Chris,
I always find myself returning to the Preface to the English
edition of KANT'S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY when trying to figure out
Deleuze's theory of time (which, I agree, is not easy). Although
some of it is basically the same as passages in DIFFERENCE AND
REPETITION, I find it easier to follow. Anyway, allow me to quote
at length from the first few pages before going adding some of my
own thoughts:
Cardo, in Latin, designates the subordination of time to the
cardinal points through which the periodical movements that it
measures pass. As long as time remains on its hinges, it is
subordinate to movement: it is the measure of movement, interval
or number...But time out of joint signifies the reversal of the
movement-time relationship. It is now movement which is
subordinate to time [which, I think, ties into the spatial terms
used by Deleuze to describe time]...
Everything changes, including movement...Time is no longer related
to the movement which it measures, but movement is related to the
time which conditions it...Time is no longer defined by succession
because succession concerns only things and movements which are in
time. If time itself were succession, it would need to succeed in
another time, and on to infinity. Things succeed each other in
various times, but they are also simultaneous in the same time, and
they remain in an indefinite time [you can see here how time
becomes in a sense 'multi-dimensional']...
Everything which moves and changes is in time, but time itself does
not change, does not move, any more than it is eternal. It is the
form of everything that changes and moves, but it is an immutable
Form which does not change. It is not an eternal form, but in fact
the form of that which is not eternal, the immutable form of change
and movement...
Kant explains that the Ego itself is in time, and thus constantly
changing...But, on the other hand, the I is an act which constantly
carries out a synthesis of time, and of that which happens in time,
by dividing up the present, the past and the future at every
instant. The I and the Ego are thus separated by the line of time
which relates them to each other, but under the condition of a
fundamental difference...I am separated from myself by the form of
time, and nevertheless I am one, because the I necessarily affects
this form by carrying out its synthesis and because the Ego is
necessarily affected as content in this form...
Thus time moves into the subject in order to distinguish the Ego
from the I in it. It is the form under which the I affects the
ego, that is, the way in which the mind affects itself...'Form of
interiority' means not only that time is internal to us, but that
our interiority constantly divides us from ourselves, splits us in
two: a splitting in two which never runs its course, since time
has no end. A giddiness, an oscillation which constitutes time.
Anyway, that's the end of all the quotes. I would hope this would
help in explaining to your friend how spatial terms get applied in
Deleuze's analysis of time, especially in the past-present-future
triad. For me, at least, the most important points of the analysis
of time is (1) through internalization of the 'production of time'
the subject becomes split; (2) the analysis makes no sense unless
it's tied to Deleuze's reading of the eternal return, as that which
is presupposed by the first two syntheses of time (DIFFERENCE AND
REPETITION again), which defines time as neither chronological nor
linear but 'untimely', and the subject as necessarily differing
from itself. There are also parts in DIFFERENCE AND REPETITION
where Deleuze says that the presentation of the past-present-future
triad is merely preliminary for describing a more profound
'groundless ground', which is time as the untimely (i.e., page 91:
"The form of time [the triad] is there only for the revelation of
the formless in the eternal return. The extreme formality is there
only for an excessive formlessness...In this manner, the ground has
been superseded by a groundlessness, a universal ungrounding which
turns upon itself and causes only the yet-to-come to return.")
You might also try to push the point that Deleuze uses alot of
terms that (at least in translation) appear somewhat deceptive.
For example, he continually writes about 'immediate presentations',
but of course presentations are already repetitions
(representations rest upon 'prior' 'presentations' which are not
originals but instead are repetitions). And of course, Deleuze's
understandings of 'depth' and 'distance' between singular points
must not be understood in terms of their spatial dictionary
definitions either (any more than, say, Derrida's differance is a
simple combination of the dictionary definitions of differing and
deferring, but represents rather something that provides the
conditions of possibility for space and time as the dictionary
defines them). These terms are used to describe 'difference in
itself', reached through what Deleuze himself refers to as a
transcendental exercise, so it's a little innane to treat these
terms as simply empirical.
Hope these suggestions and quotes are helpful.
