Deleuze often uses the word 'transcendent' when speaking of Time or what
he calls a 'synthesis,' such as connective, exclusive disjunctive, etc.
i do not think this terminology appears in the CINEMA books though.
After THE LOGIC OF SENSE, published in'69, Deleuze stops using the word
'transcendent' almost totally, except when opposing it to immanence. Perhaps
his encounter and subsequent collaboration with Guattari convinced him
to stop using this term. His respect for Kant, and his theory of Time (called
the Aion or empty form of Time, Eternal Return when dealing with Nietzsche),
often twists him into 'strange' passages that could be considered transcen-
dental. I think he does this to emphasize a Time not conditional upn space
or matter or energy or anything. But the concept of Time, combined
with the ontology of difference in itself and the resulting singularities
are very important to the rejection of ideology (at least i think they
are). But I will stand firm that the stuff on thought should not be taken
as a recapitulation of some kind of "mind" theory. According to D&G there
really isn't a psychology, only a physics or ontology. And this is ofc course
a result of his view of 'human' subjectivity, which he claims contains
a great deall of what we would think of as non-human elements. Thus all
the references to machines. For Deleuze on subjectivation see FOUCALUT, and
THE FOLD. For D&G's rejection of transcendence and their resulting ideas
for exactly what is called thinking, see the conclusion to WHAT IS
PHILOSOPHY?, "From Chaos to the Brain."
> Of course, plants and rocks do not possess a nervous systm. But, if
>nerve connections and cerebral integrations presuppose brain-force as
>faculty of feeling coexistent with the tissues, it is reasonable to suppose
>a falculty of feeling that coexists with embryonic tissues and that
>appears in the Species as a collective brain... Chemical affinities and
>physical causalities themselves refer to primary forces capable of
>preserning their long chains by contracting their elements and by making
>them resonate: no causality is intelligible without this subjective instance..
>Not every organism has a brain, and not all life is organic, but every-
>where there are forces that constitute microbrains, or an inorganic life
>of things.
WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? PP. 212-3
chris dacus
cnd7750@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
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