlock the secrets of nature, Heidegger
would not have thought him as particularly revolutionary, unlike
Descartes or Gallileo."
If Heidegger regarded ancient science as experimental (did he??), I think
he was mistaken. No doubt the ancients sometimes did things that we
would now describe as experiments, but I'm not sure it's correct to say
that ancient science was experimental, in the sense of having a basic
reliance on planned experiences designed to answer our questions about
nature. Aristotle says that the physicist needs _empeiria_, an
accumulation of natural experiences--but that's not the same as
experimentation.
I would want to say that modern natural science differs from ancient
natural science in three distinct ways: it is technological, it is
mathematical, _and_ it is experimental.
Christopher mentions that
"Poeggeler, for one, has criticized Heidegger for misrepresenting the
true character of modern science."
Can you elaborate on this, Christopher? I'm not familiar with
Poeggeler's criticism, but I would like to understand it better. Is it
connected in any way with Heidegger's failure to confront Bacon? (A
reference to Poeggeler would also be appreciated.)
Christopher goes on to make a final point that I find very interesting:
"Another point (and why I mentioned Strauss) is that taken from a
perspective that would interest Heidegger, the use of technology by
humans to conquer nature and treat it purely instrumentally, Bacon
works well, as well as or perhaps even better than Descartes. If this
is true, then Heidegger's characterization of modern science would
hold true, whether it is mathematical or experimental."
Descartes and Bacon do have much more in common than people often
assume. I have previously mentioned the point that Bacon's physics (as
least as interpreted by Faulkner) is in fact mathematical in its
conception. On the other hand, Descartes was also quite Baconian. This
comes out clearly in the sixth Discourse, where he advocates a practical
philosophy that would make us "masters and possessors of nature," then
goes on to explain the pressing need for experiment.
-- Phil Miller
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message. Christopher writes:
"Heidegger thought that modern science was specifically mathematical
because the ancients did experiments as well. Since Bacon recommended
experimentation as the way to unlock the secrets of nature, Heidegger
would not have thought him as particularly revolutionary, unlike
Descartes or Gallileo."
If Heidegger regarded ancient science as experimental (did he??), I think
he was mistaken. No doubt the ancients sometimes did things that we
would now describe as experiments, but I'm not sure it's correct to say
that ancient science was experimental, in the sense of having a basic
reliance on planned experiences designed to answer our questions about
nature. Aristotle says that the physicist needs _empeiria_, an
accumulation of natural experiences--but that's not the same as
experimentation.
I would want to say that modern natural science differs from ancient
natural science in three distinct ways: it is technological, it is
mathematical, _and_ it is experimental.
Christopher mentions that
"Poeggeler, for one, has criticized Heidegger for misrepresenting the
true character of modern science."
Can you elaborate on this, Christopher? I'm not familiar with
Poeggeler's criticism, but I would like to understand it better. Is it
connected in any way with Heidegger's failure to confront Bacon? (A
reference to Poeggeler would also be appreciated.)
Christopher goes on to make a final point that I find very interesting:
"Another point (and why I mentioned Strauss) is that taken from a
perspective that would interest Heidegger, the use of technology by
humans to conquer nature and treat it purely instrumentally, Bacon
works well, as well as or perhaps even better than Descartes. If this
is true, then Heidegger's characterization of modern science would
hold true, whether it is mathematical or experimental."
Descartes and Bacon do have much more in common than people often
assume. I have previously mentioned the point that Bacon's physics (as
least as interpreted by Faulkner) is in fact mathematical in its
conception. On the other hand, Descartes was also quite Baconian. This
comes out clearly in the sixth Discourse, where he advocates a practical
philosophy that would make us "masters and possessors of nature," then
goes on to explain the pressing need for experiment.
-- Phil Miller
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------