Heidegger and Marx: Reply to Iain Thompson

Iain -=20

Thank you for your considered and measured reply to my comments. My =
accusation of "extravagance" was itself intended to be provocative, as I =
am sure you will appreciate.

In reply to your posting (I hope you won't mind if I don't "comment out" =
our discussion so far).

1 My reference to Heidegger's "ways" rather than "way" was intended to =
suggest that your discussion of the "placement" of particular thinkers, =
say Nietzsche, in the history of Being suggests a homogeneity of that =
history, that it constitutes itself as a clear "line" or thread, almost =
(to exaggerate my reading of your position) unambiguously. Were this =
so, then Heidegger's continued dialogue with himself would suggest that =
he is ever seeking to correct his own "errors", to "purify" the reading =
of the history of Being & c. This is in itself a fallacy, for =
Heidegger's whole use of the language of "ways" (I refer you to the tag =
in the opening volume of the Gesamtausgabe, "ways not works") - and his =
discussion of "error" (repeated in his works) precisely opens up for us =
the ambiguity of the history of Being, which Heidegger so often portrays =
as a spatial experience (travelling on the ways, the "nearest" or most =
neighbourly is also the farthest from us, & c.).

2 This leads to my point about whether Marx *supplants* Nietzsche in a =
particular "placement" of the history of Being - which seems to me then =
to become a pantheon, with Heidegger simply the curator who moves the =
sarcophagi about in particular orders depending on his own particular =
position at any point in his life. This leads us to a false question of =
"who is Heidegger" - such as you might find in the early pages of van =
Buren's recent work "The Young Heidegger" - and although I think I =
appreciate what he is trying to convey there, I also think that =
discussions of that kind are unhelpful and lead to false trails =
(Holzwege, perhaps?).

3 Why I chose the citations I did from zur Seinsfrage is because, =
subtly, all the themes you raise are there present, on the first page, =
*including* a crucial discussion about the nature of the worker. (That =
Heidegger was drawn to Juenger's work at a particular historical moment =
(1932+), itself an examination of a kind of nihilistic metaphysics of =
the worker and class, tells us more than I have ever seen seriously =
discussed anywhere about Heidegger's own rapprochement with Nazism, and =
is indicative of the fact that Heidegger sided with a particular =
tendency of Nazism - a claim he himself made repeatedly. To concede =
this is to have to concede that Nazism was not a homogeneous political =
movement, but rather a collection of political tendencies of varying =
strengths and with more or less worked out ideological positions =
competing for the Fuehrer's attention and for the centre stage of power, =
but all this belongs to a different discussion it would be better not to =
resurrect on this list.) It struck me as significant that in the =
"mid-point" of Heidegger's own work that all these themes should come =
together as belonging together so clearly in one place. My choice was =
intended therefore, to challenge you "linear" reading of development in =
Heidegger's work. Ways, not *the* way.

4 If I may now quote your last post,=20

"With the fulfillment of nihilism only _begins_ the final phase of =
nihilism." This curious phrasing leaves it open that Nietzsche fulfills =
nihilism, but that Marx somehow reaches the position of the most extreme =
nihilism after Nietzsche fulfills it. I take it that man as =
labour-power represents the pinnacle of the subjectivism and metaphysics =
of will expressed in Nietzsche",=20

There is a point to be made here - is it Marx or Marxism that somehow =
reaches the position of extreme nihilism (or is it =
Marxism-Nazism-Capitalism - the global "movement of nihilism"). I think =
you have to some extent answered your own question, because the history =
of being is not linear, but epochal. There is a "hanging together" of =
certain themes (nihilism, technology and the Ge-stell etc) which have an =
essential, interior connection one with another. There is no need to =
supplant Nietzsche with Marx, they "belong together" (zusammengehoeren) =
in the *Vollendung* of metaphysics. Perhaps this is why a discussion of =
Parmenides follows on in parallel form to the later discussion of Marx =
as it does in the earlier discussion of Nietzsche in the 40's, although =
I think you need to say more here, and demonstrate *what* the discussion =
of Parmenides opens. *That* there is a parallel is perhaps merely =
coincidence or chance, unless you suggest (or Heidegger himself =
suggests) there was a reason for it. In a sense the discussion of =
Parmenides continues throughout Heidegger's life.

In conclusion, it seems to me that one of the questions that needs to be =
asked is "what is the essential (in its Heideggerian sense) connection =
between nihilism and the Ge-stell." I do not think you have yet proved =
your case, that Heidegger particularly sought to privelege Nietzsche =
over Marx or vie versa in the history of Being, or at any particular =
point in his own life.

There is so much more to be said here, but I do not have the time right =
now to say it. Thank you for a most enjoyable discussion.

Laurence Hemming


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