Nathan
widder@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
------------------
I always find myself returning to the Preface to the English
edition of KANT'S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY when trying to figure out
Deleuze's theory of time (which, I agree, is not easy). Although
some of it is basically the same as passages in DIFFERENCE AND
REPETITION, I find it easier to follow. Anyway, allow me to quote
at length from the first few pages before going adding some of my
own thoughts:
Cardo, in Latin, designates the subordination of time to the
cardinal points through which the periodical movements that it
measures pass. As long as time remains on its hinges, it is
subordinate to movement: it is the measure of movement, interval
or number...But time out of joint signifies the reversal of the
movement-time relationship. It is now movement which is
subordinate to time [which, I think, ties into the spatial terms
used by Deleuze to describe time]...
Everything changes, including movement...Time is no longer related
to the movement which it measures, but movement is related to the
time which conditions it...Time is no longer defined by succession
because succession concerns only things and movements which are in
time. If time itself were succession, it would need to succeed in
another time, and on to infinity. Things succeed each other in
various times, but they are also simultaneous in the same time, and
they remain in an indefinite time [you can see here how time
becomes in a sense 'multi-dimensional']...
Everything which moves and changes is in time, but time itself does
not change, does not move, any more than it is eternal. It is the
form of everything that changes and moves, but it is an immutable
Form which does not change. It is not an eternal form, but in fact
the form of that which is not eternal, the immutable form of change
and movement...
Kant explains that the Ego itself is in time, and thus constantly
changing...But, on the other hand, the I is an act which constantly
carries out a synthesis of time, and of that which happens in time,
by dividing up the present, the past and the future at every
instant. The I and the Ego are thus separated by the line of time
which relates them to each other, but under the condition of a
fundamental difference...I am separated from myself by the form of
time, and nevertheless I am one, because the I necessarily affects
this form by carrying out its synthesis and because the Ego is
necessarily affected as content in this form...
Thus time moves into the subject in order to distinguish the Ego
from the I in it. It is the form under which the I affects the
ego, that is, the way in which the mind affects itself...'Form of
interiority' means not only that time is internal to us, but that
our interiority constantly divides us from ourselves, splits us in
two: a splitting in two which never runs its course, since time
has no end. A giddiness, an oscillation which constitutes time.
Anyway, that's the end of all the quotes. I would hope this would
help in explaining to your friend how spatial terms get applied in
Deleuze's analysis of time, especially in the past-present-future
triad. For me, at least, the most important points of the analysis
of time is (1) through internalization of the 'production of time'
the subject becomes split; (2) the analysis makes no sense unless
it's tied to Deleuze's reading of the eternal return, as that which
is presupposed by the first two syntheses of time (DIFFERENCE AND
REPETITION again), which defines time as neither chronological nor
linear but 'untimely', and the subject as necessarily differing
from itself. There are also parts in DIFFERENCE AND REPETITION
where Deleuze says that the presentation of the past-present-future
triad is merely preliminary for describing a more profound
'groundless ground', which is time as the untimely (i.e., page 91:
"The form of time [the triad] is there only for the revelation of
the formless in the eternal return. The extreme formality is there
only for an excessive formlessness...In this manner, the ground has
been superseded by a groundlessness, a universal ungrounding which
turns upon itself and causes only the yet-to-come to return.")
You might also try to push the point that Deleuze uses alot of
terms that (at least in translation) appear somewhat deceptive.
For example, he continually writes about 'immediate presentations',
but of course presentations are already repetitions
(representations rest upon 'prior' 'presentations' which are not
originals but instead are repetitions). And of course, Deleuze's
understandings of 'depth' and 'distance' between singular points
must not be understood in terms of their spatial dictionary
definitions either (any more than, say, Derrida's differance is a
simple combination of the dictionary definitions of differing and
deferring, but represents rather something that provides the
conditions of possibility for space and time as the dictionary
defines them). These terms are used to describe 'difference in
itself', reached through what Deleuze himself refers to as a
transcendental exercise, so it's a little innane to treat these
terms as simply empirical.
Hope these suggestions and quotes are helpful.
Nathan
widder@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
------------------